在先前一篇討論半導(dǎo)體制造投資的文章中，有網(wǎng)友問到：“為何英國(guó)半導(dǎo)體業(yè)者都放棄了晶圓廠，最后演變成像 ARM 那樣的芯片/IP設(shè)計(jì)公司？”，以及：“為何在英國(guó)傳統(tǒng)的死對(duì)頭國(guó)家法國(guó)，晶圓廠反而一直存在(雖然也不算興盛)？”以下筆者嘗試響應(yīng)這些問題。(編按：本文作者為英國(guó)籍) 詳細(xì)的原因是很復(fù)雜的，但講得太籠統(tǒng)又恐怕有缺失；筆者將以一個(gè)1984年出道的中立觀察者角度來談?dòng)?guó)電子產(chǎn)業(yè)。英國(guó)半導(dǎo)體晶圓廠不興盛的主要原因，是第二次世界大戰(zhàn)讓美國(guó)成為世界經(jīng)濟(jì)強(qiáng)權(quán)，在1950到1960年代初對(duì)英國(guó)國(guó)力產(chǎn)生嚴(yán)重沖擊，影響甚至持續(xù)到今日。另一個(gè)原因則是，與科學(xué)領(lǐng)域相較，英國(guó)的人文藝術(shù)發(fā)展歷史更悠久。 我認(rèn)為癥結(jié)點(diǎn)在于科技并不足以代表英國(guó)的政治與經(jīng)濟(jì)成就，但也許這只是我的個(gè)人觀點(diǎn)。在遙遠(yuǎn)的過去，英國(guó)企業(yè)的擁有者與經(jīng)營(yíng)團(tuán)隊(duì)，通常都沒有科技背景；諸如ARM、Wolfson、CSR、Vodafone等數(shù)家表現(xiàn)出色的公司，都是比較近期才誕生的例外。 回溯到1960年代，英國(guó)的科技公司管理階層都把工程師當(dāng)成奴工般對(duì)待，不需要也不應(yīng)該支付太高的薪資；這種“將就湊合著用(make do and mend)”的心態(tài)是第二次世界大戰(zhàn)的遺毒，而且英國(guó)許多電子公司還是以早期對(duì)電子業(yè)有所需求的軍事防衛(wèi)應(yīng)用為主。這類公司通常會(huì)有以下缺點(diǎn)： 1. 不具備國(guó)際競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力；
2. 無法支應(yīng)電子產(chǎn)業(yè)所需的、不斷升高的營(yíng)運(yùn)成本；
3. 吝嗇而且眼界狹隘。 在1960與1970年代，當(dāng)面臨“該花費(fèi)數(shù)百萬英鎊競(jìng)逐薄膜單石集成電路(thin-film monolithic integrated circuits)？”，還是“只花數(shù)千英鎊來生產(chǎn)厚膜混合IC與PCB？”的抉擇時(shí)，英國(guó)大大小小的電子業(yè)高層都選擇后者，只看到成本沒看到兩者間的其它差異性。 在那個(gè)時(shí)候，美國(guó)與英國(guó)的電子產(chǎn)業(yè)在財(cái)力、抱負(fù)與創(chuàng)業(yè)精神方面的差距，以及美國(guó)可提供高薪、英國(guó)本地薪資微薄等等條件，造成了英國(guó)出現(xiàn)嚴(yán)重的人才外流。例如曾任職于摩托羅拉(Motorola)與快捷半導(dǎo)體(Fairchild)、并創(chuàng)立LSI Logic的資深工程師Wilf Corrigan，就是英國(guó)利物浦碼頭工人之子。 人才外流進(jìn)一步加深了英美電子產(chǎn)業(yè)之間的差距，間接讓美國(guó)發(fā)展出頂尖的芯片制造產(chǎn)業(yè)，也讓英國(guó)在這方面更為落后。我記得在1984年參觀英國(guó)的一座晶圓廠，它位于一座幾十年歷史的老建筑，有破窗戶與堆置在角落的化學(xué)品圓桶，看起來就像是骯臟的修車廠。 英國(guó)電子業(yè)者總部通常座落于空間狹窄的維多利亞時(shí)代建筑，對(duì)于布建需要獨(dú)立廠房、設(shè)備成本動(dòng)輒數(shù)萬英鎊的制程興趣缺缺。因此大多數(shù)的英國(guó)晶圓廠，其實(shí)是在某段時(shí)間外商投資者為了因應(yīng)可能興起的“歐洲堡壘(Fortress Europe；編按：成立歐盟的初始構(gòu)想)”，所以預(yù)先在歐洲尋找據(jù)點(diǎn)。 到了1980與1990年代，面臨要花數(shù)百萬英鎊設(shè)計(jì)ASIC，或是進(jìn)行幾乎沒有非重復(fù)性工程費(fèi)用(NRE)的FPGA編程的抉擇時(shí)，英國(guó)業(yè)者通常選擇后者。在1990年，就算有Apple、VLSI Technology、Acorn與一家日本投資銀行的支持，創(chuàng)建一家處理器公司幾乎不需要資金；這種模式的必要條件，是建立智財(cái)(IP)業(yè)務(wù)模式，也是ARM迄今奉行不悖的。 看到這里，你有發(fā)現(xiàn)任何極度吝嗇或是資金匱乏的因素在其中嗎？那到底為什幺目前在法國(guó)仍然擁有當(dāng)?shù)貥I(yè)者自有自營(yíng)的、接近頂尖的晶圓廠，但英國(guó)境內(nèi)晶圓廠那幺少？嗯…撒切爾夫人與意法半導(dǎo)體(ST)執(zhí)行長(zhǎng)Pasquale Pistorio 是兩個(gè)原因。 在撒切爾夫人擔(dān)任首相的1979年到1990年之間，英國(guó)走右派路線，廢除了給予GEC、Plessey、Ferranti與Marconi等半導(dǎo)體業(yè)者的補(bǔ)助，雖然GEC-Plessey Semiconductors曾一度成為全英國(guó)最大的芯片廠商，但顯然在后撒切爾時(shí)代的英國(guó)，半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)已經(jīng)式微。 在此同時(shí)，曾在美國(guó)半導(dǎo)體大廠Motorola工作的Pistorio，滿懷熱情地認(rèn)為半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)會(huì)帶來財(cái)富；他與中間邊左派的法國(guó)與意大利政府合作，這些國(guó)家采納政府干預(yù)策略，給予Philips、Siemens與ST等歐洲大廠不少支持。 如同英國(guó)曾經(jīng)歷過的，全球化效應(yīng)現(xiàn)在看來讓美國(guó)開始走下坡；從某部分看來，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資金(如前面所提到的種種原因，英國(guó)幾乎不曾涉入這種投資)正轉(zhuǎn)向其它領(lǐng)域，目標(biāo)由信息技術(shù)所需的半導(dǎo)體產(chǎn)業(yè)，轉(zhuǎn)向發(fā)電、節(jié)省能源與訴求環(huán)境永續(xù)性的半導(dǎo)體。 總之，沒錯(cuò)，在放棄半導(dǎo)體制造這件事上，英國(guó)確實(shí)領(lǐng)先美國(guó)；他們也走在臺(tái)灣、中國(guó)的前面。但這到底是好、是壞還是不可避免的趨勢(shì)呢？這又是另一個(gè)議題了。 編譯：Judith Cheng 本文授權(quán)編譯自EE Times，版權(quán)所有，謝絕轉(zhuǎn)載 參考英文原文： Why the British got out of fabs，by Peter Clarke

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{pagination} Why the British got out of fabs Peter Clarke In response to a request from a participant in the forum discussion below When the smart money got into/out of manufacturing I have tried to answer the questions: "Why the British had to get out of fabs and end up just with design/IP a la ARM ?" and "Why fabs still survive (if not exactly thrive) in the UK's traditional rival France?" The detailed reasons are complex, generalizations are usually faulty but I will have a go at putting down my perspective as an observer of the electronics industry from the U.K. since 1984. A primary reason that fabs failed to thrive in the U.K. is that while the Second World War helped create the U.S. as a global economic superpower it more or less bankrupted the U.K. with implications that were heavy in the 1950s and early 1960s and that continue to this day. A second reason is a long-established arts and humanities versus science division in U.K. society. I think it is still the case that science and technology are not sufficiently well represented amongst the political and wealthy establishment in the U.K. But maybe that is just the science graduate in me talking. In the distant past the owners and managers of UK companies usually had a non-scientific background. The likes of ARM, Wolfson, CSR, Vodafone and several others are now glorious but relatively recent exceptions. Back in 1960s U.K. technology-based company management treated engineers as willing serfs who did not need and should not be given too much money. It was a "make do and mend" mentality left over from the Second World War, and many electronics companies continued to be closely aligned to military interests and defense was the early application for electronics. These companies often could not comprehend or cope with: 1) international competition 2) the continuous exponential increase in the cost of participation in electronics Parsimonious and parochial When faced in the 1960s and 1970s with the choice between spending millions of pounds to compete in thin-film monolithic integrated circuits and thousands of pounds to make thick-film hybrids and PCBs, managements up and down the U.K. chose to do the latter not perceiving any difference but cost. The difference between the wealth, ambition and entrepreneurial spirit abroad in the United States, and the high salaries paid there, and the meager existence in the United Kingdom at this time, gave rise to a notorious exodus of talent, known as the "brain drain." Included in this were such people as Wilf Corrigan, the son of a Liverpool docker who worked at Motorola and Fairchild and founded LSI Logic. This migration of talent tended to polarize the situation further and help the United States pioneer chip production for higher industrial and professional volumes and the U.K. to fall behind. I remember visiting a wafer fab in the U.K. in 1984 that had been housed in a building that was decades old, had broken windows and drums of chemicals out the back stored on a concrete standing. It looked like and was as grubby as an automobile bodyshop. U.K. companies were often on space-constrained Victorian sites and few had any appetite for a manufacturing process that required its own building and equipment that cost hundreds of thousands of pounds. Therefore most of the wafer fabs that were built in U.K. were done so by inward investors sometimes seeking to gain a European location as a hedge against the possibility of an emerging "Fortress Europe." When faced in the 1980s and 1990s with a choice between spending millions of pounds to design ASICs or almost no non-recurring expense (NRE) to program FPGAs U.K. companies often chose to design using FPGAs. In 1990 when creating a processor company the option was taken to do it on almost no money, albeit backed by Apple, VLSI Technology, Acorn and a Japanese investment bank. This approach necessitated the creation of the intellectual property business model that has been pursued ever since by ARM. Are we detecting a parsimonious capital-starved theme here? one moved to the right, one didn't And why do indigenously-owned and operated fabs continue at close to the leading edge in France but there are so few fabs in UK? Well Margaret Thatcher and Pasquale Pistorio are two reasons. The move to the right in the U.K. under Thatcher's tenure as prime minister from 1979 to 1990 swept away the idea of subsidies for the likes of GEC, Plessey, Ferranti and Marconi and although GEC-Plessey Semiconductors Ltd. became a de facto national champion chip company for a brief period the concept was clearly out of fashion in post-Thatcher UK. Meanwhile Pasquale Pistorio believed passionately in the power of semiconductors to create wealth, had worked inside a U.S. pioneer of the semiconductor industry, Motorola, and was working with the governments of France and Italy that were left-of-center, believed in state intervention and supported European champions such as Philips, Siemens and STMicroelectronics. Globalization does appear to be driving the U.S. down the same paths already taken by the U.K. But partly what we are seeing is that venture capital (which the UK never had to any degree for reasons mentioned at the top of the article) is turning to other things. It is turning away from semiconductors for information technology, and towards other things, such as semiconductors for power generation, for energy-efficiency and sustainability. But, yes, the U.K. does lead the U.S. in terms of getting out of manufacturing. And both are ahead of Taiwan and China. But whether that, is a good, bad or inevitable, is another matter of opinion.