無論你是在西方市場、東方市場或是不屬于這兩個陣營的開發(fā)中國家，中國以及其貿(mào)易伙伴之間的關(guān)系，將會在接下來幾年主導(dǎo)輿論與決策方向，而且我敢說，時間將長達(dá)數(shù)十年。 更進(jìn)一步說，無論你是美國小鎮(zhèn)一家小型零售商店的經(jīng)營者，或是在某個偏遠(yuǎn)區(qū)域擁有機(jī)械重新裝備生意，還是在香港某地為富士康(Foxconn Electronics)那樣的大廠供應(yīng)零件，中國與其西方貿(mào)易伙伴之間的關(guān)系，對你與你的員工來說都應(yīng)該是第一優(yōu)先事項。 最近宣布將于中國設(shè)置一座閃存制造廠的三星電子 (Samsung Electronics)，把這樣的議題推上了火線；照理來說，這是一項無需大張旗鼓的簡單業(yè)務(wù)策略宣布，但是在這個案子上，三星還需要取得政府的批準(zhǔn)。

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如果這樣一座工廠是要建在美國奧勒岡州或是英國倫敦郊外，并不會讓人產(chǎn)生任何其它想法，但三星的宣布卻引發(fā)了有關(guān)戰(zhàn)略產(chǎn)品與制程技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)移的疑慮。 對于那些固執(zhí)地認(rèn)為企業(yè)是為了降低成本才將生產(chǎn)據(jù)點(diǎn)移往中國的人來說，三星的宣布提供了一個截然不同的結(jié)論。一座半導(dǎo)體廠需要一定水準(zhǔn)的專門人才與營運(yùn)成本，因此地點(diǎn)并無法帶來太多的改變；當(dāng)然，節(jié)省的效果還是會有，但影響程度并不高。 針對三星的這項消息，Merrill Lynch分析師Simon Dong-je Woo在一篇報告中表示，該計劃：“是一個震撼彈，因為以我們的觀點(diǎn)，在中國經(jīng)營內(nèi)存工廠，并無法保證可以取得任何顯著的成本優(yōu)勢(跟工廠設(shè)置在韓國相較，只能節(jié)省一點(diǎn)點(diǎn)成本)?！?那 么，激勵三星將一個重要廠房移往中國的理由何在？Woo在報告中指出，三星的目的是想在那個全球最大的PC市場中擴(kuò)大自身版圖：“看來三星預(yù)期新的晶圓廠 能帶來新商機(jī)(為中國本地廠商提供NAND閃存)，并降低地緣政治(geopolitical)風(fēng)險(將芯片制造基地分散)；此外，我們也認(rèn)為有一 些來自中國政府的激勵措施(土地成本與韓國相較較低)?！?以上理由解釋了一切，但大量的糾結(jié)可能會搞砸三星的業(yè)務(wù)計劃；西方國家的政府(以及韓國政府)一直強(qiáng)烈反對將尖端制造技術(shù)移往中國，因為可能會被用來強(qiáng)化該國的軍備。這種恐懼是有效的，如果中國與韓國之間真的發(fā)生戰(zhàn)爭 (例如因為離島歸屬問題)，中國本地的制造廠會被征召生產(chǎn)軍事用品。 三星的中國閃存工廠計劃應(yīng)該還是會取得批準(zhǔn)，該公司不太可能會在不曾與韓國官方或西方世界國家討論過的情況下，就貿(mào)然做了這項宣布。美國應(yīng)該會同意這個計劃，不然三星恐怕就會遇到大 麻煩；我認(rèn)為該座新廠 還是會取得批準(zhǔn)，因為西方國家應(yīng)該并不認(rèn)為該技術(shù)在緊要關(guān)頭時算得上多么“尖端”。 無論如何，三星的決定已經(jīng)對于何種技術(shù)可 轉(zhuǎn)移至中國的議題，產(chǎn)生了重大的改變；隨著中國與全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的更進(jìn)一步整合，對于世界各國來說，不批準(zhǔn)關(guān)鍵技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)移至當(dāng)?shù)兀窃絹碓诫y的一件事。筆者并非外 國事務(wù)專家，我不會在此評論如此發(fā)展趨勢的優(yōu)缺點(diǎn)，但我可以說，這勢必將主導(dǎo)輿論，也會對企業(yè)營運(yùn)造成沖擊。 我個人認(rèn)為，盡管有維護(hù)技術(shù)開發(fā)國家與尋求技術(shù)國家之間關(guān)系的考量，高階戰(zhàn)略技術(shù)不應(yīng)該很容易地轉(zhuǎn)移出去；但可以理解的是，當(dāng)兩國之間的關(guān)系出現(xiàn)不信任，將會深化爭議、升高緊張情勢與風(fēng)險。 這 正是中國目前所處的尷尬情勢，而是否要證明他們是可以信任的，取決于中國自己。制造業(yè)外包與技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)移至中國的趨勢非常可期，這也將導(dǎo)致更多中國本土企業(yè)滲 透入全球設(shè)計與供應(yīng)鏈；這是不可避免的，因為中國不會滿足于裝配工人的角色，在高科技產(chǎn)業(yè)領(lǐng)域，該國政府要求本土業(yè)者目標(biāo)放遠(yuǎn)，要成為系統(tǒng)整合者、設(shè)計 者。他們也想做最好的工作。 技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)移問題勢必會讓中國與西方國家之間的關(guān)系復(fù)雜化；可預(yù)期的是，未來東西方世界的磨合將沿著三大主軸進(jìn)行，那就是：利潤(profit)、希望(hope)與恐懼(fear)。 編譯：Judith Cheng 本文授權(quán)編譯自EE Times，版權(quán)所有，謝絕轉(zhuǎn)載 參考英文原文： Technology Transfer Conundrum，by Bolaji Ojo

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{pagination} Technology Transfer Conundrum Bolaji Ojo Whether you are based in the West, the East, or a developing nation outside these two groups, the subject of China and its relationship with trading partners will dominate discussions and policy decisions for the next several years and, I dare say, decades. Further, whether you run a mom-and-pop retail outlet in the middle of Kansas, a machine retooling business in the Adirondacks, or supply enclosures for major vendors like Foxconn Electronics Inc. from somewhere outside Hong Kong, China's relationship with its Western trading partners should be a priority for you and your employees. (See: The Real Truth About 'Made in China'.) Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. (Korea: SEC) brought this issue back to the front burner when it announced plans to set up a flash memory manufacturing plant in China. Ordinarily, this would be a simple business announcement with no additional fanfare, but in this case, Samsung needs government approval. If it wanted to establish this plant in Oregon or somewhere outside London, the plan wouldn't merit a second thought. However, this announcement is going to set some sparks flying, because of concerns about the transfer of dual-use products and manufacturing processes. For those who still cling to the idea that companies move production plants to China to lower manufacturing costs, the Samsung proposal offers a distinctly different conclusion. (See: Things Don't Get Made in China Simply Because of Cheap Labor and Why We Manufacture in China.) A semiconductor plant requires a certain level of expertise and running costs that won't change much regardless of location. There would, of course, be some savings, but this won't amount to much. The plan "is a big surprise given operating a memory chip fab in China does not warrant, in our view, any significant cost advantage (just a little cost savings vs Korean fabs)," Simon Dong-je Woo of Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. writes in a research report. What are the incentives for Samsung to move a major plant to China? Woo writes that the company wants a bigger piece of the globe's largest PC market, and that growing faster in that market involves having a local manufacturing presence, even for products as politically sensitive as semiconductors: It appears Samsung expects the new fab to offer new business opportunities (NAND chip supply to local OEMs) and to lower geopolitical risks (diversification of chip production base). Further, we expect some incentives from the China government (cheaper land cost vs Korea). That explains it all, but numerous kinks could screw up Samsung's business plans. It just happens that Western governments (along with Korea's) adamantly oppose the transfer of leading-edge manufacturing technology to China, because it could be used to advance the country's military objectives. It's a valid fear. If war were to break out between China and Korea (over disputed islands, for instance), local fabricators would be diverted to support military production. Samsung will probably get the approval it needs to proceed with the flash memory plant. It wouldn't have announced this venture without discussing it with Korean and Western officials. The United States would have to give its consent. Otherwise, Samsung could run into major problems. My conclusion is that the new plant will get approved, because Western nations probably do not consider the technology at stake so cutting-edge. However, Samsung's decision has moved the needle as to what can be located in China. As the country gets further integrated into the global economy, it will become harder for nations to withhold approval of major technology transfers. I'm not a foreign policy expert, so I won't debate here the advantages and disadvantages of such a development, but suffice it to say that this will dominate discussions and impact enterprise operations. Personally, I believe high-end, dual-use technology should never be easily transferred, notwithstanding the relationship between the nation that developed it and the ones seeking to receive it. Understandably, the controversy deepens, tensions rise, and the stakes go up when distrust dominates the relationship. That's where China finds itself today, and in many ways, it is up to the Chinese to prove they can be trusted. The trajectory of manufacturing outsourcing and transfer to China is fairly predictable. It will lead to increased penetration into the design and supply chains by Chinese enterprises. This is inevitable, because China is not going to settle for simply being everyone's assembler. In the high-tech sector, the country's political leaders are asking local companies to aim higher and become system integrators, designers, etc. They want the best jobs, too. Withholding the endorsement of technology transfers will complicate relations between China and the West, but a line must be drawn somewhere. Three other recent posts show this is a complex problem. The first calls China the real threat to the global economy. The second, from China Daily, discusses the country's need for "arduous efforts" to become a trading power. The third says General Motors can increase its share of the Chinese automotive market through attrition. The future of East-West engagement lies somewhere along the three axes of profit, hope, and fear.