景況不佳的日本芯片供應(yīng)商瑞薩電子(Renesas Electronics)已在6月底正式宣布,將終止其無線調(diào)制解調(diào)器芯片業(yè)務(wù)(即目前由 Renesas Mobile 管轄的業(yè)務(wù))。
瑞薩是在2010年收購了諾基亞(Nokia)的無線調(diào)制解調(diào)器開發(fā)團隊,上述決定將讓該團隊的全體人員受到影響,包括分別在芬蘭、印度與中國的1,100、 300與30名員工。當初宣布收購諾基亞調(diào)制解調(diào)器業(yè)務(wù)時,產(chǎn)業(yè)界就質(zhì)疑過瑞薩想由一家芯片供應(yīng)商轉(zhuǎn)型為全球移動通信技術(shù)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的野心;而經(jīng)歷了三年的掙扎, 那個不可能實現(xiàn)的夢想果然還是破滅了…

瑞薩官網(wǎng)上對終止的無線調(diào)制解調(diào)器業(yè)務(wù)范圍作出了解釋
Source:Renesaskgqesmc
所以,到底是為什么會這樣?
第一, 全球手機市場規(guī)則自2010年以來出現(xiàn)大幅度的變化,少數(shù)幾家智能手機廠商(例如Apple、Samsung),以及相關(guān)芯片供應(yīng)商(如Samsung、 Qualcomm)成了大權(quán)在握的贏家。如果你沒在 iPhone 或 Galaxy 里面搶到一席之地,你會發(fā)現(xiàn)你的手機芯片──特別是那些位高階智能手機設(shè)計的──根本沒其它地方可用。
顯然,打造一家以系出名門(如Ericsson、Nokia)之先進蜂窩式通信技術(shù)為基礎(chǔ)的公司,并不足以贏得全球市場戰(zhàn)爭;無論是 Renesas Mobile 或是 ST-Ericsson (已經(jīng)在今年稍早前走入歷史),最后都無法在過去兩年的劇烈市場動蕩中存活。
本文授權(quán)編譯自EE Times,版權(quán)所有,謝絕轉(zhuǎn)載
第2頁:沒有針對中國市場的策略,低估了需要的人力
第3頁:管理一個全球化團隊太過困難
相關(guān)閱讀:
• 每日一報7月1日:諾基亞26億美元收購西門子手中諾西股份
• 日三大半導(dǎo)體廠商獲利回升,加強核心事業(yè)
• 手機芯片淘汰風波未平,后退出者更受傷kgqesmc
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第二, 無論是ST-Ericsson或是Renesas Mobile都沒有可靠的中國市場策略;這兩家公司遠遠落后聚焦于蓬勃發(fā)展之低價智能手機市場的亞洲同業(yè)們,包括臺灣的聯(lián)發(fā)科(MediaTek)、中國的展訊(Spreadtrum)以及不斷冒出頭的中國本土芯片設(shè)計業(yè)者。
不管是Renesas Mobile或ST-Ericsson,都沒有能因應(yīng)中國OEM/ODM客戶需求的正確產(chǎn)品陣容或開發(fā)策略。

相比瑞薩在華的MCU等業(yè)務(wù),手機Modem確實不被重視
kgqesmc
第三, 低估了開發(fā)蜂窩式調(diào)制解調(diào)器芯片所需的人力;開發(fā)調(diào)制解調(diào)器芯片需要精通技術(shù)知識與經(jīng)驗的工程師,并需要保持對持續(xù)變動中蜂窩式通信標準的了解。而不同于數(shù)字化的應(yīng)用處理器,這類調(diào)制解調(diào)器芯片就算設(shè)計出來也可能最后無法完成,因為還必須通過漫長的認證程序。
調(diào)制解調(diào)器芯片需要經(jīng)過各家電信營運商的現(xiàn)場測試、修改以及認證,然后還要一再進行調(diào)整;一家調(diào)制解調(diào)器芯片設(shè)計業(yè)者擁有超過1,000名工程師的情況并不罕見。
第四, 上述的龐大人力非常消耗公司資源,如果沒有贏到大單,就難以維持經(jīng)營。無論是ST-Ericsson 或Renesas Mobile都已經(jīng)尋找買主好一陣子,但最后卻乏人問津。在本質(zhì)上,它們追隨著德州儀器(TI)、飛思卡爾(Freescale)與美商亞德諾(ADI) 的腳步,都結(jié)束了調(diào)制解調(diào)器芯片業(yè)務(wù);不過ADI算是個例外,該公司的調(diào)制解調(diào)器芯片業(yè)務(wù)是被聯(lián)發(fā)科收歸旗下。
本文授權(quán)編譯自EE Times,版權(quán)所有,謝絕轉(zhuǎn)載
第3頁:管理一個全球化團隊太過困難
相關(guān)閱讀:
• 每日一報7月1日:諾基亞26億美元收購西門子手中諾西股份
• 日三大半導(dǎo)體廠商獲利回升,加強核心事業(yè)
• 手機芯片淘汰風波未平,后退出者更受傷kgqesmc
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第五, Renesas Mobile與ST-Ericsson 都面臨整并的夢靨。Strategy Analytics 分析師Sravan Kundojjala 在3月時發(fā)表評論指出,ST-Ericsson的問題在于:“把舊有產(chǎn)品復(fù)制過渡到一個新產(chǎn)品藍圖,以及管理高層不斷變動?!彼硎荆@家合資公司在整并 多家公司與執(zhí)行原始計劃上面臨困境。
瑞薩的情況也很類似,該公司原本就是一個與NEC芯片部門合并、組織復(fù)雜且擁腫的企業(yè),后來其手機芯片子公司Renesas Mobile又加入了超過1,100位芬蘭工程師。
為了達到全球化效應(yīng),瑞薩將Renesas Mobile的關(guān)鍵決策功能──包括芯片訂價、產(chǎn)品藍圖以及LTE調(diào)制解調(diào)器芯片開發(fā)──轉(zhuǎn)移到Renesas Mobile位于巴黎的歐洲總部,雖然這能避免日本文化的羞怯問題,但管理一個全球化團隊被證實是太過困難、甚至可說是大膽。
根據(jù)母公司瑞薩的官方消息,該公司將“停止LTE調(diào)制解調(diào)器芯片的開發(fā)與銷售”,但Renesas Mobile所開發(fā)的IP (包括LTE調(diào)制解調(diào)器)將如何處置、或是否將授權(quán)給其它公司,目前仍不清楚。
此 外屬于瑞薩百分之百全資子公司的Renesas Mobile,以及旗下的Renesas Mobile Europe、Rensas Mobile India與Renesas Tongxinjishu,未來是否將不復(fù)存在,也還是未知數(shù)。至截稿時間為止,Renesas Mobile的一位高層對EETimes美國版表示無法透露相關(guān)訊息。
本文授權(quán)編譯自EE Times,版權(quán)所有,謝絕轉(zhuǎn)載
編譯:Judith Cheng
參考英文原文:5 Reasons Renesas Ditched Modem Business,by Junko Yoshida
相關(guān)閱讀:
• 每日一報7月1日:諾基亞26億美元收購西門子手中諾西股份
• 日三大半導(dǎo)體廠商獲利回升,加強核心事業(yè)
• 手機芯片淘汰風波未平,后退出者更受傷kgqesmc
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5 Reasons Renesas Ditched Modem Business
Junko Yoshida
MADISON, Wis. — Ailing Japanese chip vendor Renesas Electronics Corp. officially announced Thursday, June 27, what appeared inevitable to the rest of the world: termination of its wireless modem business.
Renesas acquired in 2010 a wireless modem development team from Nokia, all of whom will be affected: 1,100 employees in Finland, 300 in India, and 30 in China.
The acquisition of Nokia's modem business, when announced, met with skepticism from the industry while revealing Renesas's ambition to transform from a chip supplier to the world's mobile technology leader.
That impossible dream, however, went belly-up after a three-year struggle.
So, what exactly happened?
First, the world order in the mobile market, since 2010, has dramatically shifted, leaving power with a handful of smartphone winners (namely, Apple and Samsung) and mobile chip suppliers (Qualcomm, Samsung).
If you are not in iPhone or Galaxy by now, you've found that your mobile chips -- especially those designed for advanced smartphones -- have nowhere to go.
Clearly, building a company based on advanced cellular technologies of well known pedigree (such as those of Ericsson or of Nokia) wasn't enough to win the global battle. Neither Renesas Mobile Corp. (RMC) nor the ST-Ericsson joint venture (which broke up earlier this year) was able to survive the violently turbulent market of the last two years.
Second, neither ST-Ericsson nor Renesas Mobile had a credible China strategy.
Both companies lagged far behind their peers in Asia, including Taiwan's MediaTek, China's Spreadtrum, and a growing number of China's indigenous fabless chip vendors, all focused on the now burgeoning low-cost smartphone market in Asia. Neither RMC nor ST-Ericsson had the right product portfolio or development strategy to meet the needs of OEMs and ODMs in China.
Third, let's not underestimate the workforce needed to develop cellular modems.
The development of modem chips requires engineers with the sort of intimate knowledge and experience that enables them to keep up with constantly changing cellular standards. More significantly, unlike digital apps processors, the work on those cellular modem chips is often never done, even long after the modems are designed, due to a long certification process they must go through. Modem chips need to be field-tested, modified, and approved by cellular operators. And then they get adjusted again. It's not unusual for modem chip developers to keep more than a thousand engineers.
Bloated Workforce
Fourth, this bloated workforce tends to drain a company's resources. It's impossible to maintain, without big design wins.
Both ST-Ericsson and RMC had been in search of buyers for months, but, in the end, they found no takers. In essence, they followed the path traveled by Texas Instruments, Freescale, and Analog Devices years ago, when they all ended up fleeing the modem business altogether. Analog Devices was an exception, but only because the company's modem group was absorbed by MediaTek.
Fifth, both Renesas and ST-Ericsson suffered from a consolidation nightmare.
As Strategy Analytics analyst Sravan Kundojjala commented in March, ST-Ericsson struggled with "duplication among legacy products, transition to a new product roadmap and constant management changes." The analyst said at that time the JV struggled to integrate multiple companies and execute its original plan. Similarly, Renesas, already a complex (and bloated) entity merged with NEC's chip division, had to bring more than 1,100 Finnish engineers into its 100 percent mobile chip subsidiary, RMC.
In an effort to globalize, Renesas moved RMC's key decision-making functions -- pricing of chips, development of product roadmaps, and LTE modems -- to RMC-Paris. Despite avoiding the trap of Japanese timidity, managing a global team proved to be too difficult even for the bold.
The parent Renesas announced that the company will "stop developing activities and sales expansion of the LTE Modem." What remains unclear is where any RMC-developed IP -- including LTE modems -- will go, and if they'll be available for licensing to other companies.
We also do not know whether RMC, as a wholly owned Renesas subsidiary, will also cease to exist, along with Renesas Mobile Europe Oy, Rensas Mobile India, and Renesas Tongxinjishu (Beijing) Co. Ltd. An executive at RMC, when reached by EE Times today, said he's not allowed to explain.
責編:Quentin