盡管在惠普公司(Hewlett-Packard Co.)宣布第三季認(rèn)列80億美元巨額的商譽(yù)攤銷費(fèi)用，但是這家集計算機(jī)、咨詢、服務(wù)與企業(yè)硬件于一體的公司，目前仍陷于負(fù)債困境中，而且對于投資人的吸引力也一樣十分有限。再者，任何對于HP資產(chǎn)負(fù)債金額之高感到驚訝的人，應(yīng)該可以預(yù)期該公司還將出現(xiàn)下一波大規(guī)模的商譽(yù)攤銷費(fèi)用。 當(dāng)然，惠普可能將未來的商譽(yù)攤銷分成幾次較小的金額，但與被迫認(rèn)列80億美元商譽(yù)攤銷同樣的情況也將迫使該公司在未來采取類似的步驟。惠普必須減輕其資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的負(fù)擔(dān)，并擺脫有損商譽(yù)的數(shù)字。在最近這一次商譽(yù)減損發(fā)布以前，惠普在截止于4月30日的上季營收中，資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上的商譽(yù)數(shù)字為449億美元，使該公司的總資產(chǎn)達(dá)到1,278億美元。 然而，其中有一大部份的資產(chǎn)只是空殼。例如，商譽(yù)累積被視為資產(chǎn)的一部份，但惠普從過去十年來一連串收購行動后已使基本資產(chǎn)價值大幅下降了。例如最近這項與商譽(yù)減損有關(guān)的支出只計入該公司的服務(wù)部門，而它最主要就與2008年以139億美元收購Electronic Data Systems (EDS)公司有關(guān)。 惠普公司的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上還有其它可能得再進(jìn)行商譽(yù)減損的大型收購交易，其中以在2011年以100億美元收購Autonomy公司的交易最受爭議。去年八月，惠普在宣布收購交易的前一天支付了比Autonomy公司收盤價更高64%的溢價。這一收購交易招致投資社群大肆批評惠普為這家英國企業(yè)信息管理軟件 公司付出太大的代價。 惠普公司認(rèn)為，在收購Autonomy與EDS等交易后造成的商譽(yù)資產(chǎn)帳面價值降低，并不至于“導(dǎo)致未來的現(xiàn)金支出或以其它方式，影響服務(wù)部門當(dāng)前的業(yè)務(wù)或財務(wù)表現(xiàn)，”該公司在一份聲明中表示。這聽起來沒錯，但其實(shí)很荒謬。在該公司原本認(rèn)為穩(wěn)健的交易卻帶來財務(wù)沖擊后，也對投資人和股東帶來突如其來的負(fù)擔(dān)。 以下是我對惠普目前情況的一些看法。惠普為收購Autonomy公司支付了102億美元，較Autonomy在利息、稅項、折舊與攤銷前的盈利更高24倍。 而在收購Autonomy以前，惠普還以12億美元收購了Palm。但這次的收購交易隨后也導(dǎo)致惠普認(rèn)列了約10億美元的商譽(yù)減損。 惠普還曾經(jīng)在2010年分別以15億美元與23.5億美元收購了ArcSight以及3Par。溢付給這些公司的費(fèi)用對于惠普公司的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表帶來沉重的負(fù)擔(dān)，嚴(yán)重地影響該公司的財務(wù)狀況。同時，盡管惠普或其它處于類似情況的公司可能聲稱商譽(yù)支出并非現(xiàn)金交易，也不會傷害企業(yè)的長期發(fā)展基礎(chǔ)，但事實(shí)上這卻象征最初的實(shí)際貨幣(或股 票)支出。無論如何形容資產(chǎn)帳面價值降低，總之都等于承認(rèn)對于資源誤用，同時也顯示部分主管和董事會的判斷力不足。 這一切都對于企業(yè)的長期發(fā)展帶來了重大影響。這些事件造成對于該公司資深主管是否適任的質(zhì)疑，同時也動搖員工對于這些主管的信任。例如，如果惠普公司現(xiàn)在還 宣布大型收購行動，我還會相信這家公司嗎？有誰會相信管理團(tuán)隊已經(jīng)盡力調(diào)查過了？相信公司已經(jīng)慎重思考過長期信托責(zé)任，而非率性而為？投資者顯然認(rèn)為惠普 并不是一個投資焦點(diǎn)，原因當(dāng)然包括其長久來的收購策略。 惠普公司的財務(wù)現(xiàn)況已經(jīng)相當(dāng)疲弱(截至4月季度結(jié)束的長期債務(wù)為260億美元、83億美元現(xiàn)金以及短期投資)，如果在新任CEO Meg Whitman的帶領(lǐng)下仍追逐類似于先前三位CEO的收購策略，那么惠普公司的處境將會變得更加疲弱。 惠普前任CEO Carly Fiorina、Mark Hurd與Lo Apotheker為惠普公司劃下了深深的傷口，也難以抹滅。 本文授權(quán)編譯自EBN Online，版權(quán)所有，謝絕轉(zhuǎn)載 編譯：Susan Hong 參考英文原文：HP's Financial Wounds Are Still Festering，by Bolaji Ojo

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{pagination} HP's Financial Wounds Are Still Festering Bolaji Ojo Even after Hewlett-Packard Co. (NYSE: HPQ) took a hefty $8 billion impairment charge to clear some of the burdensome goodwill on its balance sheet, the computer, consulting, services, and enterprise hardware company remains mired in debt and continues to hold limited attraction for investors. Furthermore, anyone surprised by the size of HP's "goodwill" write-down should expect even bigger "one-time" charges in future. Of course, HP may parcel out future charges in smaller chunks, but the same logic that forced the $8 billion charge announced earlier this month will force the company to take similar steps in future. The company must lighten its balance sheet and get rid of unsightly goodwill numbers that are like horrid scars on its corporate face. Before the latest impairment charge, HP's net goodwill as at the end of the fiscal quarter ended April 30 was a titanic $44.9 billion, helping to boost the company's total assets to $127.8 billion. A large chunk of the "assets" is empty gas, though. The accumulated goodwill, for instance, is treated as an asset, even though the value of the underlying "assets" has fallen precipitously since HP began piling them up with a spate of acquisitions over the last ten years. The latest charge, for instance, is assigned only to the company's services business and is related primarily to the $13.9 billion purchase of Electronic Data Systems in 2008. Other large acquisition-related goodwill exists on HP's balance sheet, but none is more controversial than the $10 billion purchase of Autonomy Corp. in 2011. HP paid a whopping 64 percent premium on Autonomy's closing stock price one day prior to the announcement of the transaction last August. Many in the investment community panned the acquisition on the conviction that HP overpaid for the British enterprise information management software company. I didn't like it either because it represents some of what is wrong with the company today. (See: Five Sources of Risk in 2011.) HP insists the goodwill write-downs that follow transactions like the purchase of Autonomy and EDS do not "result in future cash expenditures or otherwise affect the ongoing business or financial performance of its services segment," said the company in a statement announcing a batch of organizational changes for enterprise services business. That's correct, but it's also baloney. It's the type of switcheroo companies lob at investors and shareholders after a transaction they thought was solid had gone bad. Here's how I see it, in HP's case. The company paid about $10.2 billion for Autonomy, representing "24 times Autonomy's trailing earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization," according to a News calculation. Before the Autonomy deal, HP had also made other good-deals-gone-bad, including its $1.2 billion purchase of Palm Inc. The transaction helped HP secure Palm's WebOS, but soon it discontinued the devices and took a "one-time charge" of about $1 billion in goodwill write-down. Previous acquisitions that helped to balloon HP's "goodwill" include the 2010 purchase of ArcSight Inc. and 3Par Inc., for $1.5 billion and $2.35 billion, respectively. The excess premiums paid for these companies are sitting like two tired elephants on HP's balance sheet, distorting its financial profile. And, while HP and companies in similar situations may claim goodwill charges are not cash transactions and don't hurt the enterprise on a long-term basis, they do represent actual monetary (or stock) outlays initially. A write-down, no matter how it is described, is an admission that resources were misused and demonstrates initial poor judgment on the part of the executives and board. All this has long-term implications for the enterprise. These events foster the creation of an environment of seeming ineptitude and lack of trust in company senior executives. For example, would I trust HP if it were to announce today another big purchase? Would I believe the management had done its due diligence? Do I think they seriously consider long-term fiduciary responsibility and are not pandering to their own whims? And would I be certain the board of directors isn't just hurling another dart at a board and hoping to hit the jackpot? Investors clearly think HP isn't a hot investment, and the reasons for this certainly include its acquisition history. HP's market value of $38 billion, as at the time of writing this article, is about half its 52-week high, which is 64 percent below the two-year peak and vastly less than the $227 billion market capitalization of IBM Corp. (NYSE: IBM), not to mention the even more stunning $592 billion for Apple Inc. (Nasdaq: AAPL). Look at their annual fiscal revenues, though, and the three companies seem more or less in the same range. Apple had $108.3 billion in fiscal 2001, IBM $107 billion for calendar 2011, and HP $127.3 billion for its fiscal 2011. Something is off-base here if the capitalizations are so much different. Of course, the companies' sales growth rates are also quite different, although HP's and IBM's are tracking similarly. But that's not the issue here. HP's financial position is weak (long-term debts as at the end of the April quarter were $26 billion versus $8.3 billion in cash and short-term investments), and it will get weaker if the company, under new CEO Meg Whitman, pursues wrongheaded acquisitions similar to the ones her three predecessors did. The wounds former CEOs Carly Fiorina, Mark Hurd, and Léo Apotheker inflicted on HP are deep and can't be written off.