三星電子(Samsung Electronics)日前公布該公司 2013年第四季財(cái)報(bào)，當(dāng)季營業(yè)利潤為8.31兆韓元(約77億美元)，比分析師先前所預(yù)期的少了20%左右；該公司當(dāng)季營業(yè)利潤是近兩年來第一次出現(xiàn)萎縮，較上一季的94億美元減少了18%。 雖 然三星的財(cái)報(bào)也顯示其 2013年第四季營收達(dá)到創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的549.5億美元，產(chǎn)業(yè)界仍關(guān)注于該公司表示在未來的幾季可能成長動力有限的狀況，此外三星也針對目前這一季恐面臨“營收乏力”發(fā)出警告，主要原因是IT產(chǎn)業(yè)在每年的年初進(jìn)入淡季；該公司雖預(yù)期業(yè)績表現(xiàn)將在下半年好轉(zhuǎn)，但這在壞消息之后顯得不算是好消息。 應(yīng)該沒有人預(yù)測過三星的“結(jié)局”，但現(xiàn)在可能是個(gè)可以拿它跟2007年的諾基亞(Nokia)比較的好時(shí)機(jī)。目前手機(jī)部門對三星電子營收與利潤的貢獻(xiàn)度超過五成，而該公司在全球智能手機(jī)市場的占有率超過35%，諾基亞的全球市占率在2007年第三季達(dá)到39%的高峰。

諾基亞2006~2011年?duì)I收變化
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現(xiàn)今市場分析師對諾基亞業(yè)績走下坡的普遍看法，是該公司錯(cuò)失智能手機(jī)風(fēng)潮、把功能型手機(jī)抓在手里太久。但有趣的是，回顧歷史，當(dāng)時(shí)分析師對于諾基亞在北美與南美市場缺乏存在感并不太關(guān)注，他們認(rèn)為諾基亞能掌握非美國市場對于功能型手機(jī)不斷成長的需求。 在2007年那時(shí)候，分析師甚至談到諾基亞為印度、中國等市場生產(chǎn)廉價(jià)手機(jī)并獲利的能力，而那：“讓該公司得以拉大與競爭對手之間的差距，包括摩托羅拉(Motorola)、三星與Sony Ericsson，這三家廠商的市占率總和才與諾基亞差不多。” 顯然，并不是只有諾基亞沒看到智能手機(jī)浪潮即將來襲──至少在2007年那時(shí)候，連市場分析師也沒注意到。此外，他們也低估了中國手機(jī)業(yè)者與白牌供貨商的 能力，這些廠商能以更低的成本、更快的速度(這更重要)制造一系列的手機(jī)，使得諾基亞在全球市場的戰(zhàn)爭中成為最大的輸家。 這個(gè)產(chǎn)業(yè)界的每個(gè)投資人、分析師以及媒體記者都在猜測下一件大事，而若是能預(yù)知在目前的智能手機(jī)風(fēng)潮之后將會發(fā)生什么，應(yīng)該能有助于預(yù)測三星的未來。不過無論是物聯(lián)網(wǎng)(IoT)或是可穿戴式裝置在目前都仍在一片渾沌，沒有人敢打包票它們會不會崛起。 比較今日的三星以及2007年的諾基亞，其中有一個(gè)分析關(guān)鍵是軟件；試問有哪家以硬件制造起家的公司，能在今日調(diào)整自己成為一家更偏向以軟件為導(dǎo)向的硬件企業(yè)？諾基亞的敗筆不只在智能手機(jī)或是中國市場，而是在于無法順利將手機(jī)硬件為導(dǎo)向的業(yè)務(wù)轉(zhuǎn)型，也未真正理解朝向軟件密集發(fā)展的未來趨勢。 請注意，諾基亞是完全有意識到軟件趨勢，而且也投資了不少軟件公司與技術(shù)，包括Symbian、Meego與Navteq；但最后，諾基亞累積的軟件資產(chǎn)越 多，焦點(diǎn)也越來越模糊。諾基亞已在 2013年宣布，將在2016年終止對Symbian與Meego應(yīng)用程序的支持。 三星到目前為止也只是在口頭上強(qiáng)調(diào)擁有軟件能力的重要性，號稱該公司的6萬5,000名研發(fā)工程師中，有3萬5,000人是軟件工程師；但你能舉得出過去五年來三星曾做過的出色軟件投資嗎？或是舉出一款因?yàn)檐浖δ芏〉蔑@著差異化的三星產(chǎn)品？ 不要問我答案，我想不出來！ 本文授權(quán)編譯自EE Times，版權(quán)所有，謝絕轉(zhuǎn)載 編譯：Judith Cheng 參考英文原文：Is Nokia’s 2007 Decline a Lesson for Samsung Today?，by Junko Yoshida

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{pagination} Is Nokia’s 2007 Decline a Lesson for Samsung Today? Junko Yoshida MADISON, Wis. — In the results posted Friday for the fourth quarter of 2013, Samsung Electronics reported an operating profit of 8.31 trillion won ($7.7 billion), which missed analyst expectations by a whopping 20%. Samsung also reported its first quarterly operating profit decline in two years -- an 18% drop from the $9.4 billion it reported for the third quarter. Though it posted a record $54.95 billion of revenue, the industry is focused now on its potential growth limits in the coming quarters. The Korean company also issued a warning about anemic earnings in the current quarter. It's blaming "weak seasonality" in the IT industry early in a calendar year. It expects performance to pick up in the second half, but admitting a disappointment in advance is hardly good news. Nobody is predicting the beginning of the end for Samsung, but this might be an opportune moment to compare its situation today with Nokia's back in 2007. Today the mobile division is responsible for more than half of Samsung Electronics' revenue and profit. Further, Samsung's share of the global smartphone market is more than 35%, and Nokia's share peaked at 39% in the third quarter of 2007. Today, the prevailing analysis of Nokia's downfall says the Finnish mobile company didn't see the emerging smartphone trend, causing it to hang on to feature phones too long. It's interesting to look back on the history, though. Back then, analysts were less concerned about Nokia's lack of presence in the North and South American markets. They were betting on its feature phones to capture the rising demand from non-US markets. Analysts even talked about Nokia's ability to manufacture inexpensive cellphones in China and India profitably. They told The New York Times in 2007 that it would "help the company build on its already sizable lead over its challengers -- Motorola, Samsung and Sony Ericsson -- whose combined market share barely equals that of Nokia." Obviously, it wasn't just Nokia that didn't see the smartphone tsunami coming -- at least in 2007. Analysts missed it, too. Moreover, they underestimated the power of China's OEMs and whitebox vendors. Their ability to churn out a host of mobile phones at a much lower cost and (more importantly) much faster turned Nokia into the biggest loser in the global feature battle. Every investor, every analyst, and every reporter is in the business of hunting for the next big thing. Knowing what will come after the current smartphone boom should help predict Samsung's future. Though the Internet of Things and wearable devices are the buzz of the moment, the jury is still out on both categories. Drawing a parallel between Samsung today and Nokia in 2007, the key to the analysis is software. Can any company launched as a hardware manufacturer adjust to today's more software-driven hardware business? Nokia's Waterloo wasn't just smartphones or China. It was an inability to transform its mobile hardware-oriented handset business and develop a real understanding of the software-intensive future. Remember that Nokia was fully aware of the software trend. It invested in a host of software companies and technologies, including Symbian, Meego, and Navteq. But in the end, the more software assets Nokia amassed, the less focused it became. Last year, it announced that it would drop support for Symbian and Meego applications, despite having pledged its troth until 2016. Samsung also pays lip service today to the importance of becoming a leading player in software. It says that 35,000 of its 65,000 R&D staff members are working on software. But name one stellar software investment Samsung has made in the last five years. Name one Samsung product whose performance is significantly differentiated by its software. But don't ask me. I'm stumped.