在中國(guó)，可以肯定的是“世事無(wú)絕對(duì)”，變化時(shí)常在發(fā)生，而且有時(shí)候速度飛快。
以上規(guī)則是否適用于目前在中國(guó)智能手機(jī)市場(chǎng)占據(jù)強(qiáng)勢(shì)地位的 Android 仍有待觀察，然而如果中國(guó)工信部(China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology)旗下研究單位最近發(fā)表的一份報(bào)告代表任何征兆，顯然中國(guó)政府有關(guān)當(dāng)局對(duì)該國(guó)電子產(chǎn)業(yè)越來(lái)越依賴由 Google 控制的 Android 操作系統(tǒng)之情況深感憂慮。
根據(jù)路透社(Reuters)報(bào)導(dǎo)，中國(guó)工信部在3月初上網(wǎng)的一份《移動(dòng)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)白皮書（2013年）》內(nèi)容指出：“我國(guó)移動(dòng)操作系統(tǒng)的研發(fā)太依賴 Android 。”所以重點(diǎn)是——該報(bào)告寫道：“雖然Android是開放源碼操作系統(tǒng)，但其核心技術(shù)與發(fā)展藍(lán)圖受 Google 嚴(yán)密控制?！?
2012年，中國(guó)已超過(guò)美國(guó)成為全球最大的智能手機(jī)市場(chǎng)。同時(shí)，在國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)，早在2012年上半年，國(guó)產(chǎn)智能手機(jī)市場(chǎng)份額就已超過(guò)國(guó)外品牌。
但國(guó)內(nèi)自主手機(jī)操作系統(tǒng)卻沒有立錐之地。《白皮書》稱，2009年，Symbian系統(tǒng)仍占據(jù)中國(guó)移動(dòng)操作系統(tǒng)市場(chǎng)全年出貨量的74.7%，而隨著Android系統(tǒng)以開源、免費(fèi)吸引中國(guó)企業(yè)大規(guī)模進(jìn)入智能終端領(lǐng)域，迅速成長(zhǎng)為市場(chǎng)主導(dǎo)力量。至2012年底，Android已占到增量市場(chǎng)的86.4%，其他系統(tǒng)中，Symbian僅余2％，蘋果iOS占8.6%，Windows占1.2%，而國(guó)內(nèi)自主操作系統(tǒng)普遍未超過(guò)1%。
中國(guó)市場(chǎng)各手機(jī)操作系統(tǒng)占有率
Source：中國(guó)工信部Jxeesmc
該報(bào)告進(jìn)一步斷言，Google以延遲分享其程序代碼的手段歧視部分開發(fā)Android系統(tǒng)的中國(guó)廠商；此外還指出，Google 利用商業(yè)協(xié)議來(lái)約束那些廠商的移動(dòng)設(shè)備開發(fā)。
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相關(guān)閱讀：
• 艾媒咨詢：詳析2012年中國(guó)智能手機(jī)市場(chǎng)
• 手機(jī)IDH做品牌，艱難轉(zhuǎn)型之路
• 從四個(gè)方面分析中國(guó)手機(jī)市場(chǎng)發(fā)展趨勢(shì)Jxeesmc
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自主操作系統(tǒng)受制安卓
如今的中國(guó)已經(jīng)成為世界智能手機(jī)和平板電腦工廠，有人稱深圳的華強(qiáng)北每天的行情甚至可以左右全球智能手機(jī)市場(chǎng)的價(jià)格。
ChinaDroid，這是一個(gè)美國(guó)媒體中使用的新詞，特指“中華酷聯(lián)”等知名品牌之外，中國(guó)品牌和白牌的Android手機(jī)中使用的改良的Android系統(tǒng)。這些系統(tǒng)基于Android系統(tǒng)并對(duì)其進(jìn)行了“閹割”，在這些系統(tǒng)中完全摒棄了谷歌原生應(yīng)用和 服務(wù)，使用一些本地開發(fā)的應(yīng)用代替了谷歌原生應(yīng)用，比如Gmail、Maps和Chrome等，不僅避免了向谷歌交License費(fèi)用，還可以通過(guò)向開發(fā)者收取費(fèi)用賺錢。
但《白皮書》指出了目前ChinaDroid的問題所在：“我國(guó)移動(dòng)操作系統(tǒng)研發(fā)對(duì)Android存在嚴(yán)重路徑依賴。Android系統(tǒng)雖保持開源，但其核心技術(shù)和技術(shù)路線受到谷歌公司的嚴(yán)格控制，我國(guó)操作系統(tǒng)研發(fā)企業(yè)時(shí)刻面臨谷歌的商業(yè)歧視，如延遲代碼共享時(shí)間、通過(guò)商業(yè)協(xié)議制約終端企業(yè)等?！?
據(jù)媒體報(bào)道，2012年9月13日，宏碁和阿里巴巴本打算聯(lián)合發(fā)布一款搭載阿里云操作系統(tǒng)的智能手機(jī)。不過(guò)，該發(fā)布會(huì)在正式開始前一小時(shí)意外取消。阿里巴巴方面當(dāng)天發(fā)布聲明稱，發(fā)布會(huì)取消是因?yàn)楣雀杞o宏碁施加壓力。谷歌方面則發(fā)聲明譴責(zé)阿里云“分裂了安卓開放手機(jī)聯(lián)盟”，并對(duì)安卓應(yīng)用APP盜版。至此，阿里云系統(tǒng)被谷歌封殺。
Jxeesmc
《白皮書》認(rèn)為，谷歌和蘋果龐大的生態(tài)系統(tǒng)對(duì)后進(jìn)入者形成的強(qiáng)大阻礙，智能手機(jī)主要核心技術(shù)及專利仍被歐美廠商控制、未形成有效的專利體系是我國(guó)移動(dòng)操作系統(tǒng)面臨的問題。
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• 艾媒咨詢：詳析2012年中國(guó)智能手機(jī)市場(chǎng)
• 手機(jī)IDH做品牌，艱難轉(zhuǎn)型之路
• 從四個(gè)方面分析中國(guó)手機(jī)市場(chǎng)發(fā)展趨勢(shì)Jxeesmc
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雖然筆者對(duì)于中國(guó)政府可能打算“控管(regulate)”該國(guó)內(nèi)的Android之猜測(cè)存疑，我感覺得到中國(guó)工信部對(duì)該國(guó)產(chǎn)業(yè)的憂慮，是關(guān)于產(chǎn)業(yè)可能會(huì)失去自我命運(yùn)的掌控權(quán)。
身為一位日本電子產(chǎn)業(yè)界的長(zhǎng)期觀察者，我發(fā)現(xiàn)中國(guó)政府的說(shuō)法實(shí)在太熟悉，他們的思考邏輯是可以理解的──也許你還記得，在1980年代中期，日本曾經(jīng)積極推動(dòng)過(guò)的“TRON”實(shí)時(shí)操作系統(tǒng)核心開發(fā)計(jì)劃。
該 計(jì)劃是由日本東京大學(xué)教授Ken Sakamura所主導(dǎo)，獲得了日本政府的贊助，也幾乎獲得了所有日本電子產(chǎn)業(yè)大廠的支持。當(dāng)時(shí)的日本成功地在TRON計(jì)劃下開發(fā)出自有開放性及時(shí)作業(yè)系統(tǒng)核心，接著衍生出的 iTRON (Industrial TRON)也誕生，成為日本最成功的嵌入式操作系統(tǒng)，應(yīng)用范圍涵蓋手機(jī)、家電甚至汽車。
其實(shí)早在2004年，NEC就推出了基于TRON系統(tǒng)的智能手機(jī)Jxeesmc
當(dāng)時(shí)日本的目標(biāo)很明確，就是認(rèn)為一個(gè)國(guó)家需要有自己的操作系統(tǒng)，以創(chuàng)造并控制一個(gè)理想的計(jì)算機(jī)架構(gòu)與網(wǎng)絡(luò)。我承認(rèn)我其實(shí)對(duì) iTRON 的成功頗感驚訝，而我認(rèn)為中國(guó)應(yīng)該要注意一下后來(lái)日本所發(fā)生的事情。
日本開發(fā)TRON是為了反制大量來(lái)自美國(guó)的技術(shù)，但iTRON從未進(jìn)軍全球市場(chǎng)，也沒有日本廠商因?yàn)檠簩歩TRON而賺大錢；后來(lái)iTRON的結(jié)局是只被應(yīng)用在日本廠商制造、在日本市場(chǎng)銷售的產(chǎn)品。
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日本所學(xué)到的教訓(xùn)是，“防堵”策略或許在地緣政治上可行，但很少能在科技與商業(yè)領(lǐng)域奏效；技術(shù)的演進(jìn)以及科學(xué)的新發(fā)現(xiàn)是沒有國(guó)界之分的，日本隊(duì)專有技術(shù)的追求，只是讓日本電子產(chǎn)業(yè)趕不上那些海外開發(fā)操作系統(tǒng)(包括Windows、Symbian與Linux等)以及相關(guān)軟件應(yīng)用程序的進(jìn)度，也阻礙日本產(chǎn)品在海外市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展──特別是現(xiàn)在發(fā)展蓬勃的智能手機(jī)。
也許中國(guó)會(huì)認(rèn)為，國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)領(lǐng)土的大小將改變局勢(shì)；他們可能會(huì)說(shuō)，中國(guó)人并不會(huì)有什么損失，但是要前往中國(guó)市場(chǎng)的海外供貨商就得被迫取得中國(guó)自有技術(shù)的授權(quán)。這些說(shuō)法都不是第一次聽到，一些中國(guó)專有的技術(shù)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)都是例證，如中國(guó)自有3G標(biāo)準(zhǔn)TD-SCDMA。
但盡管如此，中國(guó)唯一支持該標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的移動(dòng)通訊業(yè)者中國(guó)移動(dòng)(China Mobile)，最后還是要求其下一代 LTE 手機(jī)不能只支持中國(guó)自有的TD-LTE，還要支持其它全球性的無(wú)線通訊標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。在這個(gè)無(wú)縫連結(jié)的世界，很難只有一個(gè)國(guó)家或是單一專有技術(shù)稱王。
編譯：Judith Cheng
本文授權(quán)編譯自EE Times，版權(quán)所有，謝絕轉(zhuǎn)載
參考英文原文：Yoshida in China: Beijing's misguided Android worry，by Junko Yoshida
相關(guān)閱讀：
• 艾媒咨詢：詳析2012年中國(guó)智能手機(jī)市場(chǎng)
• 手機(jī)IDH做品牌，艱難轉(zhuǎn)型之路
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Yoshida in China: Beijing's misguided Android worry
Junko Yoshida
China's government agency harbors deep uneasiness about its nation's industry becoming too dependent on Android operating system, controlled by Google. One thing for certain about China is that nothing is certain. Things change in China--sometimes very quickly.
It remains to be seen if this rule applies to Android’s current stronghold on the Chinese smartphone market. However, if a white paper recently posted by the research arm of China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology is any indication, it’s clear that China’s government agency harbors deep uneasiness about its nation’s industry becoming too dependent on Android operating system, controlled by Google.
According to a Reuters report, the Chinese ministry’s whitepaper, posted online last Friday (March 1), said, “Our country’s mobile operating system research and development is too dependent on Android.”
So, what’s the beef?
"While the Android system is open-source, the core technology and technology roadmap is strictly controlled by Google," the white paper said.
The paper further alleged that Google discriminated against some Chinese companies developing their operating systems by delaying the sharing of codes. Google also used commercial agreements to restrain the development of these companies’ mobile devices, it added.
Mobile OS market share in China
Source: China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
· While I remain skeptical of speculation that the Chinese ministry is signaling to “regulate” Android in China, I feel the agency’s concerns about Chinese industries losing control of their own destiny. As a veteran of the Japanese electronics industry in the 1980’s, I find the Chinese government’s rhetoric all too familiar. And their logic is understandable.
Consider Japan’s TRON project--if you can remember it.
Japan's TRON project
Led by University of Tokyo Professor Ken Sakamura in mid 1980’s, supported by the Japanese government, and embraced by practically all of the key players in the Japanese electronics industry, Japan, in a project called TRON, succeeded in developing its own indigenous open real-time operating system kernel. Subsequently, an Industrial TRON (iTRON) derivative was born, becoming one of the most successful operating systems in embedded systems such as cellphones, appliances and sometimes even in cars in Japan.
Japan’s goal then was clear. A nation needs its own operating system to create and control an ideal computer architecture and network.
While I admit that I’m amazed at the success of iTRON, I think that China should pay attention to what happened next in Japan.
Japan developed TRON to stem the onslaught of technologies coming from the United States. But iTRON never penetrated the global market, and no Japanese company saw significant gains by sticking their guns to iTRON. And iTron ended up getting used only in products made by Japanese companies for the Japanese market.
The hard lesson for Japan was that “containment” is a strategy that might work in geopolitics, but it rarely applies to technology and business fields. Advancements in technology and discoveries in science happen regardless of national borders.
Japan’s pursuit of proprietary technologies only helped Japanese electronics companies to delay their embrace of operating systems developed abroad (Windows, Symbian, Linux included) and associated software applications. It also held back Japanese product development for the overseas market – especially now in the burgeoning smartphone market.
China could argue that the sheer size of its domestic market will alter that picture.
They might say that it’s not the Chinese who will suffer, but overseas vendors coming to China who will be forced to license proprietary technologies from China.
We’ve all heard that argument before.
But again, name a Chinese technology that proves the Chinese technocrats’ argument. Ostensibly, TD-SCDMA, China’s alternative to W-CDMA, is a possible example. Perhaps. But in the end, even China Mobile, the only Chinese cellular network operator who embraced TD-SCDMA, ended up requiring their next-generation LTE handsets to be compatible with not just TD-LTE, but practically all flavors of global wireless standards.
In today’s well-connected global world, neither one country nor a single proprietary technology gets to be king of the world.
責(zé)編：Quentin
