美國國會的一份報告幾乎將中國電信設(shè)備業(yè)者華為(Huawei)與中興(ZTE)列入黑名單
(請點擊這里查看《美國評估華為:沒有間諜行為,只是編程太爛》),對此北京政府大喊不公。
針對上述美國國會報告,中國官方媒體《中國日報》陸續(xù)刊登了“華為、中興反擊存有偏見的美國市場報告”、“美國無根據(jù)指控背后的貿(mào)易保護主義”,以及“中國強烈反對美國的電信業(yè)者報告”等報導(dǎo),并引述中國商業(yè)部官員的說法,指美國的報告是充滿了“不真實證據(jù)”的“主觀臆測”。
中國的強烈抗議并不令人意外,畢竟,華為是中國的驕傲。
這家總部位于深圳的電信設(shè)備制造商由企業(yè)家任正非在1987年創(chuàng)立,起初是為一家香港商代理銷售PBX交換器。不同于其它行動笨拙的中國國營企業(yè),華為一直保持靈活與積極,且一直頑強地追求自己的全球市場擴張策略,在美國、英國、德國、瑞典、印度、俄羅斯與土耳其等地都擁有策略伙伴與研發(fā)中心。
筆者仍記得在2000年初前往斯德哥爾摩參訪瑞典投資促進署(the Invest in Sweden Agency),聽到瑞典政府官員提及他們是如何期待華為的到訪。在那個時候我還不知道華為這家公司,于是不恥下問:“這家公司名字要怎么拼?”對方瞄了我一眼,不敢相信我不知道這家新興中國電信設(shè)備商,但我真的不知道…(華為后來在斯德哥爾摩成立研發(fā)中心)。
從那時候起,我看著華為以驚人速度成長,甚至拿下了全球電信設(shè)備市場兩成的占有率;華為的成功被認為是中國的“灰姑娘”故事,而我也同意這種說法。但對于華為,令人好奇的是這么一家全球性的電信設(shè)備大廠,一直都是私人企業(yè)。
7NBesmc
眾所周知,華為的創(chuàng)辦人任正非曾是中國解放軍軍官,而且有人認為這就是個充分的理由,可懷疑華為與中國軍方有關(guān)系,甚至能為華為幕后的真正掌權(quán)者打個大問號;但該公司聲稱,他們是一家員工持股的公司。
本文授權(quán)編譯自EE Times,版權(quán)所有,謝絕轉(zhuǎn)載
本文下一頁:華為不能公開上市的原因
相關(guān)閱讀:
• 美國評估華為:沒有間諜行為,只是編程太爛
• 美運營商或禁用中國電信設(shè)備,在華美企擔(dān)心遭報復(fù)
• 中國本土工科畢業(yè)生為何青睞跨國大公司7NBesmc
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有個在北京某半導(dǎo)體公司任職的朋友告訴我:“華為不能公開上市的原因,是因為該公司的財務(wù)一團混亂?!蔽覠o法證實這樣的說法,不過也隱約看出華為這家公司缺乏透明度。
而既然美國眾議院情報委員會(House Intelligence Committee)的華為與中興報告內(nèi)大多數(shù)證據(jù),都被列為機密,也很難苛責(zé)中國媒體對美國貿(mào)易保護主義的指責(zé)。不過,美國一直保持謹慎態(tài)度并非不合理,畢竟在擔(dān)憂網(wǎng)絡(luò)戰(zhàn)爭(cyber warfare)發(fā)動的前提下,你是否該一意孤行地與一家沒在紐約或倫敦股 票市場上市的公司做生意?
相較之下,你難道不是寧可選擇與一家上市公司合作、特別是有關(guān)下一代網(wǎng)絡(luò)布建的電信設(shè)備大訂單?據(jù)了解,華為已經(jīng)聘請了一位伶俐的美國發(fā)言人來捍衛(wèi)名聲,但筆者認為,若該公司能選擇公開上市,將可更有效地解決其透明度問題。
本文授權(quán)編譯自EE Times,版權(quán)所有,謝絕轉(zhuǎn)載
編譯:Judith Cheng
參考英文原文:Yoshida in China: Going public would demystify Huawei,by Junko Yoshida
相關(guān)閱讀:
• 美國評估華為:沒有間諜行為,只是編程太爛
• 美運營商或禁用中國電信設(shè)備,在華美企擔(dān)心遭報復(fù)
• 中國本土工科畢業(yè)生為何青睞跨國大公司7NBesmc
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Yoshida in China: Going public would demystify Huawei
Junko Yoshida
With growing U.S. concerns about cyber warfare, there's little incentive to do business with Huawei, a company that is not listed on New York or London exchanges.
TOKYO -- Beijing is crying foul in the aftermath of a congressional report that virtually places China’s Huawei and ZTE on a blacklist.
State-controlled China Daily has led the charge with stories like “Huawei, ZTE hit back at ‘biased’ US market report,” “Protectionism behind groundless US accusation,” and “China ‘strongly opposes’ US report on telecom firms.” A Commerce Ministry official is quoted in one story denouncing the U.S. report as “subjective guesswork” filled with “untrue evidence.”
The outcry from China should surprise no one. After all, Huawei is the pride of China.
The Shenzhen-based telecom equipment maker was founded in 1987 by entrepreneur Zhenghei Ren, initially serving as a sales agent for PBX switches made by a Hong Kong company. Unlike other stodgy state-owned enterprises in China, Huawei has remained nimble and aggressive, and has doggedly pursued its own global expansion strategy. Huawei has partnerships and R&D centers in the U.S., the U.K., Germany, Sweden, India, Russia and Turkey.
During an early 2000 press tour, I can recall visiting the Invest in Sweden Agency in Stockholm and hearing Swedish officials talking about a much anticipated visit by Huawei..
At the time, I didn't know Huawei. Swallowing my pride, I asked the Swedes, “How do you spell Huawei?” One shot me a look, incredulous that I didn't know the rising Chinese telecom company. I certainly deserved that look. (Huawei eventually opened an R&D center in Stockholm.)
Since then, I've watched Huawei growth with amazement as it captured 20 percent of the global market for telecom equipment. Huawei is considered a Cinderella story in China, and I agree.
I find it curious that Huawei, a major player in the global telecom equipment market, remains as a private company.
Military link?
It is widely known that Huawei’s founder Ren is an ex-People’s Liberation Army officer. While some view that fact alone as sufficient evidence to suspect a clear link between Huawei and the PLA, a larger question is who really "owns" Huawei. The company claims to be employee-owned.
A friend working for a Beijing semiconductor company explained to me over lunch: “Huawei hasn’t been able to go public because their financial book is such a mess.” We haven't been able to confirm that, but looming large is Huawei’s lack of transparency.
Since much of the evidence in the House Intelligence Committee's report on Huawei and ZTE is classified, it’s hard to blame the Chinese media for alleging U.S. protectionism. Still, it's not unreasonable for the U.S. to remain cautious. After all, as concerns mount about cyber warfare, why should you go out of your way to do business with companies who aren't even listed on the New York or London stock exchanges?
Wouldn't you rather work with a public company, especially on big telecom equipment deals for next-generation networks? Huawei has hired a slick U.S. spokesman to defend its reputation, but going public would do more to solve some of Huawei's transparency problems.
責(zé)編:Quentin