High-Tech Scam Artists: Counterfeit ICsgE7esmc

高科技專業(yè)騙子：假冒ICgE7esmc

幾十年來，電子行業(yè)一直受到假冒 IC 的困擾，但由于供應(yīng)鏈混亂且許多零件供應(yīng)短缺，這個問題正變得普遍存在。什么是“假冒”IC，問題有多大，企業(yè)如何防范被蒙騙？gE7esmc

本期音頻節(jié)目是《國際電子商情》姐妹刊EPS News 的編輯Barb Jorgensen與佛羅里達(dá)大學(xué)的網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全專家 Domenic Forte的對話。gE7esmc

The twin disasters of the trade war and the COVID pandemic have rattled supply chains all around the globe, leading to supply shortages that have left many manufacturers desperate for parts. And as they say, “Desperate times call for… desperadoes.”gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO：貿(mào)易爭端和 COVID大流行的雙重災(zāi)難已經(jīng)擾亂了全球供應(yīng)鏈，導(dǎo)致供應(yīng)短缺，使許多制造商迫切需要零件。正如他們所說，“絕望的時代催生了......亡命之徒。gE7esmc

Okay, nobody says that. I just made that up. But it happens to be true! Scam artists have been selling counterfeit ICs and printed circuit boards for almost as long as the electronics industry has been around, but counterfeiting seems to be accelerating as shortages persist.gE7esmc

好吧，沒人這么說。我只是編出來的。但它恰好是真的！幾乎只要電子行業(yè)存在，騙子就一直在銷售假冒 IC 和印刷電路板，但隨著短缺的持續(xù)存在，假冒行為似乎正在加速。 gE7esmc

Computer chips are not like money, where counterfeiters print fake bills. It’s relatively easy to gain access to a printing press. It is way harder to get access to a modern fabrication facility, which makes it nearly impossible to churn out fake chips. So what does IC counterfeiting actually look like, how can you detect it, and what can you do about it? gE7esmc

計算機(jī)芯片不像錢，造假者打印假鈔。使用印刷機(jī)相對容易。進(jìn)入現(xiàn)代制造設(shè)施要困難得多，這使得生產(chǎn)假芯片幾乎是不可能的。那么 IC 仿冒實際上是什么樣子的，如何檢測它，以及如何處理它？gE7esmc

Our guest this week is Domenic Forte, a professor at the University of Florida who is an expert in cybersecurity in general, and in counterfeiting in particular. We’ll also hear from my colleague Barbara Jorgensen, editor of EPS News, and an expert in electronics procurement.gE7esmc

本周我們的嘉賓是佛羅里達(dá)大學(xué)教授 Domenic Forte，他是一般網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全方面的專家，尤其是假冒方面的專家。我們還將聽取我的同事、EPS News 編輯、電子產(chǎn)品采購專家 Barbara Jorgensen 的意見。 gE7esmc

We hear estimates that IC counterfeiting costs the industry billions of dollars a year, but reporting of the crime is spotty, so nobody really knows exactly how big the total losses might be.gE7esmc

我們聽說 IC 造假每年給該行業(yè)造成數(shù)十億美元的損失，但犯罪報告參差不齊，因此沒有人真正知道總損失可能有多大。 gE7esmc

Now, the dollar losses are bad enough, but it’s the non-monetary consequences that are potentially the much bigger problem, and it’s not possible to put a price tag on them. If a counterfeit chip ends up causing a smart doorbell to fail, well, that’s aggravating, and if enough fail, that might end up having a material effect on the manufacturer’s business. But should a substandard chip end up in a motor vehicle, a failure could be fatal! Further, should a counterfeit chip end up in a weapons system, the result could be catastrophic!gE7esmc

現(xiàn)在，金錢的損失已經(jīng)夠糟糕了，但可能是更大的問題是非貨幣后果，而且不可能已價格衡量。如果假冒芯片最終導(dǎo)致智能門鈴出現(xiàn)故障，那會很嚴(yán)重，如果出現(xiàn)足夠多的故障，最終可能會對制造商的業(yè)務(wù)產(chǎn)生重大影響。但是如果一個不合格的芯片最終出現(xiàn)在汽車中，故障可能是致命的！ 此外，如果假冒芯片最終進(jìn)入武器系統(tǒng)，結(jié)果可能是災(zāi)難性的！ gE7esmc

And we know for a fact that happens.gE7esmc

我們知道這是真實發(fā)生的事件。 gE7esmc

The Semiconductor Industry Association issued a report on the subject back in 2019 in which it cited two recent examples of prosecutions: one against one man selling fake chips that ended up some unnamed Air Force system (the details were classified); another man was convicted of selling counterfeit ICs that were heading for use in nuclear submarines.gE7esmc

半導(dǎo)體行業(yè)協(xié)會早在 2019 年就發(fā)布了一份關(guān)于該主題的報告，其中引用了最近的兩個起訴例子：一個是針對銷售假芯片的男子，該假芯片最終進(jìn)入了一些未命名的空軍系統(tǒng)（細(xì)節(jié)已保密）； 另一名男子因銷售用于核潛艇的假冒集成電路而被判有罪。 gE7esmc

That SIA report was more than two years ago, and those who follow the subject of counterfeit ICs report the problem seems to be just getting worse, given the supply chain disruptions that have been going on for two years now and which are still nowhere near being solved.gE7esmc

SIA 的那份報告是兩年多以前的事了，那些關(guān)注假冒 IC 的人報告說，鑒于供應(yīng)鏈中斷已經(jīng)持續(xù)了兩年，而且還遠(yuǎn)未解決，問題似乎正在變得更糟 解決了。 gE7esmc

So we have questions! What is counterfeiting exactly, and how should a company go about preparing itself against being scammed?gE7esmc

所以我們有問題！究竟什么是假冒產(chǎn)品，公司應(yīng)該如何做好準(zhǔn)備以防被騙？ gE7esmc

To answer those questions, we invited an expert.gE7esmc

為了回答這些問題，我們邀請了一位專家。 gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: I’m profession Domenic Forte. I’m an associate professor and the Steven A. Yatauro Faculty Fellow at the Electrical and Computer Engineering Department at University of Florida. I’ve been there for about six years now. And I’m also affiliated with the Florida Institute for Cyber Security Research, or we call it FICS Research, at the University as well.gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE：我是Domenic Forte，佛羅里達(dá)大學(xué)電氣與計算機(jī)工程系的副教授和 Steven A. Yatauro 教員。我已經(jīng)在那里呆了大約六年了。我也隸屬于佛羅里達(dá)大學(xué)網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全研究所，或者我們稱之為 FICS 研究所。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: Alright, so you have been examining the issue of counterfeiting for at least a couple of years, perhaps longer, right?gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO：好的，所以你研究假冒問題至少幾年了，也許更久，對吧？ gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: Nearly 10 years we’ve been looking at this, yeah. So looking at the problem, looking at all kinds of solutions.gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE：近 10 年來，我們一直在研究這個。著手難題，看各種解決方案。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: So let’s talk at the highest level. You’ve got a 10-year perspective. Can we ask you to give us kind of a historical perspective of the counterfeiting phenomenon? We can go into the particulars about what counterfeiting is in a moment. But first, I’d like to get a sense of: Was it a huge problem from the beginning? Is it something that slowly accelerated? Give us a historical view of the phenomenon of counterfeiting ICs.gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO：所以讓我們談?wù)勛罡呒墑e。你有一個 10 年的視野。我們能否請您給我們提供一種關(guān)于假冒現(xiàn)象的歷史視角？我們可以馬上詳細(xì)了解什么是假冒。但首先，我想了解一下：這從一開始就是一個大問題嗎？是慢慢加速的東西嗎？讓我們對假冒IC現(xiàn)象有一個歷史的看法。 gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: Sure. So back when I started in the area, I did look into some older documents from all kinds of government agencies. Department of Energy, for example. And I do remember them seeing pointing to counterfeit parts as early as the 80s. I expect that it was a problem then. And like you said, it kind of got worse and worse over time, because it wasn’t dealt with.gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: 好的。當(dāng)我開始涉足該地區(qū)時，我確實查看了來自各種政府機(jī)構(gòu)的一些舊文件。以能源部為例。我確實記得他們早在 80 年代就看到了假冒零件。我預(yù)計那是一個問題。就像你說的，隨著時間的推移，情況變得越來越糟，因為它沒有得到處理。 gE7esmc

And when I began as a professor, around 2013, just before that, in 2012, there was a lot of talk in the US government. There was the Senate Armed Services Committee report, which was highlighting all of these counterfeits: what risks they pose to military systems, and how many suspected counterfeits had been found to be sold to the Department of Defense in 2009 and 2010. So it was a very hot topic then. There were a couple of laws and things that were passed. And, yeah, that kind of cooled the area down slightly. But, you know, in my opinion, it hasn’t necessarily solved the problem yet. And there’s still more to go. And this pandemic-induced chip shortage that we’re experiencing now is just one example of that.gE7esmc

當(dāng)我在 2013 年左右開始擔(dān)任教授時，就在此之前，也就是 2012 年，美國政府有很多討論。參議院軍事委員會的報告強(qiáng)調(diào)了所有這些假冒產(chǎn)品：它們對軍事系統(tǒng)構(gòu)成什么風(fēng)險，以及在 2009 年和 2010 年發(fā)現(xiàn)有多少可疑的假冒產(chǎn)品賣給了國防部。所以這是一個那時非常熱門的話題。有幾項法律通過了。這樣使該話題稍微冷卻了一些。但是，你知道，在我看來，它還不一定能解決問題。還有更多工作要做。而我們現(xiàn)在正在經(jīng)歷的這種由疫情引起的芯片短缺只是其中一個例子。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: Right. I imagine that the trade war, which has also disrupted supply lines, has had an effect as well.gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: 對。貿(mào)易爭端也產(chǎn)生了影響了供應(yīng)鏈。 gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: Yeah, my understanding is that materials that are needed for semiconductor chips — as you mentioned, the trade war — that impacts it, as well as the fact that we haven’t been able to produce as many chips, which leaves a void that counterfeiters are going to try to fill.gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE：是的，我的理解是，半導(dǎo)體芯片所需的材料——正如你提到的，貿(mào)易爭端——會影響它，以及我們無法生產(chǎn)盡可能多的芯片這一事實，這就留下了一個造假者試圖填補(bǔ)的空白。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: Have you found any suggestion that the way business is conducted, and how it has evolved over the years, has left any openings for counterfeiting? And I’m thinking particularly of how some of the biggest companies sell directly to their biggest customers, and then rely on distributors to take care of a lot of the smaller customers. And then you layer shortages on top of that, it seems like the industry has created for itself a couple more places where a counterfeiter can weasel into the process. Is that a reasonable view of what’s been going on?gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO：您有沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)任何跡象表明商業(yè)運作方式以及多年來的發(fā)展方式為假冒留下了任何漏洞？ 我特別在想一些最大的公司如何直接向他們的最大客戶銷售，然后依靠分銷商來照顧很多小客戶。然后你把短缺放在最重要的地方，似乎這個行業(yè)為自己創(chuàng)造了更多的地方，造假者可以在這個過程中偷偷摸摸。這是對正在發(fā)生的事情的合理看法嗎？ gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: Yeah, and in fact, of course, I guess you could say one of the biggest victims of this is usually the Department of Defense and other military contractors, right? Because they are in the grand scheme of things, smaller groups, as you mentioned. gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE：是的，事實上，當(dāng)然，我想你可以說最大的受害者之一通常是國防部和其他軍事承包商，對吧？正如你所提到的，因為它們處于宏偉的計劃中，較小的群體。gE7esmc

They’re not the big fish anymore. That’s again something that’s happened gradually over the last 30 or 40 years as we’ve been consuming a lot more electronics commercially. So they become the victims in this. And them in particular, they have systems that, again, we know: planes, trains, vehicles that last decades, right? And the electronics that’s needed to support and maintain them, you have to go to the distributors to get it now. And it does put them at risk.gE7esmc

他們不再是大魚了。這又是過去 30 或 40 年逐漸發(fā)生的事情，因為我們在商業(yè)上消費了更多的電子產(chǎn)品。所以他們成為了這件事的受害者。尤其是他們，他們擁有我們知道的系統(tǒng)：飛機(jī)、火車、車輛可以使用幾十年，對吧？而支持和維護(hù)它們所需的電子設(shè)備，你現(xiàn)在必須去分銷商那里才能買到。這確實使他們處于危險之中。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: And some of those things aren’t being made anymore. So it’s an interesting business trying to sell to the DOD a chip from a weapons system from 35 years ago. That’s what, the LSI era?gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO：有些東西已經(jīng)不再生產(chǎn)了。因此，嘗試向國防部出售 35 年前武器系統(tǒng)的芯片是一項有趣的業(yè)務(wù)。那是什么，LSI時代？ gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: Yeah, yeah. gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: Those aren’t even made anymore in many cases, right?gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO：在很多情況下，這些甚至都不再生產(chǎn)了，對吧？ gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: Yeah, that’s the obsolescence problem. And there are a couple of very small companies that are tasked with either getting designs from the old manufacturer or perhaps reverse engineering the design and remanufacturing those, but I think those are very few and far between. So like you said, you really just have to go to the distributors. And sometimes you’re putting yourself at risk.gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE：是的，這就是過時問題。有幾家非常小的公司的任務(wù)是從老制造商那里獲取設(shè)計，或者可能對設(shè)計進(jìn)行逆向工程并重新制造，但我認(rèn)為這些公司很少而且相差甚遠(yuǎn)。所以就像你說的，你真的只需要去找分銷商。有時你會把自己置于危險之中。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: Anything else about the business that opens up opportunities for counterfeiters that I haven’t asked about, before we move on to what some of the instances of counterfeiting are?gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO：在我們繼續(xù)討論一些假冒實例之前，還有其它什么事為造假者打開了機(jī)會？ gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: Well, the other one, yes; there’s one more. And that’s the fact that in the last 20 years, maybe 30 years, particularly in the US, we’ve moved to a horizontal business model in the semiconductor industry, where most chips are designed by one party. And they may actually be designed by multiple parties. And then in offshore foundry, most of the time, which is a third party, is actually manufacturing for them.gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE：嗯，另一個，是的。還有一個。這就是事實，在過去的 20 年，也許是 30 年，尤其是在美國，我們已經(jīng)轉(zhuǎn)向了半導(dǎo)體行業(yè)的橫向商業(yè)模式，其中大多數(shù)芯片都是由一方設(shè)計的。它們實際上可能是由多方設(shè)計的。然后在離岸代工中，大部分實際上是第三方為他們制造的。 gE7esmc

So the fact that we’ve had this globalization has also opened up the doors, because the design itself is being shared with third parties. And it could leak in various ways. It’s not necessarily, for example, the foundry’s fault, but could be a rogue employee, could be a state-level attacker, all these kinds of things can also leak IP, which could result in counterfeits being produced.gE7esmc

因此，我們已經(jīng)擁有這種全球化的事實也打開了大門，因為設(shè)計本身正在與第三方共享。它可能以各種方式泄漏。不一定是代工廠的問題，但可能是流氓員工，可能是國家級攻擊者，所有這些東西也可能泄漏IP，從而導(dǎo)致生產(chǎn)假冒產(chǎn)品。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: Am I to infer from that that there are fabs out there that deliberately produce counterfeit parts?gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO：我是否可以從中推斷出存在故意生產(chǎn)假冒零件的晶圓廠？ gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: I don’t know if that’s proven. I think they could also be victims in this. So if the IP leaks somehow, they may produce counterfeits unknowingly, because they’re given the same design, and it’s not their responsibility to check if it’s the same as somebody else’s. Right?gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE：我不知道這是否得到證實。我認(rèn)為他們也可能成為這方面的受害者。因此，如果 IP 以某種方式泄露，他們可能會在不知不覺中生產(chǎn)出仿冒品，因為它們的設(shè)計相同，而檢查與其他人的設(shè)計是否相同不是他們的責(zé)任。 對吧？ gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: Right. gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: So around and around we go here.gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE： 所以我們繞著繞繞到這里。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: Well, so that might be suspected and yet to be proved. But the phenomenon of the fabless design company and the globalization of manufacturing is interesting. And I didn’t want to go off on a… I have a deep love of tangents. If you’ve got IP that can be intercepted, not necessarily counterfeiting.gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO：嗯，所以這可能會被懷疑，但尚未得到證實。但無晶圓設(shè)計公司和制造業(yè)全球化的現(xiàn)象很有趣。而且我不想繼續(xù)……我對tangents有著深深的熱愛。如果你有可以被攔截的IP，不一定是偽造的。gE7esmc

But is there any suspicion that designs have been modified in such a way that people might put in something… the software analogy would be malware. Is there any suspicion that anybody plugs in a little extra circuitry that allows them to access a chip after it hits the market?gE7esmc

但是，是否有人懷疑，設(shè)計已用被某種方式進(jìn)行了修改……例如惡意軟件。是否有人懷疑有人插入了一些額外的電路，允許他們在芯片上市后訪問它？ gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: Yeah, that’s been suspected as well, since about 2006 or so. The most recent example, though, which is probably the closest we’ve ever gotten to having evidence of it (although this is still not evidence, it’s still a ghost story) is the Bloomberg big hack article from, what was it? Late 2018 I believe. This actually didn’t occur at the chip level necessarily. It was more at the printed circuit board or system level.gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: 是的，從2006年左右開始，人們就開始懷疑這一點。然而，最近的一個例子，可能是我們得到的最近的證據(jù)(雖然這仍然不是證據(jù)，它仍然是一個捕風(fēng)捉影的故事)是來自彭博社的大黑客文章，它是什么?我相信是2018年末。這實際上并不一定發(fā)生在芯片層面。它更多的是在印刷電路板或系統(tǒng)級別。 gE7esmc

But this article alleged that they had, I think it was probably about a dozen folks who were telling them that Supermicro motherboards had been intentionally modified at the manufacturing source with a small component that looked like a signal coupler. It just had basically two pins. And it was right by a component in the system which would allow you to remotely take over this server. So you could bypass the OS, you could change the BIOS, do all this kind of stuff.gE7esmc

但是這篇文章聲稱他們有，我想大概有十幾個人告訴他們，Supermicro 主板在制造源頭被故意修改了一個看起來像信號耦合器的小組件。它基本上只有兩個引腳。系統(tǒng)中的一個組件是正確的，它允許您遠(yuǎn)程接管該服務(wù)器。所以你可以繞過操作系統(tǒng)，你可以改變 BIOS，做所有這些事情。 gE7esmc

And what was alleged in the article was that many companies were impacted, apparently. And two of them that they listed were Apple and Amazon, which are two of the most profitable companies in the world. And both of them denied it. They said it didn’t happen. But, you know, what are they going to do? There’s no way they would ever admit that it did happen. Because, again, if your servers are compromised, how much private information could be leaked? What else could be done? Nobody would ever admit that.gE7esmc

文章中聲稱的是，許多公司顯然受到了影響。他們列出的其中兩家是蘋果和亞馬遜，它們是世界上最賺錢的兩家公司。而且兩家公司都否認(rèn)了。他們說這沒有發(fā)生。但是，你知道，他們要做什么？他們永遠(yuǎn)不會承認(rèn)它確實發(fā)生了。因為，再一次，如果您的服務(wù)器遭到入侵，有多少私人信息可能會被泄露？還能做什么？沒有人會承認(rèn)這一點。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: Interesting. And just to make this point, I’ve been asking you about chips, and ICs through most of this conversation. The phenomenon doesn’t end there. It’s chips and boards as well.gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO:有趣。為了說明這一點，我一直在向您詢問有關(guān)芯片和 IC 的大部分對話。現(xiàn)象并沒有就此結(jié)束。它也是芯片和電路板。 gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: Yeah. And at the board level, it, it consists of making a counterfeit of the board itself, but also replacing components on that board with counterfeits and so on. And of course, making modifications, like you mentioned.gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: 是的。在電路板級別，它包括制造電路板本身的假冒產(chǎn)品，以及用假冒產(chǎn)品替換電路板上的組件等。當(dāng)然，就像你提到的那樣，進(jìn)行修改。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: Okay, so that does get us naturally into the conversation of what constitutes counterfeiting. And again, let’s talk about ICs just to keep the conversation from getting too far wide-ranging. What are some of the instances of counterfeiting? Are there different ways to counterfeit a chip?gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO：好的，這確實讓我們自然而然地進(jìn)入了關(guān)于什么是假冒的對話。 再說一次，讓我們談?wù)?IC 只是為了避免話題過于廣泛。造假的例子有哪些？ 有不同的方法來偽造芯片嗎？ gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: Yes. So let me start by just discussing a chip in general. So a chip is essentially a piece of silicon. And the silicon is responsible for the processing, computing and storage, if it’s memory. And that piece of silicon is encased in a plastic or ceramic package. So this is, you know, that black material that you would typically see on what we call a chip. And that protects the chip. And then on that package, we typically have some kind of markings. They could be denoting where it was manufactured, what country; it could also have laser engraved markings with the company’s logo, the IP owner’s logo; and other information such as the part type, lot number, you know, again, things that designate its origin and what it’s supposed to do. So that’s what our starting point is.gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: 是的。 因此，讓我先從一般性的討論開始。所以芯片本質(zhì)上是一塊硅。硅負(fù)責(zé)處理、計算和存儲，如果它是內(nèi)存的話。那塊硅片被包裹在塑料或陶瓷封裝中。這就是，你知道的，你通常會在我們所說的芯片上看到的黑色材料。這可以保護(hù)芯片。然后在那個封裝上，我們通常有某種標(biāo)記。他們可以表示它是在哪里制造的，是哪個國家的；它還可以帶有帶有公司徽標(biāo)、知識產(chǎn)權(quán)所有者徽標(biāo)的激光雕刻標(biāo)記；以及其他信息，例如零件類型、批號，您再次知道指定其來源和應(yīng)該做什么的事情。所以這就是我們的出發(fā)點。 gE7esmc

And then when you get into the type of counterfeits, there are taxonomies out there that classify it as seven different types. But I’ll boil it down probably to four main types, which I think are the most prominent. There are two that are part of this class, which are chips and components that are already in circulation. gE7esmc

然后當(dāng)你進(jìn)入假冒的類型時，那里有分類法將其分為七種不同的類型。但我可能會歸結(jié)為四種主要類型，我認(rèn)為這是最突出的。有兩個屬于此類，它們是已經(jīng)在流通的芯片和組件。gE7esmc

So the first of this type is chips that have been taken off of old systems, and their package may be slightly refurbished, their pins may be refurbished. And they’ve probably been remarked, which means the markings that were on the package were changed to fraudulently make it look like it’s new. And we call these as recycled-type counterfeits. gE7esmc

所以這種類型的第一種是從舊系統(tǒng)上取下來的芯片，它們的封裝可能會稍微翻新，它們的引腳可能會翻新。他們可能已經(jīng)被打標(biāo)了，這意味著包裝上的標(biāo)記被更改，從而使它看起來像新的一樣。我們稱這些為回收型仿冒品。gE7esmc

Recycled because they’re previously used. And then they’re resold into the supply chain as if they’re new. So the people who are buying it think that they’re new, but they’re not.gE7esmc

回收，因為它們以前被使用過。然后它們被轉(zhuǎn)售到供應(yīng)鏈中，就好像它們是新的一樣。所以購買它的人認(rèn)為他們是新的，但他們不是。 gE7esmc

And the danger with these is, of course, that, like humans, these chips age over time and with use, and they’re more prone to failure due to a) their use and b) the harvesting process itself, which may have exposed it to harmful conditions like high temperatures and water and things like this.gE7esmc

當(dāng)然，這些芯片的危險在于，就像人類一樣，這些芯片會隨著時間和使用而老化，并且由于 a) 它們用過了和 b) 獲取過程本身——這使得它們更容易發(fā)生故障，因為過程中可能已經(jīng)暴露在有害環(huán)境下，例如高溫和水等的影響。 gE7esmc

The second part of this class of chips that are already in circulation is what’s known as the re-marked chip. So this is often done to increase a component’s grade. So for example, a commercial chip, its package may be changed to make it fraudulently appear as if it’s military or aerospace grade. And the difference in these chips is that the military and aerospace are more expensive, because they’re supposed to function in harsher conditions and harsher environments. So a counterfeiter, if they change the grade of this commercial chip and increase it artificially, they could sell it for more than they paid for it. And the person who’s getting it is getting a product that may be harmful; it may not stand up in the environments it needs to.gE7esmc

已經(jīng)流通的這類芯片的第二部分是所謂的重新標(biāo)記芯片。因此，通常這樣做是為了提高組件的等級。例如，一個商業(yè)芯片，它的封裝可能會被改變，使它看起來像是軍用或航空級的。這些芯片的不同之處在于軍事和航空航天更昂貴，因為它們應(yīng)該在更惡劣的條件和更惡劣的環(huán)境中運行。所以一個造假者，如果他們改變這個商業(yè)芯片的等級，人為地增加它，他們可以賣得比買的價格高。得到它的人正在得到一種可能有害的產(chǎn)品；它可能無法在它需要的環(huán)境中工作。 gE7esmc

And the other two types are defective and out-of-spec chips. So these are chips that could fail post-manufacturing tests, and they’re supposed to be destroyed by the manufacturer. But maybe they’re not properly disposed of, or maybe they’re, again, stolen by some kind of insider. They end up getting packaged and actually appear in the supply chain. gE7esmc

其他兩種類型是有缺陷和不合規(guī)格的芯片。所以這些芯片可能無法通過制造后的測試，它們應(yīng)該被制造商銷毀。但也許它們沒有得到妥善處理，或者它們再次被某種內(nèi)部人員偷走。它們最終被封裝好并實際出現(xiàn)在供應(yīng)鏈中。gE7esmc

So there’s actually been evidence of this long back, where there was a manufacturing step off the chip’s failure, which was to put an ink dot on it. And that would mean that it failed tests and it should be destroyed. But people later found when they de-packaged ships, they found some pieces of silicon that actually had that marking. So they were somehow getting in the market.gE7esmc

實際操作中有類似證據(jù)，很久以前，在芯片制造步驟中，會給發(fā)現(xiàn)故障的芯片上面放一個墨點。這意味著它沒有通過測試，應(yīng)該被銷毀。但后來人們在拆封裝時，發(fā)現(xiàn)了一些封裝內(nèi)有這個標(biāo)記的硅片。所以他們以某種方式進(jìn)入了市場。 gE7esmc

And then the last one that I’ll mention is just, you know, the typical thing you think as a counterfeit: a copy or a clone or a knockoff design. And this could include a real replica, it can include knockoff, and it could even include one that’s been modified intentionally or tampered, like we discussed earlier.gE7esmc

然后我要提到的最后一個就是，你知道的，你認(rèn)為是仿冒品的典型東西：復(fù)制品、克隆品或仿冒設(shè)計。這可能包括一個真正的復(fù)制品，它可以包括仿冒品，甚至可以包括故意修改或篡改的復(fù)制品，就像我們之前討論的那樣。 gE7esmc

Let me go into just slightly more detail on some anecdotes about what I’ve heard about recycled chips.gE7esmc

讓我稍微詳細(xì)地談?wù)勎衣犝f過的關(guān)于回收芯片的一些軼事。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: Sure.gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: So I’ve heard that the conditions from where they remove these chips from their previous systems are not always very good. So again, they might heat up the board that it’s on, they might bang the board to get the chip off. I’ve heard stories that they wash the chips in the streets, either in rivers or in streets. I mean, clearly stuff that you should not be exposing your chip to.gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE：所以我聽說他們從以前的系統(tǒng)中移除這些芯片的條件并不總是很好。再說一次，他們可能會加熱它所在的電路板，他們可能會敲擊電路板以使芯片脫落。我聽說過他們在街上洗芯片的故事，無論是在河里還是在街上。 我的意思是，顯然是你不應(yīng)該將芯片暴露的環(huán)境。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: Clearly!gE7esmc

gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: Yeah. The hermetic seals are probably broken, the package is probably cracked, there’s probably all kinds of humidity issues, all kinds of things. So this just adds, again, to the fact that these are already used chips, but they’re probably also damaged.gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE:是的。密封可能壞了，包裝可能裂了，可能有各種各樣的濕度問題，各種各樣的問題。因此，這再次增加了這些已經(jīng)使用過的芯片的事實，但它們可能也已損壞。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: It just sounds amazing that a bunch of people could go dumpster diving, wash these things in the street, and then be sophisticated enough to put somebody else’s logo on the package.gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO：一群人可以去垃圾箱潛水，在街上洗這些東西，然后足夠復(fù)雜，可以在封裝上貼上別人的標(biāo)志，這聽起來很神奇。 gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: Yeah! So there are a list of trusted and authorized distributors that the original chip manufacturers encourage their folks to go to, and the government also specifies by law that defense contractors should use these channels. But again, you could get desperate if there’s a chip shortage, if there’s a component that you can see that’s really cheap on eBay. Again, it may slip through the cracks.gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE:是的！ 因此，有一份原始芯片制造商鼓勵他們的人去的受信任和授權(quán)的分銷商名單，政府還通過法律規(guī)定國防承包商應(yīng)該使用這些渠道。但同樣，如果芯片短缺，如果你可以在 eBay 上看到非常便宜的組件，你可能會感到絕望。同樣，它可能會從裂縫中溜走。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: Oh, wow! I was gonna ask you about that later. But to be honest, I just can’t let that go. That level of desperation, where a company is willing to actually send out a potentially faulty product, possibly a potentially dangerous product, just because they feel compelled to get it out the door. That’s not encouraging if you want to minimize the use of counterfeit products!gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: 哦，哇！ 我以后會問你的。但說實話，我就是放不下。 那種絕望的程度，一家公司愿意實際發(fā)送一個潛在的有缺陷的產(chǎn)品，可能是一個潛在的危險產(chǎn)品，只是因為他們覺得有必要把它拿出來。如果您想最大限度地減少假冒產(chǎn)品的使用，那可不令人鼓舞！ gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: Yeah, definitely. So I would suspect that your large companies are definitely not going through unauthorized channels. Like, for example, your vehicle manufacturers. They’re waiting it out. They’re not buying anything that they shouldn’t be buying.gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE：是的，當(dāng)然。 所以我懷疑你們的大公司肯定不會通過未經(jīng)授權(quán)的渠道。例如，您的汽車制造商。他們正在等待芯片。他們不會買任何他們不應(yīng)該買的東西。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: I hear that some companies are actually shipping… Tesla was reported to be shipping certain models that simply don’t have certain ICs, and they’re being overt about it because they’re simply not to be had.gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO：我聽說有些公司實際上正在發(fā)貨……據(jù)報道，特斯拉正在發(fā)貨的某些型號根本沒有某些 IC，而且他們對此很公開，因為它們根本就沒有。 gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: Right. I think those guys, the game video games industry, I mean, every one of the big companies that has something to lose, they’re not going to do anything fraudulent for sure. But I think the small companies are definitely more susceptible here.gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: 對。我認(rèn)為那些家伙，游戲視頻游戲行業(yè)，我的意思是，每一家有損失的大公司，他們肯定不會做任何欺詐行為。但我認(rèn)為小公司在這里肯定更容易受到影響。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: Often it’s a matter of survival in some cases. Yeah?gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO：在某些情況下，這通常是生存問題。是吧？ gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: Yes. There are stories about people going to jail, like the companies that are actually doing the false distribution. Sometimes they just take your order, but they actually don’t send you anything. Sometimes they’re actively going and trying to find products that are old and are used and refurbishing them. They find evidence of that. And again, these people go to jail.gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: 是的。我聽說過人們?nèi)氇z的故事，比如實際上在進(jìn)行虛假分銷的公司。有時他們只是接受您的訂單，但實際上他們并沒有向您發(fā)送任何東西。有時他們會積極地尋找舊的、使用過的產(chǎn)品并對其進(jìn)行翻新。他們找到了證據(jù)。再一次，這些人進(jìn)了監(jiān)獄。 gE7esmc

Back several years ago, I remember seeing on the news there was a lawsuit. Xilinx was suing somebody claiming that they were doing that, and actually doing other things as well, to sell counterfeits, basically to Xilinx customers.gE7esmc

回到幾年前，我記得在新聞上看到有一場官司。 Xilinx 起訴某人，聲稱他們正在這樣做，并且實際上也在做其他事情，主要是向 Xilinx 客戶銷售假冒產(chǎn)品。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: There are regulations in place where defense contractors are supposed to be going to approved vendors, and they’re still getting taken. I’m sure the numbers aren’t reliable because the reporting isn’t thorough, but I saw one estimate one time that said 5% of all chips that the US military receives might be fraudulent counterfeited somehow.gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO：有規(guī)定國防承包商應(yīng)該去經(jīng)批準(zhǔn)的供應(yīng)商，他們?nèi)匀槐徊扇　?我確信這些數(shù)字不可靠，因為報告不徹底，但我曾經(jīng)看到一個估計，稱美國軍方收到的所有芯片中有 5% 可能以某種方式被偽造。 gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: Just to mention what the US government has done. So in 2012, there was a National Defense Authorization Act. And I think, if I recall, it had two major implications. They made it so that the US contractors who were supplying parts to the government (or even equipment that was using chips) to the government, it was their responsibility to check into the parts. And they would I think be liable if anything happened. They would have to rework the system, and I guess perhaps pay for damages. So that was one thing.gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE：僅提及美國政府所做的事情。所以在2012年，就有了國防授權(quán)法。我認(rèn)為，如果我記得的話，它有兩個主要含義。他們這樣做是為了讓那些向政府供應(yīng)零件（甚至是使用芯片的設(shè)備）的美國承包商有責(zé)任檢查這些零件。如果發(fā)生任何事情，我認(rèn)為他們會承擔(dān)責(zé)任。他們將不得不重新設(shè)計系統(tǒng)，我想也許會支付損害賠償金。所以這是一回事。 gE7esmc

And the second thing is that if a contractor became aware or had reason to suspect that a component was counterfeited, they had to report it to the government, specifically the Government Industry Data Exchange program, or GIDA. Now, again, by law, they were supposed to do that. But I couldn’t say whether or not everybody follows that or not.gE7esmc

第二件事是，如果承包商意識到或有理由懷疑某個組件是假冒的，他們必須向政府報告，特別是政府行業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)交換計劃或 GIDA?，F(xiàn)在，再一次，根據(jù)法律，他們應(yīng)該這樣做。但我不能說是否每個人都遵循這一點。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: Well, I guess this is a good point to bring up something you and I discussed in our discussion earlier, before recording. Reporting is somewhat problematic. And my analogy was 20 years ago, when network and computer hacking began to get really profoundly serious and large companies began to get hacked and people’s privacy — their credit cards and whatnot– it became obvious were targets. It was difficult to get companies to report the fact that they had been hacked. Because it was a) embarrassing and b) perhaps even foolhardy to let people know, Hey, our system was vulnerable. We’re still working on getting it secure. But if we’re still working on getting it secure, that means we’re still vulnerable.gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO：嗯，我想這是一個很好的觀點，可以在錄制之前提出你和我在之前討論中討論的內(nèi)容。報告有些問題。我的類比是 20 年前，當(dāng)網(wǎng)絡(luò)和計算機(jī)黑客開始變得非常嚴(yán)重，大公司開始受到黑客攻擊，人們的隱私——他們的信用卡等等——很明顯成為目標(biāo)。很難讓公司報告他們被黑客入侵的事實。因為它 a) 令人尷尬 b) 讓人們知道可能甚至是魯莽的，嘿，我們的系統(tǒng)很脆弱。 我們?nèi)栽谂Υ_保它的安全。但是，如果我們?nèi)栽谂Υ_保它的安全，那意味著我們?nèi)匀缓艽嗳酢?gE7esmc

So there are reasons why a company might not want to report if they’ve been hacked. And I would imagine there are reasons that a company or an organization might not want to report that they’ve been subjected to counterfeit, to some counterfeit scam.gE7esmc

因此，如果公司被黑客入侵，公司可能不想報告是有原因的。 而且我想有一些原因，公司或組織可能不想報告他們受到假冒，受到假冒騙局的影響。 gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: Yeah. So we go back to the Bloomberg big hack article, and Supermicro was a victim there in two ways. If at the manufacturing source, their systems were modified, they were a victim. They were also a victim of the article. The article basically tanked their stock. And I’m not sure if they’ve completely recovered yet. And it’s been two or three years.gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: 是的。所以我們回到 Bloomberg 的大黑客文章，Supermicro 在兩個方面成為了受害者。如果在制造源頭，他們的系統(tǒng)被修改，他們就是受害者。他們也是這篇文章的受害者。這篇文章基本上讓他們的股票大跌。而且我不確定他們是否已經(jīng)完全康復(fù)。而且已經(jīng)兩三年了。 gE7esmc

So yeah, nobody wants to admit that there’s a problem. And even if you were to admit that you want to maybe add a new feature to your or your chip that is an anti-counterfeit technology, they might also be a little hesitant to do that, too. Because it’s like they’re admitting that there’s a problem that’s been there for a while and they haven’t taken care of it.gE7esmc

所以，是的，沒有人愿意承認(rèn)存在問題。即使您承認(rèn)您可能想在您的或您的芯片中添加一項新功能，即一種防偽技術(shù)，他們也可能會有點猶豫。因為這就像他們承認(rèn)有一個問題已經(jīng)存在了一段時間并且他們沒有解決它。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: Right. I would like to move on and talk about some of the techniques, practices and technology that are available to companies to counteract counterfeiting. There’s a YouTube video that I saw of a presentation that you did where you were talking about work that you and your students and your colleagues were doing on one of these technological methods. gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: 對。我想繼續(xù)談?wù)劰究梢杂脕泶驌艏倜暗囊恍┘夹g(shù)、實踐和技術(shù)。我在 YouTube上看到了一個演示文稿，你在其中談?wù)摿四愫湍愕膶W(xué)生以及你的同事在其中一種技術(shù)方法上所做的工作。gE7esmc

Can I ask you to give us a quick review of what methods are available? First, what techniques a company should apply. What are some best practices that you can put into place in your purchasing process that would help inoculate you against this? And then I’d like to ask you to go ahead and talk about some of the actual tools that are available for examining parts that are coming in for whether or not they’re counterfeit or legitimate.gE7esmc

我可以請您快速回顧一下可用的方法嗎？首先，公司應(yīng)該應(yīng)用什么技術(shù)。您可以在購買過程中采取哪些最佳實踐來幫助您預(yù)防這種情況？然后我想請您繼續(xù)討論一些可用于檢查進(jìn)入的零件是否是假冒或合法的實際工具。 gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: Sure, sure. So I’ll start with probably the most prevalent and well-studied area. In fact, the one that has standards actually already around it. And that’s in the area of physical and electrical inspection of parts. So there again are these standards that give you a series of tests that you should apply to a part specifically to detect types of defects that occur in counterfeit parts. So like I mentioned earlier, some of these defects could be external, they could be on the package. These tests would, for example, physically inspect using microscopes, using x-ray, using other imaging techniques to try to find these defects.gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE： 當(dāng)然，當(dāng)然。所以我將從最流行和研究最充分的領(lǐng)域開始。 事實上，有標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的那個實際上已經(jīng)在它周圍了。那是在零件的物理和電氣檢查領(lǐng)域。因此，這些標(biāo)準(zhǔn)再次為您提供了一系列測試，您應(yīng)該將這些測試專門應(yīng)用于零件，以檢測假冒零件中出現(xiàn)的缺陷類型。所以就像我之前提到的，其中一些缺陷可能是外部的，它們可能在包裝上。例如，這些測試將使用顯微鏡進(jìn)行物理檢查，使用 X 射線，使用其他成像技術(shù)來嘗試發(fā)現(xiàn)這些缺陷。 gE7esmc

And typically, this would be done by a subject matter expert. So a person who has experience in this area, is trained to detect these defects. So anybody who’s making purchases, especially getting these defense contractors, what they will do is they will make a purchase, and they will send a batch of these chips to a test lab who’s certified to run these kinds of tests. And they will pay for a series of these tests, maybe a subset of them, and they’ll get a report back from them about whether or not these suspect chips are legitimate or whether or not they’re suspect, counterfeit. And that’s probably the main and most well-studied approach.gE7esmc

通常，這將由主題專家完成。因此，在這方面有經(jīng)驗的人接受了檢測這些缺陷的培訓(xùn)。因此，任何購買的人，尤其是這些國防承包商，他們要做的就是購買，并將一批這些芯片發(fā)送到經(jīng)過認(rèn)證可以進(jìn)行此類測試的測試實驗室。他們將支付一系列這些測試的費用，也許是其中的一部分，他們會從他們那里得到一份報告，說明這些可疑芯片是否是合法的，或者它們是否是可疑的，假冒的。這可能是主要的也是研究最充分的方法。gE7esmc

I highlighted mostly the physical, but there are also some very basic electrical tests that people do as well. And these are covered in the standards.gE7esmc

我主要強(qiáng)調(diào)了物理測試，但也有一些人們也會做的非?；镜碾姎鉁y試。這些都包含在標(biāo)準(zhǔn)中。 gE7esmc

And then in terms of other tools and things, we have commercially available solutions. So besides the inspection by labs, there’s a couple of companies that have come up with a kind of a, like, an all-in-one kind of system to detect counterfeits. Battelle is one of them. Battelle has this technology called Barricade. It’s this small like electrical system with a socket, and you basically plug your chip into the socket. It can take chips of varying sizes. And the system basically exercises it, gives the chip some kind of stimulus, and according to the chip type, it compares it to a set of measurements from an authentic chip of that type. And based on the measurements, it tries to use machine learning and classification methods to discern if it’s counterfeit or authentic.gE7esmc

然后在其他工具和事物方面，我們有商業(yè)可用的解決方案。因此，除了實驗室檢查之外，還有幾家公司提出了一種類似的一體化系統(tǒng)來檢測假冒產(chǎn)品。Battelle就是其中之一。 Battelle 擁有一項名為 Barricade 的技術(shù)。 這是一個帶有插座的小型電氣系統(tǒng)，您基本上將芯片插入插座。它可以容納不同大小的芯片。系統(tǒng)基本上會對其進(jìn)行練習(xí)，給芯片某種刺激，然后根據(jù)芯片類型，將其與來自該類型真實芯片的一組測量值進(jìn)行比較。并根據(jù)測量結(jié)果，嘗試使用機(jī)器學(xué)習(xí)和分類方法來辨別它是假冒的還是正宗的。 gE7esmc

Now, the only limitation in this case, compared to the inspection tests, is that you do need a set of authentic measurements from a known good chip. And for those chips that, again, are obsolete or nobody took these measurements to begin with, you wouldn’t have any point of reference to do it.gE7esmc

現(xiàn)在，與檢查測試相比，這種情況下的唯一限制是您確實需要來自已知良好芯片的一組真實測量。對于那些再次過時或沒有人開始進(jìn)行這些測量的芯片，你將沒有任何參考點來做這件事。 gE7esmc

The inspection by test labs, though, is a little different. Because the defects that they detect are very generic, they’re very well known. Things like scratches, burned markings, re-surfacing. Those are very generic things. So those are easy to find.gE7esmc

但是，測試實驗室的檢查略有不同。因為他們檢測到的缺陷非常普遍，所以眾所周知。諸如劃痕，燒傷標(biāo)記，重新鋪面之類的東西。這些都是非常通用的東西。所以這些很容易找到。 gE7esmc

And then the other things that have mostly been developed out of research, out of academia, but haven’t been adopted yet, are twofold. There have been targeted tests that have been developed that are a little bit less generic. And in some cases, they don’t require a set of authentic measurements to work. So that’s one area that myself and others have worked extensively on.gE7esmc

然后其他大部分是在研究、學(xué)術(shù)界開發(fā)但尚未被采用的東西是雙重的。已經(jīng)開發(fā)了一些不太通用的有針對性的測試。在某些情況下，它們不需要一組真實的測量值即可工作。所以這是我和其他人廣泛研究的一個領(lǐng)域。 gE7esmc

So as an example, for the recycled chips, in order to take those types of counterfeits, what you have to do is kind of get a measure of how much the chip has been used or how much it’s been aged. So there are tests that you could run that they typically do during a lot of manufacturing anyway called burn-in tests, where they perform accelerated aging on the part to see how it will withstand aging. How long it will last in say, two or three years. You could run a test like that, and you can compare the before and after.gE7esmc

舉個例子，對于回收的芯片，為了采取這些類型的假冒產(chǎn)品，你需要做的是衡量芯片的使用量或老化程度。因此，您可以運行一些測試，這些測試通常在許多制造過程中進(jìn)行，稱為老化測試，它們在部件上執(zhí)行加速老化，以查看它如何承受老化。能持續(xù)多久，比如兩三年。你可以運行一個這樣的測試，你可以比較之前和之后。 gE7esmc

So if the chip doesn’t change a whole lot, it means it’s actually probably previously used, because the aging process itself tends to kind of slow down and saturate over time. That could be an indicator that you’re working with a counterfeit. And again, it doesn’t necessarily require a reference. You’re actually using the chip itself as a reference for itself. So the before burn-in and after burn-in, you’re comparing those two.gE7esmc

因此，如果芯片沒有發(fā)生太大變化，這意味著它實際上可能是以前使用過的，因為老化過程本身往往會隨著時間的推移而減慢和飽和。這可能表明您正在使用假冒產(chǎn)品。同樣，它不一定需要參考。您實際上是在使用芯片本身作為自己的參考。因此，老化前和老化后，您是在比較這兩者。 gE7esmc

And besides these tests, again, there have been tests developed for all kinds of chips. FPGAs, all kinds of memories: SRAM, DRAM flash, system on chip, analog chips, and so on. But the alternative to this — and this is where there has been a lot of research as well — is in developing anti-counterfeit sensors or primitives. So these are things that you have to add to new chips. So you add them to the chips that are being manufactured today and designed today, and they pay off much further down the line. Because a lot of today’s chips become tomorrow’s counterfeits. If a company is willing to invest and add these sensors or primitives to their chip, they could get ahead of the problem later.gE7esmc

除了這些測試之外，還有針對各種芯片的測試。FPGA、各種存儲器：SRAM、DRAM閃存、片上系統(tǒng)、模擬芯片等。但替代方案——這也是有大量研究的地方——是開發(fā)防偽傳感器或原語。所以這些是你必須添加到新芯片中的東西。因此，您將它們添加到今天正在制造和設(shè)計的芯片中，它們會在未來獲得更多回報。因為今天的很多芯片都變成了明天的贗品。如果一家公司愿意投資并將這些傳感器或原語添加到他們的芯片中，他們可以在以后解決問題。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: What kind of premium would adding this type of sensor or circuitry to a chip represent?gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO：將這種類型的傳感器或電路添加到芯片中意味著什么樣的溢價？ gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: Personally, I think that they’re mostly inexpensive, but it depends. It’s a case-by-case dependence. So for a chip that itself is only worth pennies, like maybe a very simple analog component, this may be this may be very expensive to add to that. But if we’re talking about a processor or an FPGA, I think this is less than a fraction of a penny to probably add some of these sensors. And that’s in terms of silicon area and things like that.gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE：就個人而言，我認(rèn)為它們大多不貴，但這取決于具體個案。 所以對于一個本身只值幾美分的芯片，比如一個非常簡單的模擬組件，這可能是非常昂貴的。但是，如果我們談?wù)摰氖翘幚砥骰?FPGA，我認(rèn)為添加這些傳感器可能還不到一分錢。這是在硅面積等方面。 gE7esmc

But the silicon area is probably only one part of the cost. The other part of the cost is really in taking measurements of it periodically. So after its manufactured, taking a measurement from the sensor, and then as it’s moving through the supply chain, taking measurements. You may also want to take measurements for a system that’s in the field as well.gE7esmc

但硅面積可能只是成本的一部分。成本的另一部分實際上是定期對其進(jìn)行測量。因此，在制造完成后，從傳感器進(jìn)行測量，然后在它通過供應(yīng)鏈時進(jìn)行測量。您可能還想對現(xiàn)場系統(tǒng)進(jìn)行測量。 gE7esmc

So there’s additional time and cost and resources to collect that data, store it and maybe provide a service where you can analyze that data and get a response about whether or not this is anomalous or not.gE7esmc

因此，需要額外的時間、成本和資源來收集、存儲數(shù)據(jù)并提供服務(wù)，您可以在其中分析數(shù)據(jù)并獲得有關(guān)這是否異常的響應(yīng)。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: Yeah. Interesting. So, the tests and techniques that exist today, there’s going to be at least some cost and some time penalty associated with them. Again, I imagine that it makes a difference case by case. But is there any rule of thumb or sense of exactly… would it be days, weeks, months that this might add?gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: 是的。有趣的。因此，今天存在的測試和技術(shù)至少會產(chǎn)生一些成本和一些時間損失。同樣，我想這會因情況而異。但是有沒有任何經(jīng)驗法則或確切的感覺……這可能會增加幾天、幾周、幾個月？ gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: Oh, no, no, no, I think it’s a very short amount of time. In fact, like I mentioned with burn-in, those types of tests are done anyway, typically, after manufacturing, so you’d just be asking them to measure the sensor. And again, if it’s designed in a certain way that it’s easily accessible, it shouldn’t take much time.gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE：哦，不，不，不，我認(rèn)為這是很短的時間。事實上，就像我提到的老化一樣，這些類型的測試無論如何都會完成，通常是在制造之后，所以你只是要求他們測量傳感器。再說一次，如果它以某種易于訪問的方式設(shè)計，那么它應(yīng)該不會花費太多時間。 gE7esmc

Now, when a chip or a system is moving through the supply chain, in order to test every chip on a PCB, that may require additional infrastructure that I think could be designed and added to boards. And we could build standards and protocols around that.gE7esmc

現(xiàn)在，當(dāng)芯片或系統(tǒng)在供應(yīng)鏈中移動時，為了測試 PCB 上的每個芯片，這可能需要額外的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，我認(rèn)為這些基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施可以設(shè)計并添加到電路板上。我們可以圍繞它建立標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和協(xié)議。 gE7esmc

So for example, if you were to purchase a printed circuit board, there should be a chip on there that kind of gets the information from all those chips on the board, securely sends it to a database or cloud for you, and then there’s a service — again, in the cloud — that’s verifying this information and telling you that this board and all of its chips are okay. That doesn’t exist today. But there’s no reason to believe that it couldn’t. gE7esmc

例如，如果你要購買一塊印刷電路板，上面應(yīng)該有一個芯片，可以從板上的所有芯片中獲取信息，為你安全地將其發(fā)送到數(shù)據(jù)庫或云中，然后有一個服務(wù) - 再次，在云中 - 驗證此信息并告訴您該板及其所有芯片都可以。這在今天不存在。但沒有理由相信它不能。 gE7esmc

And again, it would require an investment, but I don’t think it’s that significant compared to the cost of counterfeits. Which, by the way, we haven’t really mentioned, but it’s estimated to be in the range of 7.5 billion each year. This is according to a semiconductor industry association.gE7esmc

再說一次，這需要投資，但與假冒產(chǎn)品的成本相比，我認(rèn)為這并不重要。順便說一句，我們還沒有真正提到，但估計每年在 75 億左右。這是根據(jù)半導(dǎo)體行業(yè)協(xié)會的說法。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: Wow! That’s sobering. Interesting! New techniques that are in development. Are there other techniques that might be being created now or could be created soon that would help counteract the counterfeiting problem?gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: 哇！ 這是發(fā)人深省的。有趣的！正在開發(fā)的新技術(shù)。是否有其他可能正在創(chuàng)造或可能很快創(chuàng)造出來的技術(shù)來幫助抵制假冒問題？ gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: Yeah, yeah. So there’s been some research by a couple of groups, also funded by a few agencies, towards building that cloud environment, like especially with blockchain. So blockchain will give you this capability where it could be decentralized. So all types of companies can contribute to it. And it’s a record that is untamperable that it creates. So that’s a technology that people are investing in.gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE： 是的，是的。因此，幾個小組（也由一些機(jī)構(gòu)資助）進(jìn)行了一些研究，以構(gòu)建云環(huán)境，尤其是區(qū)塊鏈。所以區(qū)塊鏈會給你這種去中心化的能力。所以所有類型的公司都可以為它做出貢獻(xiàn)。它創(chuàng)造了一個不可篡改的記錄。所以這是人們正在投資的一項技術(shù)。 gE7esmc

There’s a technology that I developed in my group. The patent was published recently, although I don’t think it’s approved yet. And it’s based on using the low-dropout regulator, which is in a lot of chips, even some analog chips. It’s called an LDL. And again, it’s responsible for power regulation. We found that we could use it to detect recycled chips, because it actually degrades when the chip is being used. And it’s unavoidable to not age this part, because if the chip is being powered and it’s being used, it’s using a power regulator. So we’ve developed a set of tests that can use that.gE7esmc

我在小組中開發(fā)了一項技術(shù)。該專利是最近公布的，雖然我認(rèn)為它還沒有被批準(zhǔn)。它基于使用低壓差穩(wěn)壓器，這種穩(wěn)壓器存在于很多芯片中，甚至是一些模擬芯片中。它被稱為LDL。再次，它負(fù)責(zé)功率調(diào)節(jié)。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)我們可以用它來檢測回收的芯片，因為在使用芯片時它實際上會退化。并且這部分不能老化是不可避免的，因為如果芯片正在供電并且正在使用，它正在使用電源調(diào)節(jié)器。 所以我們開發(fā)了一套可以使用它的測試。 gE7esmc

And again, it’s almost like a universal technique, because this component is available in a lot of chips. And we’re also right now creating a version where you could modify an existing LDL in your design and add it to new designs to make this technology even better, even more accurate.gE7esmc

再說一次，它幾乎就像一種通用技術(shù)，因為這個組件在很多芯片中都可用。我們現(xiàn)在也在創(chuàng)建一個版本，您可以在其中修改設(shè)計中現(xiàn)有的 LDL 并將其添加到新設(shè)計中，以使這項技術(shù)變得更好、更準(zhǔn)確。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: Nice! Okay, cool! I have asked about every question I can think of to ask about this phenomenon. What haven’t I asked about that’s interesting or of note?gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: 太好了！我已經(jīng)詢問了我能想到的所有關(guān)于這種現(xiàn)象的問題。 我沒有問什么有趣或值得注意的事情？gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: There’s one other thing I wanted to mention. It’s what I alluded to when we first started, and it’s that the US government did some things to try to crack down things in 2012, especially with the National Defense Authorization Act, but that was pushed on the equipment manufacturers. But I think that the chip manufacturers need to do their part, too. Which means they should try to adopt a lot of these sensors and techniques. And there could be a variety of reasons to hopefully help motivate them to do that.gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE：我還想提一件事。這是我剛開始時提到的，是美國政府在2012年做了一些事情試圖打擊事情，特別是通過國防授權(quán)法案，但這是強(qiáng)加給設(shè)備制造商的。但我認(rèn)為芯片制造商也需要盡自己的一份力量。這意味著他們應(yīng)該嘗試大量采用這些傳感器和技術(shù)?？赡苡卸喾N原因可以幫助激勵他們這樣做。 gE7esmc

One of which is that some of these technologies are not only useful for anti-counterfeit, but they could have all their other purposes as well. So for example, those aging sensors, or odometers, that I mentioned, they can be used to detect recycled chips, but they could also be used for preventive maintenance. So if you’re monitoring a system over time, and you realize that this chip has been used quite a bit, you may know that it’s going to be in need of replacement very soon. And rather than the whole system coming down because of this one chip, you could avoid the downtime.gE7esmc

其中之一是其中一些技術(shù)不僅可用于防偽，而且還可以用于其他所有目的。例如，我提到的那些老化的傳感器或里程表，它們可以用來檢測回收的芯片，但它們也可以用于預(yù)防性維護(hù)。因此，如果您隨著時間的推移監(jiān)控系統(tǒng)，并且意識到該芯片已經(jīng)使用了很多次，您可能知道它很快就會需要更換。而不是整個系統(tǒng)因為這個芯片而崩潰，您可以避免停機(jī)時間。 gE7esmc

And so the company gets a benefit for that. And the company that’s using the chip gets a benefit, and the manufacturer will look better as well, if they actually offer this feature. So that’s one example.gE7esmc

因此，公司因此而受益。使用該芯片的公司會從中受益，如果制造商真的提供此功能，他們也會看起來更好。這是一個例子。 gE7esmc

And then the other example, as a motivator for the chip manufacturers, is that we’re all consumers of electronics, even them. So they’re purchasing monitors and PCs and all kinds of electronics themselves. Even though they’re claiming that you should go to authorized distributors, they may be purchasing things that they don’t know where it’s from, or they may be getting things from places they don’t know. And it affects their own business, and it affects them personally because, as we discussed, this could affect their own families, if this is placed in a car or a plane that, you know, their family’s on, their own safety is at risk.gE7esmc

然后另一個例子，作為芯片制造商的動力，我們都是電子產(chǎn)品的消費者，甚至是他們。所以他們自己購買顯示器、個人電腦和各種電子產(chǎn)品。即使他們聲稱您應(yīng)該去找授權(quán)經(jīng)銷商，但他們可能會購買他們不知道來自哪里的東西，或者他們可能會從他們不知道的地方獲取東西。它影響到他們自己的生意，也影響到他們個人，因為正如我們所討論的，這可能會影響到他們自己的家人，如果把它放在汽車或飛機(jī)上，你知道，他們的家人在上面，他們自己的安全就會受到威脅 . gE7esmc

So really for the good of the ecosystem, I hope that the chip manufacturers will take it a little bit more seriously as well. I would suspect that it would be difficult to, again, for the government to enforce having these sensors in things. But there are examples where it has been done.gE7esmc

所以真的為了生態(tài)系統(tǒng)的利益，我希望芯片制造商也能更加認(rèn)真地對待它。我懷疑政府很難再次強(qiáng)制在事物中安裝這些傳感器。但是有一些例子已經(jīng)完成了。 gE7esmc

Our vehicles have to contain odometers by law. And there’s even some countries that have odometer databases. So when you sell a car, the odometer value goes into that database to make sure that nobody’s turning it backwards. So if we do this for cars, I can’t see why we can’t do it for electronics. And electronics are being used more and more in the last few decades. They’re ubiquitous today. And some of them are in our homes and our IoT devices, all these kinds of things. It seems like the next natural step to me to take this more seriously.gE7esmc

根據(jù)法律，我們的車輛必須包含里程表。甚至有些國家擁有里程表數(shù)據(jù)庫。 因此，當(dāng)您出售汽車時，里程表值會進(jìn)入該數(shù)據(jù)庫，以確保沒有人將其倒轉(zhuǎn)。所以如果我們?yōu)槠囎鲞@件事，我不明白為什么我們不能為電子產(chǎn)品做這件事。 在過去的幾十年里，電子產(chǎn)品的使用越來越多。它們今天無處不在。其中一些在我們的家中和我們的物聯(lián)網(wǎng)設(shè)備中，所有這些東西。對我來說，更認(rèn)真地對待這似乎是下一個自然步驟。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: I’m sorry for laughing, to laugh for crying. After losing $5 billion per year, and probably being aware of horror stories after 20, 30, 40 years of counterfeiting. It’s probably 40 years too late. But it would be nice to start, wouldn’t it?gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO：我為笑而抱歉。在每年損失 50 億美元之后，并且可能在 20、30、40 年的假冒之后意識到恐怖故事?？赡転闀r已晚 40 年。 但是開始會很好，不是嗎？ gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: Yeah, yeah. People always talk about how it takes time for policy to catch up to the technology. And I think that’s understandable. But in this case, again, the problem has been around for maybe 30 or 40 years. It’s really time for the policy to catch up!gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE： 是的，是的。人們總是談?wù)撜呷绾乌s上技術(shù)需要時間。我認(rèn)為這是可以理解的。但在這種情況下，同樣，問題已經(jīng)存在了 30 或 40 年。政策真的到了該跟上的時候了！ gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: Yeah. Domenic Forte, thank you so much for being on the show.gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO:是的。Domenic Forte，非常感謝你參加這個節(jié)目。 gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE: Thanks again for inviting me. This is a topic near and dear to me.gE7esmc

DOMENIC FORTE： 再次感謝您邀請我。這是一個對我來說很熟悉的話題。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: That was Domenic Forte from the University of Florida.gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO：以上是佛羅里達(dá)大學(xué)的 Domenic Forte。 gE7esmc

Our next guest is Barbara Jorgensen from our sister publication, EPS News. Barb is one of the most knowledgeable reporters in the industry when it comes to matters of electronics distribution and procurement, and in fact, I prepped for my discussion with Domenic Forte by reading some of her coverage.gE7esmc

我們的下一位嘉賓是來自我們姊妹刊物 EPS News 的 Barbara Jorgensen。 在電子產(chǎn)品分銷和采購方面，Barb 是業(yè)內(nèi)知識最淵博的記者之一，事實上，我通過閱讀她的一些報道為與 Domenic Forte 的討論做好了準(zhǔn)備。 gE7esmc

I asked Barb to describe how the market tries to minimize the problem. Part of my question was about blockchain techniques and the extent to which they’re being used in addressing the issue.gE7esmc

我請Barb描述市場如何試圖將問題最小化。我的部分問題是關(guān)于區(qū)塊鏈技術(shù)以及它們在多大程度上被用于解決這個問題。 gE7esmc

BARBARA JORGENSEN: There are a number of ways that you can lower the risk of procuring bad chips in the first place. And the authorized distribution channel has been fighting this for as long as there have been counterfeit parts. They differentiate themselves from the open market, or something that’s called the gray market, where chips that are not used can be resold sometimes pennies on the dollar. But if they’re in high demand, they can be sold at a premium. And this includes a lot of the end-of-life chips and the older chips that you and the professor were talking about. They’re hard to get, they’re hard to find. And if you find them, you’re willing to pay top dollar for them.gE7esmc

BARBARA JORGENSEN：首先，您可以通過多種方式降低購買劣質(zhì)芯片的風(fēng)險。只要有假冒零件，授權(quán)的分銷渠道就一直在與此作斗爭。他們將自己與公開市場或稱為灰色市場的東西區(qū)分開來，在這些市場中，未使用的芯片有時可以以美元的價格轉(zhuǎn)售。但如果它們的需求量很大，它們可以高價出售。這包括你和教授談?wù)摰脑S多報廢芯片和舊芯片。他們很難得到，很難找到。如果你找到它們，你愿意為它們支付高價。 gE7esmc

But the point is that authorized distribution buys factory direct. Brand owners such as Intel, AMD, Murata, really any component vendor, basically audits their distributors to make sure that they are handling their products correctly, they’re storing their products correctly, and that they have access to all of the information that the vendor can supply them in terms of who made the chip, where it was made. And they can kind of drill down to some really granular information such as the lot number, what factory it came from, who the packaging partner was, who the assembly partner was.gE7esmc

但關(guān)鍵是授權(quán)分銷是直接購買工廠。英特爾、AMD、村田等品牌所有者，實際上是任何組件供應(yīng)商，基本上都會審核他們的分銷商，以確保他們正確處理他們的產(chǎn)品，他們正確存儲他們的產(chǎn)品，并且他們可以訪問所有信息供應(yīng)商可以根據(jù)誰制造芯片、在哪里制造來向他們提供這些信息。他們可以深入了解一些非常精細(xì)的信息，例如批號、來自哪個工廠、包裝合作伙伴是誰、組裝合作伙伴是誰。 gE7esmc

Authorization is kind of the gold standard for the procurement side. This is kind of how I back into blockchain. Blockchain basically lets everybody in the chain know that this particular player has undergone a lot of these same things. If you’re Intel, and you’ve got three or four different partners before you actually sell that packaged chip, those partners will be part of the blockchain. So if you’re a user and you want to trace the stuff back, a blockchain will automatically give you the information that this person has been vetted, or this company has been vetted, that this is part of the supply chain. And you don’t have to really trace or research every single partner that the chip passes through.gE7esmc

授權(quán)是采購方面的黃金標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。這就是我回到區(qū)塊鏈的一種方式。區(qū)塊鏈基本上讓鏈中的每個人都知道這個特定的參與者經(jīng)歷了很多同樣的事情。如果您是英特爾，并且在您實際銷售該封裝芯片之前已經(jīng)擁有三四個不同的合作伙伴，那么這些合作伙伴將成為區(qū)塊鏈的一部分。因此，如果您是用戶并且想要追溯這些東西，區(qū)塊鏈將自動為您提供此人已經(jīng)過審查或這家公司已經(jīng)過審查的信息，這是供應(yīng)鏈的一部分。而且您不必真正追蹤或研究芯片通過的每個合作伙伴。 gE7esmc

You can start with the materials supplier. So there’s a lot of steps, and all of these steps do increase the risk of something going wrong or something being interjected into the chip. I don’t know how much downloading of malware goes on. I think the supply chain has that pretty well tightened up. But I think my original point was that the traceability is really important. And an authorized distributor will have all of that information directly from the chip factory. And that will be retained, whether it’s electronically, or in some cases, paperwork. But all of that information will follow the chip to the end user.gE7esmc

您可以從材料供應(yīng)商開始。所以有很多步驟，所有這些步驟確實增加了出錯或插入芯片的風(fēng)險。我不知道下載了多少惡意軟件。我認(rèn)為供應(yīng)鏈已經(jīng)收緊了。 但我認(rèn)為我最初的觀點是可追溯性非常重要。授權(quán)經(jīng)銷商將直接從芯片工廠獲得所有這些信息。這將被保留，無論是電子方式，還是在某些情況下，文書工作。但所有這些信息都將跟隨芯片傳遞給最終用戶。 gE7esmc

So really, although distributors do buy and sell among themselves, an authorized distributor will buy from the factory, it will buy from other authorized distributors, or it may obtain product that it sold, that the distributor sold to an end user that the end user no longer wants. And again, that traceability is going to be there, and it’s going to be demonstrated. That really lowers the risk of procuring a bad chip in the first place.gE7esmc

確實，盡管經(jīng)銷商之間確實進(jìn)行買賣，但授權(quán)經(jīng)銷商將從工廠購買，從其他授權(quán)經(jīng)銷商處購買，或者它可能會獲得其銷售的產(chǎn)品，即經(jīng)銷商出售給最終用戶的最終用戶不再想要。再一次，這種可追溯性將在那里，并將被證明。這確實降低了首先獲得不良芯片的風(fēng)險。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: It’s clear that there are situations where there’s a demand for chips and the supply isn’t there. What recourse do people have other than to go to the gray market?gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO：很明顯，有些情況下對芯片有需求而供應(yīng)卻沒有。除了去灰色市場，人們還有什么辦法？ gE7esmc

BARBARA JORGENSEN: There are distributors that aren’t authorized, that do buy and sell product, and many of them have the same standards as the authorized distributors. They will only buy product that’s in unopened boxes, and that the traceability data is intact and retrievable. Or in the case of paperwork. Many of them will actually perform lot tests on chips. If you invest in a thousand chips and notice that they’re in short supply, first of all, you’re going to charge a lot more than you usually do for them. But secondly, it definitely behooves you to make sure that you’re selling what you advertise.gE7esmc

BARBARA JORGENSEN：有些經(jīng)銷商是未經(jīng)授權(quán)的，他們買賣產(chǎn)品，其中許多與授權(quán)經(jīng)銷商的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)相同。他們只會購買未開封且可追溯性數(shù)據(jù)完整且可檢索的產(chǎn)品?；蛘咴谖臅ぷ鞯那闆r下。他們中的許多人實際上會對芯片進(jìn)行批量測試。如果您投資一千個芯片并注意到它們供不應(yīng)求，首先，您將收取比平時多得多的費用。但其次，你絕對有必要確保你正在銷售你所宣傳的東西。 gE7esmc

The other kind of player is kind of the Wild, Wild West of the chip market. These are basically opportunists. And yes, they will take damaged product; they will reclaim product from scrapped printed circuit boards; they will re-mark products that are in circulation, but they don’t perform to the standards of the chip that you’re looking for. And they will advertise, We have these things. They basically won’t give you a lot of information, and they won’t give you what you’re looking for. It’s basically just a straight-out purchase. And if you’re not as involved in the supply chain as I am, or really a lot of industries are, you might be tempted to buy from them without really knowing the traceability and how important that is. And that’s another way to make sure that you’re getting what they’re what they’re selling.gE7esmc

另一種玩家是芯片市場的狂野西部。這些基本上都是機(jī)會主義者。是的，他們會拿走損壞的產(chǎn)品；他們將從報廢的印刷電路板上回收產(chǎn)品；他們會重新標(biāo)記流通中的產(chǎn)品，但它們的性能不符合您正在尋找的芯片標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。他們會做廣告，我們有貨。他們基本上不會給你很多信息，也不會給你你想要的東西。這基本上只是直接購買。如果你不像我那樣參與供應(yīng)鏈，或者很多行業(yè)都參與其中，你可能會在不知道可追溯性及其重要性的情況下從他們那里購買。這是另一種確保你得到他們所賣的東西的方法。 gE7esmc

So going to the gray market is tempting. There are players with very high standards. And basically have built a reputation on that. But there are the opportunists that will set up a shop, a storefront, and then disappear once they’ve been paid. Or they will send you substandard product.gE7esmc

所以去灰色市場很誘人。有非常高標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的廠商?；旧弦呀?jīng)建立了聲譽(yù)。但是有些機(jī)會主義者會開一家商店，一個店面，然后一旦他們得到報酬就消失了。 否則他們會寄給你不合格的產(chǎn)品。 gE7esmc

One of the anecdotes I remember from a long time covering this is one such counterfeiter spelled Malaysia wrong on the box. That’s how they identify counterfeit chips. It can be really just stupid chip tricks, as I call them, but it can be that basic. They be that obvious, but you kind of need to know to ask for the traceability, for the information. And I’m not sure that that’s top of mind with everybody who’s looking for a chip who has a production line at a standstill, and sees the availability of the chip. And it’s very, very tempting.gE7esmc

我記得很長一段時間以來的軼事之一是一個這樣的造假者在盒子上拼錯了馬來西亞。這就是他們識別假冒芯片的方式。正如我所說的那樣，它實際上可能只是愚蠢的芯片技巧，但它可以是基本的。它們是如此明顯，但您需要知道以要求可追溯性和信息。而且我不確定這是否是每個正在尋找生產(chǎn)線處于停頓狀態(tài)的人，看到有芯片可用時首要考慮因素。這非常非常誘人。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: The Semiconductor Industry Association had some recommendations for how to combat counterfeiting in its white paper, which we link to on this podcast episode’s web page. Our guest, Dominic Forte had some recommendations, too. I asked Barb what she thought the industry could do. And she agreed with Forte on one thing:gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO：半導(dǎo)體行業(yè)協(xié)會在其白皮書中就如何打擊假冒提出了一些建議，我們在本播客集的網(wǎng)頁上鏈接到這些建議。我們的客人 Dominic Forte 也提出了一些建議。我問Barb她認(rèn)為這個行業(yè)可以做什么。她同意 Forte 的一件事： gE7esmc

BARBARA JORGENSEN: Chip makers, and frankly all component manufacturers, can do more. Clearly they are focused on their own product. So the brand owners such as Intel and AMD, the passive and connector guys, they will be able to identify their product one way or another. The problem with that is, if you’re a distributor, let’s say, and you carry literally hundreds of products, you have to really trace every single product that you sell. The hope and desire would be some sort of standard by which the electronics industry can normalize, through the identification and checking system. Because you have to remember: With a lot of these, it’s not just the identification that you get. You need something to read it. So it might be software, it might be equipment, Imagine doing that hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of times. So it does add up.gE7esmc

BARBARA JORGENSEN：芯片制造商，坦率地說，所有組件制造商都可以做得更多。顯然，他們專注于自己的產(chǎn)品。因此，英特爾和 AMD 等品牌所有者、無源和連接器廠商，他們將能夠以一種或另一種方式識別他們的產(chǎn)品。這樣做的問題是，假設(shè)您是分銷商，并且您攜帶數(shù)百種產(chǎn)品，您必須真正追蹤您銷售的每一件產(chǎn)品。希望和愿望將成為電子行業(yè)可以通過識別和檢查系統(tǒng)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化的某種標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。因為你必須記?。河泻芏噙@樣的，你得到的不僅僅是身份證明。你需要一些東西來閱讀它。所以它可能是軟件，也可能是設(shè)備，想象一下這樣做成百上千次。所以它確實加起來了。 gE7esmc

Understandably, the brand owners are most concerned with tracing their own chips, for a lot of reasons, including liability. There is less effort put toward just some kind of standard process by which you have your quality assurance. And blockchain may be one way to achieve that. So you kind of get your stamp of approval prior to purchasing the product. But for now, you really have to trust who you buy from, especially if you’re buying from a distributor.gE7esmc

可以理解的是，品牌所有者最關(guān)心追蹤自己的芯片，原因有很多，包括責(zé)任。 只需通過某種標(biāo)準(zhǔn)流程來保證質(zhì)量，就不需要付出多少努力。區(qū)塊鏈可能是實現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)的一種方式。因此，您可以在購買產(chǎn)品之前獲得您的批準(zhǔn)印章。但就目前而言，你真的必須相信你從誰那里購買，特別是如果你是從經(jīng)銷商那里購買的。 gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO: The counterfeiting problem has been dragging on for decades. Domenic Forte quoted an SIA estimate that the counterfeiting problem is costing the industry $7.5 billion dollars a year. The semiconductor industry now seems to be far more focused on supply side issues, however: adding capacity and figuring out where to add that capacity. And that’s understandable. But again, fraud and waste isn’t the point.gE7esmc

BRIAN SANTO：假冒問題已經(jīng)拖了幾十年。Domenic Forte 引用了 SIA 的估計，假冒問題每年給該行業(yè)造成 75 億美元的損失。然而，半導(dǎo)體行業(yè)現(xiàn)在似乎更關(guān)注供應(yīng)方面的問題：增加產(chǎn)能并弄清楚在哪里增加產(chǎn)能。這是可以理解的。但同樣，欺詐和浪費并不是重點。 gE7esmc

We keep risking the possibility that some counterfeit chips will end up causing accidents or even fatalities. Wouldn’t it be better to address the problem now before tragedy occurs?gE7esmc

我們一直在冒一些假冒芯片最終導(dǎo)致事故甚至死亡的風(fēng)險。在悲劇發(fā)生之前解決問題不是更好嗎？ gE7esmc

We would like to thank our guests today, Domenic Forte from the University of Florida and Barbara Jorgensen, editor of EPS News.gE7esmc

我們今天要感謝我們的客人，來自佛羅里達(dá)大學(xué)的 Domenic Forte 和 EPS News 的編輯 Barbara Jorgensen。 gE7esmc

That wraps up this episode of the weekly briefing. Thank you for listening.gE7esmc

這一集到此結(jié)束。 謝謝你的聆聽。 gE7esmc