曾經(jīng)顯赫一時的中美合資新創(chuàng)企業(yè)──凌訊科技(Legend Silicon)，在2011年底時結(jié)束了在美國的營運業(yè)務。其中究竟出了什么問題？我們又能從中學習到什么經(jīng)驗教訓？
在 讀過Raj Karamchedu所寫的《The Disconnect Patterns: Notes for Managing a U.S.-China High Technology Company.》一書后，終于在上周有機會見到了作者本尊。我想當面問問他關于凌訊科技──這家他最后經(jīng)營管理過的公司──究竟發(fā)生了什么事？我還想聽 聽Karamchedu談談他任職于這家中美合資企業(yè)的個人經(jīng)驗。針對這部份，我認為Karamchedu在他寫的書中并未多談。
我知道沒人想在離開前任雇主后還過河拆橋。所以，我并不指望他能告訴我所有的來龍去脈。但我們的對話內(nèi)容仍透露出一些可能導致凌訊科技結(jié)束美國營運業(yè)務的線索，以及任職于中、美合資企業(yè)中的任何人都應該知道的幾件事。
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專注于開發(fā)數(shù)字電視芯片的凌訊科技曾經(jīng)是美國加州Fremont一家知名的新創(chuàng)企業(yè)。這家公司具備了所有得天獨厚的條件──包括由清華大學的留美學者(其中還包括一位清華大學教授)所創(chuàng)辦、自主創(chuàng)新、與中國政府機構(gòu)關系密切，以及擁有美式管理團隊。
凌訊科技積極投入中國數(shù)字廣播電視標準的開發(fā)，而且它看起來就像在天時地利人和的條件下崛起，特別當時中國正準備好迎接2008年北京奧運的來臨──還有什么比這更好的時機以展現(xiàn)數(shù)字電視技術呢？
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本文下一頁：千萬別低估了政治環(huán)境
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2007年春天，英特爾旗下投資公司Intel Captial斥資4,000萬美元投資于凌訊科技。
時間快轉(zhuǎn)來到2011年底，凌訊科技決定關閉美國加州總部，裁撤掉在美國的所有員工及其管理團隊。凌訊仍保有在中國的子公司，并為現(xiàn)有的客戶提供服務，但似乎從那時起就再也未開發(fā)新產(chǎn)品了。凌訊科技的公司官網(wǎng)也還同時存在中英雙語版本，但自2011年起未見更新，原先頁面上所列的公司管理團隊也不復存在。
那么，凌訊究竟是哪里出錯了？而曾經(jīng)擔任凌訊COO的Karamchedu又從中學到了哪些經(jīng)驗教訓？
很自然地，Karamchedu分析了他所得到的經(jīng)驗教訓。從這家中-美芯片公司的文化中，他驚訝地發(fā)現(xiàn)了一些事，也看到了團隊所經(jīng)歷的掙扎，因此他特別強調(diào)以下五點：
一、千萬別低估了政治環(huán)境
要正確的解讀政治環(huán)境，可能會是個嚴峻的挑戰(zhàn)──在中國和美國都一樣。雖然許多讀者常提醒我們保持中立，避免帶有政治立場的文章，但如果不注意某些地區(qū)的政治角力(或完全搞不清楚當?shù)卣l因為什么原因?qū)櫺艺l)的話，其結(jié)果是相當可怕的。
在凌訊科技草創(chuàng)時期，中國 DTV 的轉(zhuǎn)型比一般預期地更緩慢。再者，中國 DTV 基礎架構(gòu)轉(zhuǎn)型時所需的成本，該由誰來買單呢？中國官方可能突如其來地要求你提供財務支持、支付必要的回扣或最后決定什么都不采用。簡單來說，它缺少一種循序漸進的轉(zhuǎn)型過程，當然也就沒有一個公開的市場讓凌訊科技這樣的芯片商參與。相反地，凌訊發(fā)現(xiàn)自己正擔負著一個國家DTV轉(zhuǎn)型的重大任務。
本文授權(quán)編譯自EE Times，版權(quán)所有，謝絕轉(zhuǎn)載
本文下一頁：中國人喜歡用更低的成本來實現(xiàn)“創(chuàng)新”
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二、新奇 vs 創(chuàng)新
即 使是在西方技術領域，過去被看重的“發(fā)明”現(xiàn)在已被簡化成為“創(chuàng)新”，往往只需為系統(tǒng)簡單地加入最新的技術與功能。而中國現(xiàn)在更將這一趨勢發(fā)揮得淋漓盡致 ──他們喜歡讓產(chǎn)品看來更“新奇”(無論是5寸屏幕的智能手機或四核心應用處理器的新趨勢)，同時也快速地發(fā)展出一些新噱頭。他們善長用更低的成本來實現(xiàn) “既創(chuàng)新又新奇”。
這幾乎就像中國人學會如何“破解”西方所取得的創(chuàng)新，而今他們正用自己的游戲規(guī)則打敗了西方國家，Karamchedu解釋。
三、定價策略
如果你的客戶基礎來自全球，包括美國、歐洲、日本與中國，那么定價就是中、美合資公司所面對最困難的挑戰(zhàn)。
理論上，你不能讓同一款芯片賣不一樣的兩種價格。但是，對于中國OEM/ODM顯然就得采用不同的定價模式。對于美國芯片公司來說，雖然為大量芯片采購訂單降價是很合理的事，但如果在中國大量采購的話，價格通常會被提高。同時，中國OEM/ODM幾乎一開始就預期以極低價格取得新芯片。
如何居中調(diào)解這種差距仍然是一項巨大的挑戰(zhàn)──成為想要根據(jù)一般原則定價的美國團隊以及從當?shù)乜蛻艨吹讲煌枨蟮闹袊鴪F隊之間的一種拉據(jù)戰(zhàn)。
本文授權(quán)編譯自EE Times，版權(quán)所有，謝絕轉(zhuǎn)載
本文下一頁：別指望能從你的中國同事/客戶得到回饋
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四、認定客戶采用了你的芯片？
這 并不是特別針對中國OEM而已(我也聽過韓國三星有類似情況)，但是，一般來說，你永遠不會知道你的芯片(你認為已取得設計訂單的芯片)是否真的被客戶用 于其設計中。實際的情況通常是你得和好幾家競爭廠商的團隊共同為OEM/ODM工作。雖然你和許多潛在客戶握了手，你也永遠無法確定你的芯片最后是否會被用于其系統(tǒng)中。這種做法──從OEM的觀點來說，可能是必要的──可能會讓你被榨干好多資源，最后仍徒勞無功。
五、別指望能從你的中國同事/客戶得到回饋
對于在一家中、美合資公司工作的人來說，最令人沮喪的一件事就是你很難從中國的同事或客戶得到任何回饋。通常，中國客戶根本不知道他們要什么或如何響應?；蛟S更令人挫斥的是，你的中國客戶或同事多半分享一些對于開發(fā)新市場的恐懼。他們寧可追逐于已經(jīng)驗證或明顯已經(jīng)成長中的市場。
因此，雖然他們可能悄悄地決定為下一款產(chǎn)品周期增添更多新奇的功能，他們也不太會和你交流或分享他們的想法。最后，你只會陷于難以理解的謎團中。
本文授權(quán)編譯自EE Times，版權(quán)所有，謝絕轉(zhuǎn)載
編譯：Susan Hong
參考英文原文：Yoshida in China: Guidelines for working at U.S.-Sino firm，by Junko Yoshida
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Yoshida in China: Guidelines for working at U.S.-Sino firm
Junko Yoshida
Legend Silicon, once a red-hot China-U.S. startup focused on DTV chips, closed its U.S. operation in late 2011. What went wrong and what did we learn? MOUNTAIN VIEW, Calif. – Last week I had a chance to sit down with Raj Karamchedu, author of a book entitled, "The Disconnect Patterns: Notes for Managing a U.S.-China High Technology Company."
After reviewing the book earlier this month, I was eager for a face-to-face meeting with the author--for two reasons. First, I wanted to learn more about whatever happened to Legend Silicon (Karamchedu’s last employer). Second, I wanted to hear more about Karamchedu’s personal experience working at Legend Silicon. My thinking was that Karamchedu left a lot unsaid in his book.
I understood that nobody wants to burn bridges with a former employer. So, I didn’t exactly expect a tell-all story. But our conversation revealed a few clues about what might have led to the closure of Legend Silicon in the United States, and subsequently a few things anyone working in a China-U.S. company ought to know.
Legend Silicon, focused on digital TV chips, was once a red-hot start-up based in Fremont, Calif. It appeared to have come up with all the right ingredients--including the Tsinghua University pedigree (even a Tsinghua professor) of its founders, along with on-the-ground intelligence, procedural knowledge and close ties with Chinese government agencies, and a U.S. management team.
Legend Silicon, deeply involved in the development of digital TV standards in China, also looked like it was emerging at the right time in the right place, since China was getting ready for the Beijing Olympics in 2008. What better timing could anyone ask for showcasing digital TV technology?
In spring 2007, Intel Capital, the investment arm of chipmaker Intel Corp., led a series D private equity investment round worth up to $40 million in Legend Silicon.
Legend Silicon's booth at CCBN (China Content Broadcasting Network) exhibition in 2011.
Fast forward to the end of 2011, Legend Silicon decided to close its U.S. headquarters, with its U.S. management team laying off everyone in the U.S. including themselves. Legend Silicon’s Chinese subsidiary still exists to serve existing customers, but there appears to be no new product development going on. Legend Silicon’s website still exists both in English and Chinese, but the page that lists its management team is no longer available.
So where did Legend Silicon go wrong, and what lessons did Karamchedu learn from having been COO?
Lessons to be learned
Naturally, Karamchedu has analyzed the lessons he learned, reducing his insights to the comprehensive list of “disconnects” laid out in his book.
But during the interview, he highlighted the following five points--as something that either caught him by surprise, or what he saw his team struggling with at the U.S.-China chip company.
1. Never underestimate the political environment
To read the political environment correctly is a serious challenge--both in China and the United States. While many EE Times readers often advise us to keep politics out of stories, the consequences of not knowing how politics works in a certain region (or being clueless about who is favoring whom in that region due to which reasons) are dire.
At the time of Legend Silicon’s startup, the transition to DTV in China was moving more slowly than anyone had expected (despite the Olympics).
Moreover, who was going to pay the transition cost--necessary to make changes in China’s broadcasting infrastructure--remained in question. Chinese officials might unexpectedly ask for financial assistance, expect kickbacks or decide to do nothing. Simply put, there was no orderly transition process in place, and there was, hence, no conventional open market ready for chip vendors like Legend Silicon to jump in. Instead, the small new company found itself doing the heavy lifting needed for a nation’s DTV transition.
2. Novelty vs. innovation
Even in the Western technology field, what used to be considered “invention” is now reduced to “innovation,” which often amounts to the simple addition of new bells and whistles to systems. China is now taking that trend to another level. They love grabbing onto “novelty” (whether it is a new trend for 5-inch screen smartphones or quad-core apps processors) and developing those gimmicks quickly. They know how to add “innovation-cum-novelties” at low cost.
It’s almost as though the Chinese have learned how to “blast” gimmick innovations made by the West and they’re now beating the Western companies at their own game, explained Karamchedu.
3. Pricing
If your customer-base is truly global--including those in the U.S., Europe, Japan and China, pricing becomes one of the hardest issues with which your China-U.S. company must wrestle.
In theory, you can’t have two separate prices for the same chip, and yet, Chinese OEMs/ODMs are clearly in need of a different pricing model than what’s applied in the West. While it’s customary for a U.S. chip company to reduce the price for chips purchased in volume, the price often goes up in China if you buy in volume. Meanwhile, Chinese OEMs/ODMs almost expect to get their hands on a new chip at a very low cost--initially.
How you mediate that gap remains a huge challenge-- turning into a tug of war between a U.S. team who wants to decide price according to a set of familiar rules and a China team that sees a whole different demand from its local customers.
4. Knowing if your chip is actually getting designed in
This isn’t particularly specific to Chinese OEMs (I've heard similar stories about Korean giants like Samsung), but, generally speaking, you’re never sure if your chip (which you thought was a design win) is actually designed into a system by your customers. More often than not, you’re working for OEMs/ODMs along with a number of other competing teams from your rival chip companies. Despite a lot of handholding with your potential customer, you’re never sure your chip will eventually get designed into their systems. This practice--maybe necessary from an OEM viewpoint--could suck up a lot of your resources with no results after all.
5. Expect no feedback from your China customers/colleagues
One of the most frustrating things for anyone working for a U.S.-China company is that you rarely get any feedback from your China colleagues or customers. Often, Chinese customers just don’t know what they want. Perhaps more striking is that your customers or colleagues often share a fear of creating a new market. They’d rather go after a market that’s already proven or that’s getting visibly hot.
So, while they might quietly decide to hang their hat on novelty features to the next product cycle, they neglect to communicate their decisions or share their desires with you. You end up with an enigma designed into a conundrum.
Related stories:
China chips: Bomb, or just a lot of firecrackers?
Yoshida in China: Managing Sino-U.S. disconnects
Yoshida in China: Chip guy's quest for end of the rainbow
責編：Quentin
