誕生于1987年的華為(Huawei Technologies)從一家在中國(guó)農(nóng)村販賣電話交換機(jī)設(shè)備的經(jīng)銷商，搖身變成今日年?duì)I收達(dá)340億美元的全球電信設(shè)備大廠，其成功故事在中國(guó)商業(yè)界總被愛國(guó)主義者與欽羨者一再傳頌。
而在華為內(nèi)部，這家公司披荊斬棘的成長(zhǎng)之路讓員工大多抱持著“處于劣勢(shì)一方”的心態(tài)，驅(qū)使他們比任何人都努力向上。華為的工程師通常被競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手形容為“狼群”，堅(jiān)持著想證明全世界看錯(cuò)了他們──該公司的員工普遍認(rèn)為華為被西方世界否定、甚至是被那些對(duì)中國(guó)有偏見的人誤解；華為就是在這種逆境之中茁壯成長(zhǎng)。
現(xiàn)在，這家電信設(shè)備業(yè)者開始經(jīng)營(yíng)自有品牌，想在移動(dòng)設(shè)備(智能手機(jī)與平板電腦)市場(chǎng)與三星(Samsung)、蘋果(Apple)一較高下，在企業(yè)應(yīng)用市場(chǎng)則是與Cisco、Juniper、IBM、Oracle等互別苗頭；華為積極想要實(shí)現(xiàn)看來不可能實(shí)現(xiàn)的夢(mèng)想。
華為旗下華為終端(Huawei Device)首席營(yíng)銷官邵洋(Shao Yang)自1990年代末期至2000年初是負(fù)責(zé)蜂窩式基頻設(shè)備業(yè)務(wù)；他表示，華為所有員工──包括他自己──對(duì)于公司是如何艱辛地取得今日成就的集體記憶，將有助華為終端取得最后成功。不過邵洋要將華為品牌智能手機(jī)推上全球市場(chǎng)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位的任務(wù)，還有一段路要走。
華為旗下華為終端(Huawei Device)首席營(yíng)銷官邵洋(Shao Yang)
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根據(jù)市場(chǎng)研究機(jī)構(gòu) IHS iSuppli 的統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)，華為在 2012年是排名全球第六大的智能手機(jī)供貨商，前面還有Blackberry、諾基亞(Nokia)、中興(ZTE)，以及領(lǐng)先更多的三星與蘋果；IHS估計(jì)，華為2012年全球市占率約4%左右。
另一家市場(chǎng)研究機(jī)構(gòu) IDC 的統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)則顯示，華為2012年第四季的全球手機(jī)出貨量為1,080萬支，在當(dāng)季躍居為全球第三大智能手機(jī)供貨商，超越LG與HTC，首度擠進(jìn)全球前五大智能手機(jī)供貨商排行榜之列。不過邵洋對(duì)此仍以謙卑的態(tài)度表示：“我們距離三星與蘋果還很遠(yuǎn)，而且這只是2012年第四季單季的數(shù)據(jù)?！?
全球智能機(jī)出貨量排名
Source：IDCAP2esmc
當(dāng)然，邵洋坦承，想在市場(chǎng)上勝出是一回事，最難的是如何達(dá)到目標(biāo)：“因?yàn)楦?jìng)爭(zhēng)已經(jīng)很激烈?！蹦敲矗A為的戰(zhàn)略是什么？
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對(duì)于華為來說，面臨苦戰(zhàn)是家常便飯；邵洋表示，他在1990年代加入華為時(shí)，有“七座山”橫在面前，包括愛立信(Ericsson)、諾基亞、Lucent、Alcatel、Nortel等等，當(dāng)時(shí)的華為在全球市場(chǎng)知名度非常小。
邵洋當(dāng)時(shí)在華為的研發(fā)部門，是該公司首套商用GSM設(shè)備的設(shè)計(jì)團(tuán)隊(duì)成員，該產(chǎn)品在1998年問世。他表示，該產(chǎn)品真的不怎么樣，與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手產(chǎn)品難以匹敵，無論如何，華為還是向蜂窩式設(shè)備業(yè)務(wù)跨出腳步，雖然銷售對(duì)象并非富裕的市場(chǎng)，而是中國(guó)西北的草原。
“人們那時(shí)候形容我們賣的是‘馬背上的GSM’，”邵洋回憶：“我們是用直升機(jī)來運(yùn)輸GSM設(shè)備，再用馬匹將機(jī)器載到安裝地點(diǎn)?！痹?998~2000年間，華為的學(xué)習(xí)曲線呈現(xiàn)往上攀升的趨勢(shì)，他表示：“我們?nèi)找岳^夜地工作，而且真的趕上了同業(yè)的腳步。”
華為的第一次突破是獲得了荷蘭第四大網(wǎng)絡(luò)營(yíng)運(yùn)商的青睞，該公司當(dāng)時(shí)為了第一個(gè)3G網(wǎng)絡(luò)的布署尋找較小型的GSM設(shè)備，但諾基亞卻要他們等18個(gè)月，因此這家積極搶占市場(chǎng)商機(jī)的荷蘭業(yè)者找上了華為；邵洋指出：“我們派出20位最優(yōu)秀的工程師，為那家荷蘭業(yè)者設(shè)計(jì)新型GSM設(shè)備，那套設(shè)備有一部分可安裝在戶外， 一部分則放置在室內(nèi)?！?
來自荷蘭的客戶為華為開啟一扇前往西方世界的大門，但邵洋表示：“我們根本沒時(shí)間慶祝?！币?yàn)椴坏揭?年，荷蘭最大電信業(yè)者KPN收購(gòu)了那家華為的客戶，也讓華為丟掉了唯一來自歐洲的訂單。華為的第二次機(jī)會(huì)來自于Vodafone Spain的訂單，該公司藉此機(jī)會(huì)改善了3G基地臺(tái)設(shè)備的性能與功耗，得以與愛立信、諾基亞等對(duì)手比肩。
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不過華為歷史上的真 正突破，是直到開發(fā)自家SingleRAN技術(shù)才開始；SingleRAN是一種能讓行動(dòng)通訊業(yè)者在GSM與UMT網(wǎng)絡(luò)之間切換、或是同時(shí)使用這兩種標(biāo)準(zhǔn) 的無線接取網(wǎng)絡(luò)(adio access network，RAN)；該技術(shù)需要開發(fā)軟件定義無線裝置以及一套硬件零組件，讓網(wǎng)絡(luò)營(yíng)運(yùn)商得以采購(gòu)、運(yùn)作并維護(hù)單一電信網(wǎng)絡(luò)與配套設(shè)備，同時(shí)能支持多種移動(dòng)通訊標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。
邵洋仍記得，在某個(gè)周六，他與華為的一群同事在深圳登山踏青，當(dāng)時(shí)華為終端的現(xiàn)任CEO余承東(Richard Yu)也在，一群同事：“邊爬山邊熱烈討論我們是否應(yīng)該開發(fā)SingleRAN?！钡?dāng)時(shí)幾乎所有爬山成員與他們?cè)谏缴贤高^電話聯(lián)絡(luò)的人，都否定該想法。
技術(shù)門檻、無法預(yù)期的產(chǎn)品延遲以及成本，是大伙兒反對(duì)開發(fā)SingleRAN的主要理由；”總之風(fēng)險(xiǎn)實(shí)在太大?！鄙垩蟊硎?，不過當(dāng)時(shí)余承東一邊爬山還是一邊堅(jiān)持應(yīng)該要做：”如果我們不做，就永遠(yuǎn)無法打敗愛立信?！?
華為的SingleRAN取得成功，也讓這家中國(guó)電信設(shè)備業(yè)者得以快速成長(zhǎng)；根據(jù)IDC今年稍早的預(yù)測(cè)，華為可望在 2013年取代愛立信躍居有線/無線通訊設(shè)備市場(chǎng)龍頭，愛立信與華為自2010年至2012年一直是全球電信市場(chǎng)的前兩大廠商(以營(yíng)收計(jì))。
華為簡(jiǎn)介
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由電信設(shè)備市場(chǎng)跨足手機(jī)終端市場(chǎng)
今日的華為在電信設(shè)備市場(chǎng)已經(jīng)翻越過1996年時(shí)還橫在眼前的七座高山，現(xiàn)在則是將目光聚焦到終端設(shè)備市場(chǎng)；華為是在2003年涉足終端業(yè)務(wù)，當(dāng)時(shí)3G技術(shù)剛起飛，電信營(yíng)運(yùn)商缺乏3G終端設(shè)備，也讓華為在2011年以低階手機(jī)ODM身分進(jìn)軍3G手機(jī)市場(chǎng)。
在2011年，拜蘋果大受市場(chǎng)歡迎的 iPhone 之賜，手機(jī)市場(chǎng)出現(xiàn)劇烈變化；不過紹洋也表示，電信營(yíng)運(yùn)商很快地對(duì)蘋果的強(qiáng)勢(shì)感到厭倦，有部分業(yè)者因此故意提供用戶三星Galaxy 2更多價(jià)格上的優(yōu)惠，以對(duì)抗蘋果。
有 部分電信營(yíng)運(yùn)商也找上華為，并警告該公司需要有所改變；他們慫恿華為將手機(jī)產(chǎn)品提升至高階，并由ODM轉(zhuǎn)型為OEM。于是在2012年，邵洋成為華為終端 的首席營(yíng)銷官，并將公司轉(zhuǎn)型做了180度的大轉(zhuǎn)變：“一旦我們決定經(jīng)營(yíng)品牌業(yè)務(wù)，我們就得全力以赴，這是一件正確的事?！币虼巳A為砸下重金，將大部分的手機(jī)設(shè) 計(jì)資源轉(zhuǎn)向開發(fā)自有品牌智能手機(jī)。
但是華為也在短時(shí)間之內(nèi)為此付出代價(jià)──那些未預(yù)期華為策略轉(zhuǎn)變?nèi)绱丝焖俚碾娦艩I(yíng)運(yùn)商客戶出現(xiàn)了抱怨；邵洋表示，華為的ODM業(yè)務(wù)在2011年有14家營(yíng)運(yùn)商客戶，大多數(shù)在歐洲，但到了2012上半年，那些客戶因?yàn)槿A為策略的轉(zhuǎn)變而紛紛轉(zhuǎn)身 離去，只剩Vodafone Italy還繼續(xù)與華為終端合作。
在2012下半年，華為終端推出了Ascend P1與Ascend D1兩款讓產(chǎn)業(yè)界印象深刻的智能手機(jī)；一開始大多數(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)觀察家都不看好華為的手機(jī)品牌，大多數(shù)消費(fèi)者也沒聽過華為－－特別是尊重品牌的法國(guó)等市場(chǎng)，但華為大膽地透過亞馬遜(Amazon)銷售Ascend系列產(chǎn)品，很快地成為市場(chǎng)上前三大暢銷品牌，也吸引了電信營(yíng)運(yùn)商的注意。
邵洋自豪地表示：“在2013上半年，我們?cè)谌蛴谐^14家電信營(yíng)運(yùn)商采用華為品牌手機(jī)?！彪m然今日華為終端對(duì)整個(gè)華為集團(tuán)營(yíng)收的貢獻(xiàn)度僅20%，其它四 分之三營(yíng)收還是來自于電信設(shè)備業(yè)務(wù)，但這個(gè)新創(chuàng)事業(yè)在2012年的整體營(yíng)收已經(jīng)達(dá)到80億美元，預(yù)測(cè)今年可進(jìn)一步成長(zhǎng)至90億美元，其30%手機(jī)業(yè)務(wù)在中 國(guó)，日本、歐洲市場(chǎng)各有約10%左右。
IHS iSuppli資深分析師Wayne Lam表示：“華為在過去幾年非常積極打造智能手機(jī)系列產(chǎn)品，雖然目前仍稍微落后同業(yè)中興，但預(yù)測(cè)在接下來幾年其整體手機(jī)出貨量將超越中興，并因?yàn)榫邆涫謾C(jī)核心芯片組件的垂直整合能力，在智能手機(jī)市場(chǎng)取得更快的成長(zhǎng)速度?！?
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掌握芯片設(shè)計(jì)能力
華為旗下的芯片設(shè)計(jì)公司海思(HiSilicon) 在2004年成立，華為最新的Ascend P2智能手機(jī)、也是第一款支持Cat4 LTE的產(chǎn)品，就是采用海思的LTE基頻芯片；據(jù)IHS的Lam表示：“華為在很多方面追隨三星的腳步，包括手機(jī)零組件技術(shù)的重直整合，以及砸重金行銷自 家品牌。”但采用海思芯片的智能手機(jī)對(duì)華為來說還是很新的嘗試。
去年推出的Ascend D1是采用海思的應(yīng)用處理器芯片(1.4GHz四核心K3V2應(yīng)用處理器整合16核心GPU)與基頻芯片；但Lam表示：“到目前為止，采用海思基頻芯片 的Ascend D1尚未獲得電信業(yè)者的青睞?！盇scend P2是華為第二次采用海思應(yīng)用處理器/基頻解決方案，也還沒宣布任何一家電信業(yè)伙伴。
Lam表示：“整體看來，海思的命運(yùn)是與華為高階智能手機(jī)Ascend系列綁在一起，因?yàn)楹Ｋ甲约议_發(fā)的應(yīng)用處理器是為華為智能手機(jī)量身打造?！?
不過邵洋表示，站在華為的立場(chǎng)，有海思這樣一個(gè)伙伴，能讓華為終端的設(shè)計(jì)工程師更方便與芯片設(shè)計(jì)工程師溝通；他指出，華為終端還是采取多家芯片供貨商策略(也采用Qualcomm芯片)，有海思也有助于華為與其它芯片供應(yīng)來源的協(xié)商。
在 被問到華為終端的智能手機(jī)發(fā)展策略時(shí)，邵洋表示該公司在2013年與2014年的目標(biāo)是專注于增強(qiáng)智能手機(jī)硬件能力：“我們將智能手機(jī)是為一種‘超級(jí)工具組’?！逼涫滓蝿?wù)是在攝影機(jī)、MP3與電話功能方面做到差異化；而到2015年之后，華為的智能手機(jī)發(fā)展焦點(diǎn)將會(huì)有較多轉(zhuǎn)向軟件。
本文授權(quán)編譯自EE Times，版權(quán)所有，謝絕轉(zhuǎn)載
編譯：Judith Cheng
參考英文原文：Huawei, world’s biggest underdog，by Junko Yoshida
相關(guān)閱讀：
• 歐洲市場(chǎng)復(fù)蘇，華為擬增招5500人
• 華為2012年凈利潤(rùn)154億元，研發(fā)支出301億元
• 獨(dú)家報(bào)道：中國(guó)正通過品牌產(chǎn)品戰(zhàn)略崛起AP2esmc
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Huawei, world’s biggest underdog
Junko Yoshida
The ascent of Huawei -- from a reseller of commodity PBX equipment in rural China to a global telecom equipment behemoth with $34 billion revenue today -- is a story told and retold in China.
SHENZHEN – The ascent of Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. -- from a reseller of commodity PBX equipment in rural China when founded in 1987 to a global telecom equipment behemoth with $34 billion revenue today -- is a story told and retold by both the patriotic and the envious in the Chinese business world.
Within Huawei, its “against-all-odds” heritage fuels employees with an “underdog” mentality, driving them to work even harder. Huawei engineers, often described by rivals as “a pack of wolves,” are perpetually determined to prove the world wrong about them (even when the world says they’re right).
Its workers tend to believe that Huawei is a great company underestimated by the West, and worse, misunderstood by those whose worldview is prejudiced against China. And Huawei thrives on this perceived adversity.
Now that the telecom equipment giant is entering new markets such has its own “branded mobile devices” (smartphones and tablets) à la Samsung and Apple, and “enterprise business” (storage, servers, VPN, networking, transactions, etc.) à la Cisco, Juniper, IBM and Oracle, Huawei’s “dream the impossible dream” cliché becomes even more essential.
Shao Yang, chief marketing officer of Huawei Device, cut his teeth in the cellular baseband equipment business from the late 1990s to the early 2000s. He explains that helping Huawei Device achieve its eventual success will emerge from employees’ collective memory -- including his own -- of how Huawei reached the heights it occupies today.
Shao Yang, CMO at Huawei Device
However, Yang’s mission -- to dominate the global market with Huawei branded smartphones -- is still a work in progress.
According to IHS iSuppli, Huawei closed out 2012 in 6th place among smartphone manufacturers, just behind Blackberry, Nokia and ZTE. The others way ahead of Huawei are obviously Samsung and Apple. IHS believes that overall Huawei commanded a little over 4% of the market in 2012.
Meanwhile, the market research firm IDC’s recent data shows that in the fourth quarter of 2012, Huawei, which shipped 10.8 million handsets worldwide, came in the third among smartphone vendors. The fourth quarter of 2012 marked the first time Huawei has ever cracked the top five in global rankings, displacing both LG and HTC, according to IDC.
Remaining humble, Yang pointed out, “There’s still a big gap between us and Samsung/Apple, and that was only one fourth quarter in 2012.”
Of course, having the will to win the market is one thing. Harder is to actually achieve the goal, acknowledged Yang, “because the competition is already there.”
So what’s Huawei’s game plan?
Uphill battle
Facing an uphill battle is nothing new to Huawei. When Yang joined Huawei in the mid-1990’s, “We saw ‘seven mountains’ standing in front of us,” he said. Those included Ericsson, Nokia, Lucent, Alcatel, Nortel and others. Huawei was still largely unknown to the world.
Working at Huawei’s R&D division, Yang was a part of a team who designed Huawei’s first commercial GSM equipment, launched in 1998. He acknowledged that it was “a poor design,” not in the same league with its rivals. Nonetheless, Huawei went about selling the equipment “not in the rich market,” but in “the grasslands of northwest China,” said Yang. “People used to describe it as ‘GSM on horseback.’ We transported our GSM equipment by a helicopter and then we had to carry it on horses to where it needed to be installed.”
In the period between 1998 and 2000, Huawei’s learning curve trended up. “We worked day and night,” said Yang, “and really learned to catch up with the industry.”
Huawei’s first break came when the then number-four network operator in the Netherlands came knocking. This operator, looking for smaller GSM equipment for their first 3G network deployment, was told by Nokia that they’d have to wait 18 months. The Dutch operator turned to Huawei, which was eager for an opportunity in the Western market. “We sent 20 of our best engineers to the Dutch operator, and we designed a new type of GSM equipment. Part the equipment can be installed outside, while another part stays inside.”
Working with the Dutch, Huawei got its foot in the door in the West. But “we had no time to celebrate,” said Yang. Within less than a year, “bad news came. The Netherland’s largest operator, KPN, bought the number four operator we’d been working with.” The acquisition effectively left Huawei with no commercial contracts in Europe.
A second chance developed with a contract with Vodafone Spain. Huawei used this opportunity to improve the performance and power consumption of its 3G base station equipment, reaching par with Ericsson and Nokia.
But Huawei’s real breakthrough didn’t come until it decided to develop its SingleRAN technology. The goal of SingleRAN was to design a radio access network (RAN) technology allowing mobile operators to switch from GSM to UMTS network standards or use both simultaneously.
The technology required development of a software-defined radio device and a consolidated set of hardware components that would allow operators to purchase, operate and maintain a single telecommunications network and set of equipment, while supporting multiple mobile communications standards.
Yang still remembers a Saturday in Shenzhen, when he was climbing a mountain with his Huawei colleagues. The group included Richard Yu who later became the current CEO of Huawei Device. “While climbing, we heatedly debated whether we should work on the development of SingleRAN.” Pretty much everyone in the group, and others they reached via cellphone from the mountain, was against the idea. Technical challenges, anticipated product delays and costs were the main reasons most of the team shied away from the idea. “There were just too many risks,” recalled Yang. Then, while still climbing the mountain, Yu uttered a four-letter word and exclaimed, “We’ve got to do this,” according to Yang.
“If we don’t make this, we can never beat Ericsson,” said Yu.
Shifting focus to Huawei Device
The success of Huawei’s SingleRAN launched the unlisted Chinese telecom gear company into a rapid growth trajectory. Earlier this year, IDC predicted that Huawei is poised to become the market leader in wireline and wireless equipment segment in 2013, overtaking Ericsson. Ericsson and Huawei continue to be the overall global telecom product revenue leaders from 2010 through 2012.
Now that Huawei has pretty much conquered the seven mountains it confronted 1996, the company is shifting focus to Huawei Device. It’s bringing to the division its best and brightest -- including Yu and Yang, leaders of Huawei’s telecom gear business.
Huawei initially got into the terminal business in 2003, when 3G networks were emerging. Operators who were suffering from the lack of 3G terminals to support their network urged Huawei to get into the 3G phone market, in which it served as a low-end handset ODM until 2011.
By 2011, however, the industry trend was clearly shifting, thanks to Apple’s hugely popular iPhone. But operators were quickly wearying of Apple’s arrogance, according to Yang. Some operators deliberately gave Samsung’s Galaxy 2 a break in pricing to subscribers, as leverage against Apple, explained Yang.
Operators also turned to Huawei, but warned, “Huawei, you need to change.” They urged the Chinese company to shift its product line to high-end phones and change its business from ODM to OEM. In 2012, Yang became CMO of Huawei Device, and made the 180-degree turn to OEM. Yang said, “Once we decided to go for our branded OEM business, we had to stick with it. This was the right thing to do.” So, Huawei went whole hog, switching most of its handset design resources to developing branded smartphones.
In the short term, Huawei paid a price. Operators who hadn’t expected Huawei to change so quickly complained. According to Yang, in 2011, Huawei’s ODM business was serving 14 operators -- many based in Europe. In contrast, in the first half of 2012, operators -- turned off by Huawei’s sudden switch in strategy -- shunned Huawei. Only Vodafone Italy signed up to work with Huawei Device.
By the second half of 2012, however, Huawei’s Ascend P1 (introduced at the Consumer Electronics that year) and Ascend D1 were beginning to make an impression on the industry.
Most industry observers initially predicted that Huawei’s mobile handsets won’t stand a chance. Most consumers had never heard of Huawei, and -- especially in markets like France -- people have high respect for brands. Yang, undeterred, started selling Ascend series phones online through Amazon. Huawei quickly became one of the top three brands and started to get operators’ notice.
Yang proudly reported, “In the first half of 2013, we have more than 14 operators using Huawei’s branded phones.”
Smartphone global shipment ranking
source: IDC
Today, Huawei Device contributes only 20 percent of Huawei’s revenue, three-quarters of revenue comes from Huawei’s carrier business group. But, even though it’s still a startup, Huawei Device generated almost $8 billion revenue 2012 with projections of $9 billion this year. Thirty percent of its handset business originates in China, with Europe and Japan at about 10 percent each, according to Yang.
Wayne Lam, senior analyst at IHS iSuppli, said, “Huawei has been very aggressive building up their smartphone portfolio in the past few years. It still trails behind its compatriot ZTE but we predict that Huawei will overtake ZTE in the next few years in sheer handset volume and likely faster in smartphones due to their vertical integration of core silicon components.”
HiSilicon and Huawei Device
So then, how’s HiSilicon -- Huawei’s chip division, founded in 2004 -- working out?
Huawei’s recent Ascend P2 was featured as the first production Cat4 LTE smartphone using HiSilicon’s LTE baseband, said IHS’ Lam. “In many ways, Huawei is following Samsung's formula for growth by going vertical with their handset componentry and putting lots of marketing dollars promoting their brand.”
However, HiSilicon-enabled smartphones are still very new for Huawei, Lam added.
Last year's Ascend D1 was announced with HiSilicon apps processor (1.4 GHz quad-core K3V2 apps processor integrated with 16-core GPU) and baseband. “But to date, no carrier has taken the Ascend D1 with the HiSilicon LTE baseband yet,” noted Lam. The Ascend P2 is Huawei's second attempt at promoting a complete HiSilicon apps processor/baseband solution but it has yet to announce a carrier partner.
“Overall, the fate of their HiSilicon division is tied to the fortunes of Huawei's high-end smartphone Ascend line since they are introducing their home-grown apps processor at that smartphone trim level,” said Lam. From Huawei’s standpoint, though, Yang noted that having HiSilicon as its partner makes it easier for Huawei Device designers to communicate with chip designers. Noting that Huawei Device has a multiple-vendor strategy (they also use Qualcomm), Yang added that having HiSilicon also eases negotiations with other chip suppliers.
Asked about Huawei Devices’ smartphone development strategy, Yang explained that Huawei is focused on beefing up its smartphone hardware in 2013 and 2014. “We see smartphones as a super tool kit,” said Yang. The first order of business for Huawei is to make differentiating improvements in functions such as camera, MP3 and phone, he added.
Huawei’s smartphone focus will shift more to software in 2015, he added.
Huawei at a glance
責(zé)編：Quentin
