諾基亞(Nokia)沒救了嗎？不是的，你要說我天真或是拒絕承認(rèn)都沒關(guān)系，但我就是還沒準(zhǔn)備好接受一個只有三星(Samsung)與蘋果(Apple)兩家品牌獨(dú)大的智能手機(jī)市場“新常態(tài)”。
看著那兩大品牌主導(dǎo)著半導(dǎo)體市場中唯一具備有意義成長率的領(lǐng)域，實(shí)在是太痛苦；它們排除了高通(Qualcomm)與三星以外、幾乎其它所有調(diào)制解調(diào)器芯片以及應(yīng)用處理器供貨商。而我想不只是我一個人有這樣的感覺。
別誤會，我不是要在這里呼吁誰出手拯救諾基亞；這家公司會走到今天這個地步，完全是自作自受?；仡欉^去，諾基亞的管理高層冠冕堂皇地在以下三件事情上搞砸了：
1. 執(zhí)著于Symbian太長時間；
2. 輸了在中國市場上的戰(zhàn)爭；
3. 沒有選擇在自家智能手機(jī)上采用Android操作系統(tǒng)。
有許多產(chǎn)業(yè)專家將諾基亞的失敗歸咎于該公司太晚掌握智能手機(jī)熱潮，認(rèn)為該公司在智能手機(jī)領(lǐng)域缺乏表現(xiàn)，是失敗的主因；但我不同意這種說法。
在智能手機(jī)變成市場主流之前，諾基亞對功能手機(jī)市場的掌控能力已經(jīng)開始動搖，該公司在花費(fèi)大量工程資源針對全球市場推出一系列功能手機(jī)的同時，很遺憾地錯失了兩個關(guān)鍵商機(jī)：其一是雙卡雙待手機(jī)，其二是在中國推廣Symbian手機(jī)。
所謂的雙卡雙待手機(jī)就是能同時放進(jìn)兩張SIM卡的機(jī)種，諾基亞花了幾乎十年的時間才趕上這個潮流；支持雙插卡基本上就是讓終端用戶能不必攜帶兩支手機(jī)、就能同時使用兩個門號，讓消費(fèi)者能針對不同特定應(yīng)用目的選擇不同的服務(wù)供應(yīng)商或通話、短信、移動上網(wǎng)月租方案。
諾基亞姍姍來遲的雙卡雙待手機(jī)系列
Source:Nokia.com0Xlesmc
諾基亞與移動通信業(yè)者的關(guān)系緊密，卻讓該公司失去洞察力；該公司對大型移動通信業(yè)者的忠誠放錯了地方，以至于沒搭上雙卡雙待手機(jī)的熱潮──因?yàn)槟切┩ㄐ欧?wù)業(yè)者當(dāng)然都希望消費(fèi)者只采用他們的網(wǎng)絡(luò)。
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本文下一頁：不在中國推Symbian手機(jī)，錯失商機(jī)
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• 諾基亞很滿意：芬蘭總部大樓賣了2.23億美元
• 2013年智能手機(jī)市場Top 10排名將大幅變動0Xlesmc
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至于沒能在中國市場大力推廣Symbian手機(jī)，也是諾基亞錯失的另一個商機(jī)；據(jù)了解，在Android平臺席卷全球之前，中國手機(jī)業(yè)者曾經(jīng)有一度對Symbian平臺有大量需求，但Symbian (也就是Nokia)對這個平臺的開放與否實(shí)在太晚決定、開放程度也太低。
而在中國手機(jī)業(yè)者可能接受Symbian的那時候，其實(shí)Symbian內(nèi)部已經(jīng)沒有足夠的工程人才，能將該平臺大力推進(jìn)中國智能手機(jī)產(chǎn)業(yè)生態(tài)系統(tǒng)；后來Symbian剩下的一些人也被Accenture所收購。
除了錯過以上兩個商機(jī)，諾基亞決定在智能手機(jī)產(chǎn)品與微軟(Microsoft)結(jié)盟的策略，也大失人心。但諾基亞真正的罪過不在于與微軟聯(lián)手，而是該公司一直頑固地不愿承認(rèn)Android平臺之崛起。
諾基亞與微軟之間這種詭異的牢固“友誼”讓很多人不解
0Xlesmc
雖然產(chǎn)業(yè)觀察家明白微軟對諾基亞有很大影響力(在2010年取代諾基亞前任首席執(zhí)行官Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo的，就是挖角自微軟的Stephen Elop)，但他們可能無法理解諾基亞是如何忽視了Android。這看來像是諾基亞高層的蓄意舉動，就是要完全無視Android不可擋的潮流。
有一個來自手機(jī)芯片領(lǐng)導(dǎo)廠商的工程部門主管說：“我就是不懂為何諾基亞不開發(fā)Android手機(jī)──這明明可以跟微軟的Windows Phone手機(jī)并行?！?
本文授權(quán)編譯自EE Times，版權(quán)所有，謝絕轉(zhuǎn)載
本文下一頁：諾基亞會采用其它手機(jī)操作系統(tǒng)嗎？
相關(guān)閱讀：
• 回應(yīng)歐盟“傾銷說”：華為在芬蘭設(shè)立研發(fā)中心
• 諾基亞很滿意：芬蘭總部大樓賣了2.23億美元
• 2013年智能手機(jī)市場Top 10排名將大幅變動0Xlesmc
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諾基亞會采用其它手機(jī)操作系統(tǒng)嗎？
市場不斷有傳言指出，諾基亞會在入門或中階智能手機(jī)市場放棄采用微軟的Windows Phone平臺，尋找其它替代操作系統(tǒng)來生產(chǎn)中低階智能手機(jī)。
但 有報導(dǎo)引述匿名臺灣供應(yīng)鏈消息來源指出，諾基亞應(yīng)會在2013年繼續(xù)釋出Windows Phone 7.5手機(jī)訂單給臺灣代工業(yè)者，這意味著諾基亞會在明年繼續(xù)固守Windows Phone 7.5平臺，并未打算將針對新興市場的入門等級手機(jī)升級至Windows Phone 8。
諾基亞的硬件工藝有目共睹，其實(shí)期待他與Android牽手的粉絲也不在少數(shù)
0Xlesmc
總之，目前沒有明確證據(jù)顯示諾基亞已經(jīng)著手開發(fā)Android產(chǎn)品；但無論如何，我認(rèn)為，涉足Android平臺是諾基亞面對現(xiàn)實(shí)該采取的第一個步驟。至于諾基亞該采取的第二個步驟，是重新設(shè)定對功能手機(jī)市場的期待。
本文授權(quán)編譯自EE Times，版權(quán)所有，謝絕轉(zhuǎn)載
本文下一頁：功能手機(jī)能讓諾基亞復(fù)興嗎？
相關(guān)閱讀：
• 回應(yīng)歐盟“傾銷說”：華為在芬蘭設(shè)立研發(fā)中心
• 諾基亞很滿意：芬蘭總部大樓賣了2.23億美元
• 2013年智能手機(jī)市場Top 10排名將大幅變動0Xlesmc
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根據(jù)市場研究機(jī)構(gòu)IDC的最新報告預(yù)測，全球手機(jī)市場規(guī)模在 2012年將比2011年成長1.4%，是過去三年來的最低水準(zhǔn)，但卻預(yù)期智能手機(jī)出貨量將在這個圣誕采購季創(chuàng)新高紀(jì)錄。沒錯，在智能手機(jī)銷售量持續(xù) 成長的同時，功能手機(jī)數(shù)量將逐漸減少；但諾基亞與少數(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)專家似乎認(rèn)為，功能手機(jī)能讓諾基亞扭轉(zhuǎn)敗局，甚至讓該公司走上復(fù)興之路。
最近諾基亞發(fā)表了Nokia 206與205系列手機(jī)，自詡為“功能手機(jī)的重塑”。但仔細(xì)檢視，叫它們“功能手機(jī)”好象不太對，無論是206或205能讓使用者實(shí)時聯(lián)機(jī)Facebook，也能收發(fā)電子郵件，還能下載諾基亞線上商店“超過千種的免費(fèi)/付費(fèi)游戲與應(yīng)用程序”。
Nokia 206（左）與205（右）系列手機(jī)
0Xlesmc
此外這兩款手機(jī)配備的攝像頭能自動將拍攝的照片檔案大小調(diào)整到700KB，以便使用者分享或是上傳上網(wǎng)。唯一讓它們像是“非智能手機(jī)”的地方，是擁有傳統(tǒng)的手機(jī)實(shí)體按鍵，以及僅2.4寸的屏幕；而這兩款手機(jī)都有單卡或雙卡的機(jī)型選擇。
Google 的Google Play商店以及蘋果的線上商店，目前分別可提供67萬5,000與70萬種的應(yīng)用程序；諾基亞是不是把珍貴的資源浪費(fèi)在建構(gòu)自家不太受矚目的線上商店上？所有那些諾基亞功能手機(jī)的獨(dú)特優(yōu)點(diǎn)，難道不能移植到該公司未來的Android手機(jī)上？
也許諾基亞視中階手機(jī)市場為未來成長動力的思路正確，但如果是這樣，為何不用中階智能手機(jī)來進(jìn)軍該市場，而是用諾基亞特有的功能手機(jī)？
本文授權(quán)編譯自EE Times，版權(quán)所有，謝絕轉(zhuǎn)載
本文下一頁：與擁有近7億用戶的中國移動聯(lián)手吧
相關(guān)閱讀：
• 回應(yīng)歐盟“傾銷說”：華為在芬蘭設(shè)立研發(fā)中心
• 諾基亞很滿意：芬蘭總部大樓賣了2.23億美元
• 2013年智能手機(jī)市場Top 10排名將大幅變動0Xlesmc
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中國市場也是目前諾基亞面臨的一個難題；沒有與蘋果或三星同等的品牌號召力，諾基亞無法期望中國消費(fèi)者愿意花更多錢選擇該公司的功能手機(jī)產(chǎn)品，而舍棄HTC、聯(lián)想(Lenovo)、華為(Huawei)或中興(ZTE)等品牌的平價Android智能手機(jī)。
幸好，日前中國移動(China Mobile)所發(fā)表的諾基亞Lumia 920T──中國首款支持TD-SCDMA標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的Windows平臺手機(jī)，帶來了一線希望。諾基亞還是與全球各大移動通信服務(wù)業(yè)者維持緊密關(guān)系，能與擁有 近7億用戶的中國移動聯(lián)手，就是連蘋果也做不到的。
雖然還不能算是一記妙招，至少諾基亞在這件事上比蘋果領(lǐng)先了近一年(據(jù)了解，蘋果與中國移動可能會在2013下半年合作)?，F(xiàn)在諾基亞有一個很好的機(jī)會，能藉由全球最大移動通信業(yè)者抓住成長中的中國市場商機(jī)，如果掌握得好，該公司可望向復(fù)蘇踏出第一步。
編譯：Judith Cheng
本文授權(quán)編譯自EE Times，版權(quán)所有，謝絕轉(zhuǎn)載
參考英文原文：Too late to save Nokia?，by Junko Yoshida
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• 諾基亞很滿意：芬蘭總部大樓賣了2.23億美元
• 2013年智能手機(jī)市場Top 10排名將大幅變動0Xlesmc
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Yoshida in NY: Too late to save Nokia?
Junko Yoshida
Nokia's management screwed up royally on several fronts. But it's not too late to save the company.
It isn't. Call me naive or in denial, but I’m not prepared to accept a “new normal,” where there exist only two big design sockets–Samsung’s and Apple’s–for the smartphone market.
It’s just too painful to watch these two handset giants–through their dominance in the only market with meaningful growth for semiconductors–shut out practically every chip company who designs modems and apps processors, except for Qualcomm and Samsung.
I suspect I’m not alone in this feeling.
Don’t get me wrong. I’m not here calling for a Nokia bailout. Nokia’s where it is today through Nokia’s own doing.
Looking back, Nokia’s management screwed up royally on three fronts: 1) clinging to Symbian for too long; 2) losing the battle in China; and 3) not choosing Android as an operating system for the company's smartphones.
Many pundits pin Nokia’s failure on the company having been too slow to accept the emergence of smartphones. They believe Nokia’s lack of presence in smartphones has triggered its downfall.
I disagree.
Missed opportunities
Nokia’s grip on the feature phone market had begun sliding way before smartphones became mainstream. While spending a lot of engineering resources perfecting a variety of feature phones for the global market, Nokia unfortunately missed the cues for two key opportunities.
One was the advent of the dual SIM mobile phone, designed to hold two SIM cards. It took Nokia almost a decade before fully embracing this trend. Dual-SIM operation essentially enables mobile phone users to use two services without carrying two phones. Using multiple SIM cards allows a user to take advantage of different pricing plans for calls and text messages to certain destinations, as well as mobile data usage.
Nokia’s close relationship with mobile carriers, however, blurred Nokia’s vision. It stayed off the dual SIM bandwagon out of misplaced loyalty to large operators, who preferred customers to use one network exclusively.
“Symbian in China” was another missed opportunity for Nokia. Before Android took the world by storm, there was reportedly a groundswell of demand for Symbian-based phones among handset vendors in China. But the decision by Symbian (and by Nokia) to make Symbian an open source operating system was too little, too late.
By the time Chinese OEMs could have embraced Symbian, there wasn’t enough engineering talent left at Symbian to make serious inroads into the China’s smartphone ecosystem. Meanwhile, what’s left of Symbian was later acquired by Accenture.
Unpopular decision
Then, Nokia made the unpopular decision of going with Microsoft for its smartphone strategy.
Nokia’s sin, however, wasn’t in partnering with Microsoft. Rather, it was its stubbornness in not acknowledging the rising tide of Android.
Although industry observers understood Microsoft’s powerful influence on Nokia (Stephen Elop who replaced Nokia’s previous CEO, Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo, in 2010 came from Microsoft), they could not comprehend how Nokia could possibly ignore Android. It seemed almost a willful act by Nokia’s management to miss Android’s unmistakable momentum so completely.
One engineering executive working for a leading mobile chip company said, "I just don’t understand why Nokia couldn’t develop Android phones--even in parallel with Microsoft’s Windows phones."
Looking for an alternative platform?
There have been persistent rumors, however, that Nokia might be ditching Microsoft’s Windows Phone at least for entry to the mid-level smartphone market, while it looks for an alternative platform in the low-end smartphone market segment.
Taiwan’s Digitimes recently quoted an unnamed source from Taiwan-based supply chain makers saying that Nokia is expected to continue to release orders for Windows Phone 7.5 handsets to Taiwan-based ODM makers in 2013. The point is that Nokia appears to be sticking to Windows Phone 7.5 through next year, instead of upgrading its entry-level feature phones to Windows Phone 8 in the emerging market.
At this point, however, there is no hard evidence indicating that Nokia is actually working to develop Android handsets.
Three steps
Nonetheless, dabbling in Android, in my opinion, is at least the first step Nokia could take to accept reality.
A second step Nokia must take is to re-set its expectations for the future of its feature phone market. According to International Data Corp.’s latest report, the worldwide mobile phone market is forecast to grow 1.4 percent this year compared with 2011, the lowest annual growth rate in three years despite a projected record number of smartphone shipments in the high-volume holiday season.
Make no mistake. While smartphones continue to rise, sales of feature phones are shrinking.
But Nokia and a few other industry pundits seem to believe that Nokia’s feature phones could save the day for Nokia–or at least put Nokia back on the recovery path.
In recent weeks, Nokia released the Nokia 206 and 205 handsets (shown left). Nokia is hailing this move as “reinventing the feature phones.”
Upon closer examination, calling these “feature phones” seems like a misnomer. Both 205 and 206 allow users to link instantly to Facebook, as well as e-mail. The phones allow downloads of “1000s of free and paid games and apps” in the Nokia Store, according to Nokia. A camera integrated into each phone will automatically resize pictures to around 700KB for easy sharing and posting.
The only things that make these phones look like non-smartphones are a traditional keypad and a 2.4-inch screen. Both phones come in single and dual-SIM varieties.
But with Google’s Google Play store today offering 675,000 applications and Apple 700,000 apps, is Nokia wasting precious resources on its own, less impressive Nokia Store? Couldn’t all the unique features Nokia has designed into its feature phones be brought over to Nokia’s future Android phones?
Nokia may be right thinking that the future for growth is in entry to the mid-level market. If so, why not address that market with entry-level smartphones, instead of Nokia’s proprietary feature phones?
China remains the last but not least problem Nokia faces today.
Without brand appeal equivalent to that of Apple or Samsung, Nokia can’t expect Chinese consumers to shell out more for its feature phones than low-cost Android smartphones made by HTC, Renovo, Huawei or ZTE.
However, the announcement this week that China Mobile is launching Nokia’s Lumia 920T --the first TD-SCDMA Windows phone in China–offers a glimmer of hope.
Nokia still has close relationship with leading carriers in the world. A partnership with China Mobile – which has close to 700 million subscribers – is one thing Apple has not been able to pull off.
It’s not a slam dunk, but Nokia may have close to a one-year lead over Apple (Apple and China Mobile might come to a deal in the second half of 2013).
For now, Nokia has a good chance to leverage the growing market the world’s largest mobile carrier offers in China. If it seizes the opportunity, Nokia could be making its first baby steps toward recovery.
責(zé)編：Quentin
