自1990年代晚期起，博通(Broadcom)與科勝訊(Conexant Systems)在類似的市場都采取積極的收購策略，這兩家公司都鎖定發(fā)展蓬勃的寬頻網(wǎng)絡(luò)市場，但最后的結(jié)果卻大不相同。 今日的博通年?duì)I收規(guī)模達(dá)到80.1億美元，是僅次于高通(Qualcomm)的全球第二大無晶圓廠芯片設(shè)計(jì)業(yè)者；但在科勝訊這廂，該公司營收由2000年的 21億美元縮水至2012年的13.5億美元，并在美國時(shí)間3月1日向德拉瓦州轄區(qū)法院(Court for the District of Delaware)聲請美國破產(chǎn)法第十一章(Chapter 11)的破產(chǎn)保護(hù)。 根據(jù)科勝訊的組織重整計(jì)劃，該公司唯一擔(dān)保 貸款方QP SFM Capital Holdings將提供1,500萬美元的DIP (debtor-in-possession)融資。此外QP SFM Capital Holdings將以1.95億美元的可擔(dān)保債(secured debt)交換組織重整中的科勝訊股權(quán)，此舉將消滅科勝訊所有未償還的擔(dān)保債。 “我們已經(jīng)背負(fù)龐大債務(wù)好一段時(shí)間；”科勝訊 總裁暨CEO Sailesh Chittipeddi接受EETimes美國版訪問時(shí)特別提到了該公司1999年時(shí)的并購狂熱──從1999年8月到2000年7月，科勝訊在短短十一 個(gè)月的時(shí)間內(nèi)收購了7家公司，但科勝訊手上的積蓄不到20億美元：“那是當(dāng)時(shí)我們需要盡快解決的問題?！? 科勝訊的例子是典型的惡性循環(huán)，該公司收購了一大堆債務(wù)以產(chǎn)生營運(yùn)資本──為了那些收購來的公司以及自己原本的業(yè)務(wù)，同時(shí)還要處理手上現(xiàn)有的債務(wù)。以債養(yǎng)債的負(fù)擔(dān)終于把科勝訊壓得透不過氣；更慘的是，因?yàn)楸粋鶆?wù)追著跑：“我們的那些大客戶們開始質(zhì)疑我們公司的能力，并逐漸疏遠(yuǎn)我們?！盋hittipeddi 表示。 2012年，科勝訊的唯一打印機(jī)SoC客戶柯達(dá)(Eastman Kodak)聲請破產(chǎn)，又讓科勝訊的命運(yùn)雪上加霜。 但Chittipeddi指出，科勝訊比較幸運(yùn)的是只需要面對單一貸款方QP SFM Capital Holding來進(jìn)行組織重整的協(xié)商，不必面對多個(gè)債主；而且這個(gè)單一債主的幕后管理者是知名投資人索羅斯(George Soros)所經(jīng)營的資本投資公司Soros Fund Management，對科勝訊的業(yè)務(wù)并不陌生──該投資公司也曾經(jīng)是科勝訊長期的貸款方。 然而，要讓貸款方相信科勝訊有能力、有長期性策略以及堅(jiān)強(qiáng)的產(chǎn)品陣容，又是另一個(gè)難題；據(jù)了解，科勝訊與貸款方的協(xié)商組織重整策略擬定，是自2012年5月 就開始進(jìn)行，直到近日才有結(jié)果。目前科勝訊的產(chǎn)品組合已經(jīng)大幅精簡化，但根據(jù)Chittipeddi說法，其中有幾個(gè)是該公司特別看好的“成長動(dòng)力”。 本文授權(quán)編譯自EE Times，版權(quán)所有，謝絕轉(zhuǎn)載 本文下一頁：科勝訊對公司的復(fù)蘇有信心

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{pagination} 科勝訊是在1999年自Rockwell獨(dú)立，在當(dāng)時(shí)的語音與傳真機(jī)/調(diào)制解調(diào)器芯片市場占據(jù)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位；而現(xiàn)在科勝訊看來打算走老路，積極想為其語音處理技術(shù)開辟一個(gè)利基市場。在今年初的國際消費(fèi)性電子展(CES)，科勝訊展示了獨(dú)家的遠(yuǎn)程語音輸入處理器單芯片，能以語音觸發(fā)(voice trigger)來開關(guān)電視，甚至可用于吵雜的室內(nèi)。 同 樣的語音處理芯片亦可用于VoIP網(wǎng)絡(luò)電話，例如Skype TV的應(yīng)用，也就是使用者能一邊看電視一邊透過Skyper軟件與朋友通話。以上解決方案的關(guān)鍵是科勝訊的遠(yuǎn)程語音處理算法(支持回音消除、噪音抑制、 波束成型，以及預(yù)先/后端處理)，以及其高性能24位ADC。 除了語音處理技術(shù)，科勝訊也鎖定打印機(jī)單芯片、游戲機(jī)用耳機(jī)以及安防視頻監(jiān)控。Chittipeddi表示， 該公司擁有堅(jiān)強(qiáng)的客戶陣容，包括Plantronics與Logitech等大廠。 值得一提的是，科勝訊避免進(jìn)入已經(jīng)競爭非常激烈的消費(fèi)性視頻產(chǎn)品、機(jī)頂盒等市場；這些市場大多數(shù)已經(jīng)被對手博通占據(jù)，而科勝訊的新策略是在其利基市場做好差異化。挾其更集中資源的產(chǎn)品線，科勝訊對公司的復(fù)蘇有信心、并采取更合理的成長策略；Chittipeddi表示，清償了債務(wù)之后：“我們能產(chǎn)生現(xiàn)金流來 投資業(yè)務(wù)，不用再支付利息。” 本文授權(quán)編譯自EE Times，版權(quán)所有，謝絕轉(zhuǎn)載 編譯：Judith Cheng 參考英文原文：How Conexant ended up filing for Chapter 11，by Junko Yoshida

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• 科勝訊視頻解碼器支持HDTV機(jī)頂盒和個(gè)人錄像機(jī)
• 科勝訊推出具有手機(jī)Bluetooth功能的“連網(wǎng)相框”參考設(shè)計(jì)pACesmc

{pagination} How Conexant ended up filing for Chapter 11 Junko Yoshida · Service of company's debt eventually led to its downfall. Madison, Wis.--Both Broadcom Corp. and Conexant Systems Inc. deployed aggressive acquisition strategies in similar market segments starting in the late 1990’s—each company betting the farm on the burgeoning broadband market. In the end, they achieved spectacularly different results. Broadcom (Irvine, Calif.), today armed with $8.01 billion in annual revenue, is the world’s second largest fabless chip company after Qualcomm Inc.. On the other hand, Conexant, who saw its revenue decline from $2.1 billion in 2000 to just $135 million in 2012, is fighting for survival. Conexant last Friday (March 1) filed for Chapter 11 protection in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. Under the terms of the restructuring plan, Conexant's sole secured lender, QP SFM Capital Holdings Ltd., will provide $15 million in debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing. Further, QP SFM Capital Holdings will exchange $195 million of secured debt into equity in the reorganized Conexant, an action that will wipe out all of Conexant’s outstanding secured debt. “We’ve been suffering from the debt overhang for a long time,” said Sailesh Chittipeddi (right), Conexant's president and CEO, in an interview with EE Times. Chittipeddi referenced the company’s feverish shopping spree in 1999. During the 11 months between August 1999 and July 2000, Conexant acquired seven companies for just under $2 billion in Conexant stock, Chittipeddi explained. “This was something we needed to address as soon as possible,” he added. The story of Conexant is typical of a vicious cycle. Conexant acquired a significant amount of debt in order to generate operating capital--for a number of the companies it acquired, and for its own ongoing business--all while it also had to deal with its existing debt. The burden of servicing that debt eventually caught up with Conexant. Worse, aware of the constant pressure to service debt whose due date looms large, “Our blue-chip customers started questioning viability of our company and migrating away from us,” Chittipeddi said. The fact that Eastman Kodak, for whom Conexant was the sole source of printer SoCs, filed for bankruptcy last year intensified Conexant’s crisis. Fortunately for Conexant, said Chittipeddi, “we had to deal with only one lender – QP SFM Capital Holding – to negotiate the terms of a restructuring, rather than multiple parties.” Further, it also helped that QP SFM Capital Holding, managed by Soros Fund Management LLC founded by billionaire George Soros, was no stranger to Conexant’s business, since the capital investment fund has been Conexant’s lender for a long time. However, convincing the lender that Conexant has a viable, long-term strategy with a solid portfolio was another matter. It took from May 2012 until last week to negotiate and structure a restructuring plan. Conexant, now with a significantly reduced portfolio, has several solid “growth engines,” according to Chittipeddi. Voice heritage Conexant spun off in 1999 from Rockwell, which at the time held a dominant position in the voice and fax/modem chip market. Now Conexant looks as though it’s going back to its voice heritage. The company is keen on carving out a niche for its voice processing technology. At the Consumer Electronics Show earlier this year, Conexant showed off its proprietary far-field voice input processor SoC, which works on a voice trigger, to turn a TV on or off even in a noisy room. The same voice processing chip can be also used with VoIP applications such as Skype TV, so that a user can talk to another person on Skype even while the TV is blasting in high volume. Keys to such solutions are Conexant’s far-field voice processing algorithms (acoustic echo cancellation, noise reduction, beam forming as well as pre- and post-processing) and its high performance 24-bit A-to-D converter. Beyond voice processing, Conexant will focus on printer SoCs, headsets for gaming machines and video surveillance. Chittipeddi noted that Conexant today has a solid customer base including Plantronics and Logitech. It’s also important to note that Conexant is avoiding the already crowded market for consumer video products and set-tops, where competition is intense and often dominated by Broadcom. The company’s new commitment is to well-differentiated niche segments. With its more focused portfolio, Conexant is confident of recovery and managing its growth more reasonably. Free of debt payments, “we can generate cash that we can use for investing in our business, rather than for paying interest,” said Chittipeddi. What went wrong There are a million reasons why and how things went wrong for Conexant. However, betting on the Internet boom and building its business on “networking” wasn’t one of them. The problem for Conexant in the late 1990’s was that the company’s modem chips were built for the analog era. In order to compensate for this weakness, the company went whole hog acquiring technologies that looked useful for building the broadband future of the Internet. Of the nearly $2 billion Conexant spent during its shopping spree, the most stunning was the acquisition of Maker Communications, a Massachusetts-based software company whose chips worked with light-based technology. Maker Communications had all of $13.6 million in annual sales at the time it sold itself for nearly $1 billion in Conexant stock, according to Conexant. As all this happened, Conexant underestimated the constant need for large capital that had to be fed to the companies it had acquired. In 1999 and 2000, Conexant ended up issuing two tranches of debt, totaling $1 billion. Bubble burst And of course, in 2000, the dot-com bubble burst, a blow to the networking equipment vendors--such as Nortel and Lucent--to whom Conexant was planning to sell its chips. What followed then was a decline of Conexant’s revenues from $2.1 billion in 2000 to $521 million in 2002. While the usual management response to such a decline is to cut workforce to the bones, Conexant chose instead a business creation strategy. The company spun off business lines while retaining partial interests in the divested companies. Three new independent companies Conexant created were Jazz, Skyworks and Mindspeed. The strategy worked. It gave an opportunity to all three companies--Jazz, Skyworks and Mindspeed--to focus on their particular market segments, while Conexant was able to focus on the “digital home” market. The company's revenues increased each year from 2002 through 2004, but reversed again following fiscal 2006. The company attributed its reduced revenue to an overall drop in average selling price for products and a drop in demand for Conexant products. Looking back, Chittipeddi, who didn’t join Conexant until June 2006, observed that Conexant’s competitors had better architecture and better products than chips then designed by Conexant. When the revenue slid from 2006 to 2011, Conexant’s mounting challenge became the maturing of its debt. In order to address its debt load, the company sold off assets, including technology and business lines it had developed and acquired--such as Conexant’s remainder of its interest in Jazz and its broadband business. Then, in April, 2011, Conexant was acquired by investment firms Golden Gate Capital and August Holdings Inc. Conexant, after being taken private, continued to see revenues slide, despite its efforts to eliminate operation costs and streamline businesses. Dead leases Beyond the overall weakness of the semiconductor market, the company’s relentless debt dogged Conexant. It needed to break free from the burden--originally born out of the company’s acquisition spree and later divestitures--once and for all. Besides losing key customers like Kodak, Conexant was burdened by “oversized and untenable” real estate costs, according to the company. Chittipeddi noted that Conexant is saddled with dead leases--facilities the company no longer uses and the company has been unable to rent. Of lots totaling 300,000 square feet, “we only use 25,000 square feet,” he said. When asked how the company’s customers are responding to the company’s restructuring announcement, Chittipeddi said, “Their reactions have been relatively positive.” Further, a $50 million investment by the lender, will give Conexant “breathing room” to build a sound strategy and strong balance sheets at a reasonable pace, said the CEO. The company expects to receive court approval for its restructuring plan in less than 85 days.