“反向創(chuàng)新“(Reverse innovation)不應(yīng)和“逆向工程“(reverse engineering)混淆。以下我們將討論它們的不同之處，以及像聯(lián)發(fā)科(MediaTek)這樣的公司如何善用它們來(lái)與諾基亞(Nokia)等對(duì)手競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。 我們來(lái)看看”反向創(chuàng)新”和”逆向工程”的差異。 首先，我們要了解一些背景。 本月初，當(dāng)我與中國(guó)無(wú)晶圓廠半導(dǎo)體公司瑞芯微(Rockchip)副總裁陳鋒(Feng Chen)吃早餐時(shí)，他突然問(wèn)我是否知道“80-3-2規(guī)則”。我從來(lái)沒(méi)有聽(tīng)說(shuō)過(guò)。 提到“80-3-2規(guī)則”是因?yàn)槲覀冋谟懻撊蛎襟w平板電腦市場(chǎng)。陳鋒說(shuō)，這是他的個(gè)人理論，不是瑞芯微的。他解釋道：如果你設(shè)計(jì)一款系統(tǒng)(或芯片)，性能可與市場(chǎng)上80%最好的產(chǎn)品相比，并能以三分之一的價(jià)格供貨，你就可以讓你的系統(tǒng)(芯片)銷售量呈倍數(shù)成長(zhǎng)。 陳鋒以媒體平板電腦市場(chǎng)為例指出，許多Android平板電腦的性能都比蘋(píng)果(Apple) iPad略為遜色，但最終它們的銷售量將超過(guò) iPad 。 換句話說(shuō)，就是不要過(guò)度設(shè)計(jì)。 具備可外包設(shè)計(jì)及更快產(chǎn)品周期等特色的Android陣營(yíng)，為“80-3-2規(guī)則”的可行性提供了左證。該規(guī)則同時(shí)提供了如何讓產(chǎn)品抵達(dá)消費(fèi)者手中的機(jī)制。

Source：IHS iSuppliaSJesmc

“80-3-2規(guī)則”是否真有意義？ 上圖說(shuō)明了該理論的缺陷：蘋(píng)果獲得iPad產(chǎn)生的所有利潤(rùn)，而Android陣營(yíng)的銷售收入則由許多Android平板電腦和芯片供貨商瓜分。所有這些包含在”80-3-2規(guī)則”范圍內(nèi)的企業(yè)都彼此激烈競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，進(jìn)一步降低了他們的利潤(rùn)。 因此，“80-3-2規(guī)則”本身雖然很簡(jiǎn)單，但看起來(lái)它無(wú)法持續(xù)。 陳鋒的理論讓我想起另一件事。《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人》(The Economist)曾刊登了一篇名為”節(jié)儉創(chuàng)新”(frugal innovation)的文章。該篇文章中提到了諸如通用電氣(General Electric)和印度Tata Consultancy Services (TCS)等開(kāi)發(fā)新型手持式心電圖(GE)和水過(guò)濾器(TCS)的公司。 “與其開(kāi)發(fā)更花俏的產(chǎn)品，他們選擇回歸基本，從”節(jié)儉創(chuàng)新”開(kāi)始，有時(shí)這也被稱為”反向創(chuàng)新”，”經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人解釋道。 本文授權(quán)編譯自EE Times，版權(quán)所有，謝絕轉(zhuǎn)載 本文下一頁(yè)：如何進(jìn)行反向創(chuàng)新工程

相關(guān)閱讀：
• 模仿蘋(píng)果就能獲得成功嗎？不見(jiàn)得
• 調(diào)查：用戶吐槽對(duì)iPhone 5失望的N種理由
• 圖文報(bào)道：IDF上的百變超極本和平板aSJesmc

{pagination} 如何進(jìn)行反向創(chuàng)新工程 據(jù)《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人》文章所稱，“節(jié)儉創(chuàng)新不只是重新設(shè)計(jì)產(chǎn)品，它還涉及到重新思考整個(gè)生產(chǎn)流程和商業(yè)模式。企業(yè)必須節(jié)省成本，以便讓他們獲得更多客戶，賺取微薄的利潤(rùn)、沖高銷售量......” 其中的某些論點(diǎn)可用來(lái)與陳鋒的理論連接。他的“80-3-2規(guī)則”解決了一家公司如何找到一種在壓縮成本情況下開(kāi)發(fā)出產(chǎn)品的業(yè)務(wù)流程和方法，并獲得上百萬(wàn)的新客戶。 聯(lián)發(fā)科已經(jīng)從根本上改變了芯片產(chǎn)業(yè)，特別是智能手機(jī)和平板電腦領(lǐng)域。與聯(lián)發(fā)科競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的智能手機(jī)和平板電腦芯片供貨商都不得不類似的“turnkey systems”，而不再僅提供參考設(shè)計(jì)。 技術(shù)的演進(jìn)，特別是在電子產(chǎn)業(yè)，向來(lái)都是呈現(xiàn)單一面向的一維發(fā)展。這一切幾乎都落在工程團(tuán)隊(duì)身上，包括如何讓系統(tǒng)運(yùn)作速度更快、可執(zhí)行更多應(yīng)用程序和功能，而且功耗還要降低。

aSJesmc

節(jié)儉式，或是反向、創(chuàng)新和“80-3-2規(guī)則”都表明，重新思考多維創(chuàng)新的時(shí)刻到了。 我想到了兩個(gè)很好的例子，可以說(shuō)明忽略反向創(chuàng)新會(huì)對(duì)一家公司造成多大影響。 過(guò) 去已經(jīng)有很多文章談到了手機(jī)制造商諾基亞的衰落。很多人將之歸咎于諾基亞進(jìn)入智能手機(jī)市場(chǎng)時(shí)間點(diǎn)太晚。但我不同意這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)。諾基亞的失敗，與其無(wú)法在該公司曾經(jīng)主導(dǎo)的全球功能手機(jī)市場(chǎng)擊敗對(duì)手有關(guān)。你必須知道，諾基亞擁有極優(yōu)良的產(chǎn)品，而且?guī)缀醵纪獍a(chǎn)。但盡管如此，諾基亞并未注意到只要開(kāi)發(fā)出”足夠好”的產(chǎn)品，而且也沒(méi)有開(kāi)發(fā)出更多創(chuàng)新和更具想象力的產(chǎn)品。 這同樣適用于日本液晶電視廠商，如夏普(Sharp)，該公司堅(jiān)持建造大型工廠，以生產(chǎn)超薄、大尺寸LCD面板。夏普代表著日本制造業(yè)的最高“制造”水準(zhǔn)，相當(dāng)令人欽佩，但最終，這不過(guò)是浪費(fèi)力氣罷了。夏普的工作是制造電視，而不是創(chuàng)造藝術(shù)品。 中國(guó)公司不斷重復(fù)嘗試逆向工程，很可能很快就會(huì)在市場(chǎng)上推出他們別出心裁的反向創(chuàng)新成果。如果成功，他們就可以順利贏得地球上至今仍常被忽視的“60億人口”市場(chǎng)。 但在此同時(shí)，中國(guó)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者們──特別是許多仍沉浸一維技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的公司們，仍將爭(zhēng)先恐后地在擁有10億消費(fèi)者在已開(kāi)發(fā)國(guó)家中激烈競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。 本文授權(quán)編譯自EE Times，版權(quán)所有，謝絕轉(zhuǎn)載 編譯： Joy Teng 參考原文：Yoshida in China: How Nokia failed, MediaTek won ，by Junko Yoshida

相關(guān)閱讀：
• 模仿蘋(píng)果就能獲得成功嗎？不見(jiàn)得
• 調(diào)查：用戶吐槽對(duì)iPhone 5失望的N種理由
• 圖文報(bào)道：IDF上的百變超極本和平板aSJesmc

{pagination} Yoshida in China: How Nokia failed, MediaTek won Junko Yoshida "Reverse innovation" shouldn't be confused with "reverse engineering." Here's how they differ, and how companies like MediaTek used it to run circles around rivals like Nokia. SHANGHAI – "Reverse innovation" should not be confused with “reverse engineering.” Let's examine the differences. First, some context. Earlier this month when I sat down for breakfast here with Feng Chen, vice president of China fabless company Rockchip, he abruptly asked if I knew the “80-3-2 rule.” I had never heard of it. The subject came up as we were discussing the global media tablet market. Chen, who noted that this is his personal theory, not Rockchip’s, explained: If you design a system (or chip) with performance of at 80 percent compared to the best-in-class product on the market, and if you offer it at one-third the price, you can double the sales volume of your system (chip). Chen used the media tablet market as an example. Many Android-based tablets with relatively less performance than Apple’s iPad, will eventually exceed sales of iPad in volume, he argued. In other words, don’t over-engineer it. Android, along with outsourcing and faster product turnarounds are the key elements that make the 80-3-2 rule possible. The rule also offers a mechanism for getting products in the hands of consumers. Source: IHS iSuppli Does the 80-3-2 rule make sense? Sort of. The chart above illustrates the theory’s flaw: While Apple gets all the profits generated by the iPad, sales revenue for the Android camp is divvied up by many me-too Android tablet and chip suppliers. Presumably those companies, all subscribing to the 80-3-2 rule, are fiercely undercutting one another, further reducing their margins. So, the 80-3-2 rule is simplicity itself, but it doesn’t look sustainable to me. Chen’s theory reminded me of something else. The Economist carried a story about "frugal innovation." The article cited companies like General Electric and India’s Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) that developed new products like a hand-held electrocardiogram (by GE) and a water filter (TCS). “Instead of adding ever more bells and whistles, they strip the products down to their bare essentials," embarking on “frugal innovation,” or as it is sometimes called, “reverse innovation,” the Economist explained. How reverse innovation works According to the Economist, "Frugal innovation is not just about redesigning products; it involves rethinking entire production processes and business models. Companies need to squeeze costs so they can reach more customers, and accept thin profit margins to gain volume...." Therein are the dots we can use to connect to Chen’s theory. His 80-3-2 rule also addresses the issue of how a company finds a way to develop a product and a business process to squeeze costs, gain volume and reach millions of new customers. (Full disclosure here. The Economist article was first pointed out to me by a U.K.-based engineering executive who works for Taiwan’s chip giant MediaTek. He was explaining how MediaTek’s recent success has a lot to do with "frugal innovation." MediaTek, virtually unknown 10 years ago, is now a power house with huge market share in the Chinese smartphone and media tablet markets.) MediaTek has fundamentally changed the playbook for the chip industry here, especially for smartphones and tablets. More chip suppliers for smartphones and tablets who are competing with MediaTek are now expected to provide similar “turnkey systems” that MediaTek delivers, rather than just reference designs. Technology development, especially in the electronics industry, has historically been one-dimensional. It all pretty much comes down to how your engineering team makes a system operate faster, run more apps and features, while consuming less power. Frugal, or reverse, innovation and the 80-3-2 rule both suggest that it’s time to rethink innovation in more in multi-dimensional terms. I can think of two good examples for how ignoring reverse innovation costs companies. Much has been written about the decline of mobile phone maker Nokia. Many blame it on Nokia's late entry to the smartphone market. I disagree. Nokia’s failure is directly related to its inability to beat its competitors in the global feature phone market, where Nokia once dominated. Mind you, Nokia had quality products and production was outsourced. Still, Nokia neglected to develop a “good enough” product, and failed to develop a more innovative and imaginative process. The same goes for Japanese LCD TV manufacturers like Sharp, which insisted on building a mega fab to handle ultra-thin, large LCD panels. Sharp's strategy, which raised Japanese manufacturing to the highest "craftsmanship-like" level, was admirable but, ultimately, wasted effort. Sharp’s job was manufacturing TVs, not developing works of art. Chinese companies that are repeatedly bashed for their reverse engineering practices may soon surprise the world with their reverse innovation ingenuity. If successful, they could reach the neglected 6 billion people on the earth. Meanwhile, China's competitors, still steeped in the one-dimensional technology innovation, will be scrambling to compete in the replacement market of 1 billion consumers in developed countries.