日本政府不喜歡國內(nèi)企業(yè)擁有來自海外的所有權人或是資本投資，在過去幾個月來，這種偏惡以“國家利益”為幌子，變得越來越明顯。這種情況是令人擔憂的…
不久前筆者人在東京，當?shù)貍餮运侥脊蓹鄻I(yè)者KKR有意收購日本芯片廠商瑞薩電子(Renesas)；而KKR一開始的目標是日立(Hitachi)，該公司打算把日立分拆成數(shù)個規(guī)模較小、但有利潤的公司，并藉此獲得豐厚投資報酬。
然而，一位資深日本產(chǎn)業(yè)觀察家、技術顧問對此表示：“日立在日本是‘天皇級’公司，沒人敢碰；”所以KKR才把投資標的轉(zhuǎn)向了最近狀況不佳的瑞薩。不過 KKR收購瑞薩的低飛球策略也遭遇失敗，原因是日本政府很快地與10家本土企業(yè)(大多數(shù)是瑞薩的客戶)聯(lián)手籌措了一筆資金，出價2,000億日圓 (25.5億美元)收購瑞薩。
瑞薩這家日本微控制器大廠問題多多，其中關鍵之一就是其緩慢的決策程序，明顯得歸咎于該公司的管 理高層；這個問題又因為瑞薩的眾多股東包括日立、NEC與三菱電機(Mitsubishi Electric)而變本加厲，這些股東在過去兩年間都要在瑞薩的每個決策中保有發(fā)言權。
日本政府的援助計劃是為瑞薩安插更多大股東，例如該公司客戶之一、車廠豐田(Toyota)；但這恐怕只是讓瑞薩的問題雪上加霜。
更重要的一個問題是，是否應該讓瑞薩的客戶成為其大股東？包括豐田等車廠，都傾向于藉由與芯片廠商協(xié)商價格來宣示其影響力，這意味著至少有一家大客戶會與瑞薩需要將利潤瑞大化的目標產(chǎn)生直接沖突。
瑞薩只是日本偏惡海外資金的一個最新案例；今年稍早，另一家日本科技廠商Olympus也在尋求金援，根據(jù)來自金融圈的消息來源指出，在后來Sony決定對 其注資之前，原本有兩家外商有意投資，是三星(Samsung)與美商GE (General Electric)；這樣的投資合作案其實是有理的，因為這兩家外商都有Olympus所聚焦的醫(yī)療電子市場經(jīng)驗與地位。
但是，當上述投資案送到日本經(jīng)濟產(chǎn)業(yè)省(METI)，卻被官員們駁回；根據(jù)消息來源指出，有一位官員告訴投資銀行：“如果你們是來問有關于Olympus的海外所有權人問題，答案是“不行”，我們不想聽到有外商公司對Olympus感興趣?！?
于是，不同于三星與GE，在醫(yī)療設備領域并不擅長的Sony后來在9月宣布對Olympus注資500億日圓(6.42億美元)，也成為擁有該公司10%股權的最大股東。
有部分日本產(chǎn)業(yè)界人士認為，主導以上交易的經(jīng)濟產(chǎn)業(yè)省官員是為了拯救Sony；畢竟這家日本消費性電子大廠也正處于水深火熱中，很需要在其傳統(tǒng)電視機、攝影機業(yè)務之外加入新的營收來源。透過投資Olympus，Sony得以立即將其觸角伸進醫(yī)療內(nèi)視鏡(endoscope)領域。
日本政府干預的第三個案例，是先前在產(chǎn)業(yè)界沸沸揚揚的“鴻夏戀”；傳言經(jīng)濟產(chǎn)業(yè)省正打算以日本企業(yè)拯救瑞薩的模式，來挽救面板廠夏普(Sharp)，總之其目標就是要阻止臺灣廠商鴻?？刂葡钠盏墓蓹嗯c技術。目前還不清楚事件將會如何發(fā)展，但日本政府顯然正試圖避免臺灣EMS大廠并吞夏普。
為了保有人民的工作機會，并以經(jīng)濟安全為名義避免讓日本技術流往海外，這在1970與1980年代是值得贊賞的；但來到2012年，這幾乎等同于自我毀滅。
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許多海外觀察家都不解，為何日本認為自己有充裕的時間能解決那些日益嚴重的問題？更大的謎團是：為何日本人似乎認為，只要其本國廠商就可以解決那些經(jīng)濟與技術問題？其實，日本就像是擱淺在海上的船只，向鄰近海域的其它船艦發(fā)送求救信號一點也不丟臉──就算它們掛著外國的旗幟。
三大消費性電子廠各有各的問題
索尼(Sony)、松下(Panasonic)與夏普(Sharp)這三家日本消費性電子大廠在不久前公布慘淡的第二季財報后，紛紛提出振興策略；他們爭相想要回答的兩個問題是：最壞的情況已經(jīng)過去了嗎？以及什么將會是驅(qū)動他們未來成長的動力？
這些日本消費性電子廠商已經(jīng)明確表示，他們希望盡快擺脫虧損的電視機業(yè)務，同時將把市場焦點由消費性電子產(chǎn)品轉(zhuǎn)向“節(jié)能(eco)”、“智能(smart)”產(chǎn)品的開發(fā)，但相關細節(jié)仍然不完整，而且大部分缺乏說服力。
因此現(xiàn)在金融圈對這幾家日本電子廠商的計劃并不買帳，也認為他們的未來希望渺茫。
上述三家大廠都提出了自己的核心問題，每家的狀況都不一樣；其中松下的問題是其所謂“節(jié)能”產(chǎn)品的未來性，索尼則持續(xù)與其“重新聚焦(refocused)”的核心電子產(chǎn)品奮斗中。而夏普可能是其中最慘的，該公司與其最大客戶蘋果(Apple)之間的關系顯然出現(xiàn)裂痕──因為比承諾的時間晚太多提供iPad與iPhone所需的小型顯示器。
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一家金融分析機構標準普爾(Standards & Poors)將松下的長期債券評等降至倒數(shù)第二低的“BBB”(最低評等為A-)，主要是因為該公司面臨鉅額虧損，復蘇前景也進展緩慢。無疑地，日圓 的強勢已經(jīng)對日本企業(yè)造成傷害，但真正棘手的是沒有一家公司能提出具說服性的恢復獲利計劃。
松下的未來發(fā)展堪慮
松下日前宣布了新策略，內(nèi)容包括縮減日本制造產(chǎn)能、停止在海外市場銷售手機，以及限制太陽能光電板、可充電電池的投資。松下需要大刀闊斧的變革才能止血，在該公司定義為具成長性的三項業(yè)務：即太陽能、鋰離子電池與家電中，已經(jīng)又削減了兩項業(yè)務的投資。
根據(jù)其最新策略，松下將把日本國內(nèi)的可充電電池生產(chǎn)線減少一半，同時聚焦于非消費性應用領域；該公司也將縮減在馬來西亞的太陽能板制造廠投資。此外，松下將停止今年于歐洲市場推出智能型手機的計劃，其實該公司是在今年3月才重回歐洲市場。
不過，以“綠色創(chuàng)新企業(yè)(Green Innovation Company)”自居的松下可能會發(fā)現(xiàn)，在該公司大幅縮減其綠色產(chǎn)品與智能型手機業(yè)務的同時，要打造所謂的“節(jié)能與智能解決方案”會加倍困難，而這可能是其智能家電新產(chǎn)品是否能成長的關鍵。
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索尼電子產(chǎn)品業(yè)務持續(xù)萎縮
索尼預期在這一個財務年度擺脫赤字，但壞消息是，該集團旗下的電子產(chǎn)品業(yè)務恐怕難以達成恢復獲利的目標。根據(jù)索尼公布的4至9月半年度財報，整體凈損為 401億日圓，該數(shù)字在去年同期為424億日圓；虧損減少的主因是該公司出售了化學產(chǎn)品業(yè)務部門，使得營運利潤在第二季提升了約40%，但這還不足以抵銷增加的稅務負擔。
今年索尼因電視業(yè)務導致的虧損幅度縮小，是值得鼓勵的，其財報表現(xiàn)也優(yōu)于預期；但這家公司要脫離困境并不容 易。最大的問題在于，索尼無法證明該公司新執(zhí)行長Kazuo Hirai在今年稍早前列出的“重新聚焦”產(chǎn)品領域──即數(shù)字相機/影像產(chǎn)品、視頻游戲機與行動裝置──正在將該公司拉回成長的軌道。
相反的，索尼的游戲機與數(shù)字相機業(yè)務持續(xù)萎縮，該公司也坦承，其電子產(chǎn)品業(yè)務要在今年擺脫赤字“會很難”。
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另一家國際評等機構Fitch Ratings甚至在最近將夏普的評等降至“垃圾(junk)”，表示：“在短期與中期內(nèi)，我們并未看到該公司有任何具意義的核心業(yè)務營運改善?！?
夏普失信于蘋果？
夏普的未來命運顯然取決于其手機/平板裝置用中小型顯示器，而非大尺寸電視機；甚至有人推測，夏普的存亡關鍵在于能否順利量產(chǎn)供應蘋果 iPhone 與 iPad 的面板。而根據(jù)業(yè)界消息，夏普顯然是已經(jīng)搞砸了…
據(jù) 了解，蘋果是在2009年開始尋找新的面板供貨商，主要是因為原本的面板供應伙伴三星(Samsung)發(fā)表Galaxy系列智能手機產(chǎn)品，讓兩家公司之間的競爭關系惡化。蘋果在面板方面通常是采取多來源策略，少了三星這家主力，蘋果不得不積極尋求另一家領導級供貨商，而夏普的IGZO與in-cell觸控面板技術，獲得了蘋果的青睞。
在2010年12月，蘋果決定協(xié)助夏普擴展智能手機與平板電腦面板產(chǎn)能，投資了 1,000億日圓讓夏普得以改裝位于日本Kameyama的旗艦面板廠；該據(jù)點本來是生產(chǎn)大尺寸電視面板。但根據(jù)日經(jīng)新聞(Nikkei)報導，盡管有蘋果出手相助，夏普還是無法以蘋果要求的成本為后者生產(chǎn)足夠的面板。
蘋果在3月份發(fā)表的New iPad確實采用了夏普的IGZO面板技術，但報導指出，夏普的新面板交貨時間比原先預定遲了近半年。此外，要供應iPhone 5的in-cell觸控面板，是在蘋果于9月12日宣布推出新一代iPhone計劃的同一天，才開始于夏普Kameyama廠量產(chǎn)，延遲交貨情況糟得可 以；在關鍵產(chǎn)品上失信于如此重要的客戶，夏普幾乎可說是自毀前程。
此外，夏普一直想成為太陽能領導廠商，隨著該公司結束在美國、歐洲的太陽光電模塊生產(chǎn)，將產(chǎn)能集中于日本，這個希望也宣告破滅；在9月底，夏普為了取得銀行貸款而公布的振興計劃中，也包括了太陽能業(yè)務的緊縮策略。
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參考英文原文： Yoshida in Japan: Tokyo scuttling tech bailouts；Japanese CE giants losing credibility war，by Junko Yoshida
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Yoshida in Japan: Tokyo scuttling tech bailouts
Junko Yoshida
NEW YORK – Japan's bureaucracy doesn't like foreign ownership or capital investment in domestic corporations. In the last few months, this aversion has grown more pronounced under the guise of national interest.
That’s troubling.
The word in Tokyo while I was there last week was that the private equity firm KKR, which appeared to be targeting Japanese chip maker Renesas, initially had its eye on Hitachi. KKR wanted to break up Hitachi and spin out several smaller but profitable companies, which it hoped to "harvest" for big returns.
However, as a veteran Japan observer and technology consultant put it recently, “Hitachi is like the Emperor in Japan.” No one dares to touch Hitachi. So, KKR switched its focus to struggling Renesas as its investment target.
But KKR’s low-ball effort to acquire Renesas also fell through. The reason is Japanese bureaucrats quickly put together a government fund along with partnerships with about 10 companies – mostly the company's own customers – in a bid to buy Renesas for 200 billion yen ($2.55 billion).
While Japan’s MCU giant has many problems, a key issue was the slow decision-making process at Renesas. Blame squarely rest with Renesas management. The problem was exacerbated by shareholders like Hitachi, NEC and Mitsubishi Electric, who demanded a say in nearly every Renesas decision over the past two years.
The government's bailout plan calls for piling on more “major” shareholders like Toyota, a customer, potentially hanging an even bigger albatross around Renesas’ neck.
More important is the question of whether its customers should also be among it largest shareholders. Automotive customers like Toyota tend to throw their weight around in negotiating prices with chip companies. That throws at least one big customer into direct conflict with Renesas’ need to maximize its margins.
Renesas is merely the latest example of Japan’s aversion to foreign investment. When Olympus was looking for help earlier this year, two foreign companies, not Sony, sought to invest, according to a source in the financial community. Two potential saviors were Samsung and General Electric. Such an investment by Samsung or GE actually makes sense since each company has experience and a significant presence in the medical electronics market.
Save Sony
But when investment bankers broached the subject at Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), officials there rejected the deal. Said one bureaucrat, according to an investment banker, “If you came here to ask us about foreign ownership of Olympus, the answer is 'NO.' We don’t even want to know the name of the foreign companies interested in Olympus.”
Rather than Samsung or GE, Sony -- with little medical equipment expertise -- agreed in September to pump 50 billion yen ($642 million) into cash-strapped Olympus, making Sony the largest shareholder with around a 10 percent stake.
Some Japanese industry sources believe METI bureaucrats engineered the deal to save Sony. After all, the Japanese consumer electronics giant is in dire straits. It needs new businesses well beyond its traditional TV and video camera products. By investing in Olympus, Sony gets instant access to its strong technology and market share in the endoscope business.
A third example of bureaucratic meddling: Speculation abounds in Japan concerning the future of the Hon Hai-Sharp relationship. Rumor has it that METI is looking for a way to rescue Sharp as Japan Inc. bailed out Renesas. The goal is to deny Taiwan’s Hon Hai (better known in the west as Foxconn) a controlling share in Sharp and it's technology. It’s uncertain how Japan Inc.’s response to the existing Hon Hai-Sharp deal will unfold. There appears to be an effort afoot among Japanese officials to prevent the Taiwanese EMS behemoth from devouring Sharp.
Trying to save people’s jobs and keep Japan’s indigenous technologies from moving offshore in the name of economic security may have been admirable in the 1970’s and 1980’s. In 2012, it looks almost suicidal.
Many foreign observers are mystified about why Japan seems to think it has plenty of time to fix its deepening problems. An even bigger mystery is: Why do the Japanese seem to believe that only domestic players can solve its economic and technology problems?
The Japanese ship of state is taking on water. There is no shame in sending an SOS to every ship within range, even if they’re flying foreign flags.
Japanese CE giants losing credibility war
Junko Yoshida
· As Japan's consumer electronics companies shift from consumer to industrial markets along with "eco" and "smart" products, details are scarce.
NEW YORK -- Sony, Panasonic and Sharp this week outlined their turnaround strategies after posting bleak second quarter financial results with big write-offs. The embattled Japanese companies, however, are scrambling to respond to two simple questions:
1. Is the worst over?
2. What, if anything, will drive their future growth?
The Japanese consumer electronics companies have already made it clear they hope to get out of the money-losing TV business as soon as possible. While they shift their focus from consumer to industrial markets and pitch themselves as developers of “eco” and “smart” products, details remain sketchy and largely unconvincing.
For now, the financial community is not buying their argument and sees little hope in the Japanese electronics companies’ future.
Fitch Ratings, a global ratings agency, downgraded Sharp’s credit to junk on Friday (Nov. 2). “Fitch does not foresee any meaningful operational turnaround in the company’s core business over the short- to medium-term," the company said in a statement.
Similarly, Standards & Poors downgraded Panasonic’s long-term debt to BBB, the second-lowest investment grade, from A-. The ratings company cited “huge” losses and a slow recovery outlook.
Undoubtedly, the strong yen has been hurting Japanese companies. But the real dilemma is that none has been able to tell a convincing story about how they plan to return to profitability.
The trio share some core problems, but each has a different story. With Panasonic, the issue is the future of their so-called “eco” products. Sony continues to struggle with its “refocused” core electronics products. But Sharp may have it worst of all. The company appears to have already damaged a relationship with its biggest customer – Apple, delivering small displays for iPads and iPhones much later than promised.
Panasonic's future
Panasonic this week announced a new strategy that includes scaling back manufacturing in Japan, ending overseas sales of mobile phones and curbing investment in solar panels and rechargeable batteries.
Drastic changes are needed to stop the bleeding. Of three segments Panasonic has identified as growing businesses – namely solar, lithium-ion batteries and appliances, it is already making further cuts in two of them.
Under the new plan, Panasonic will cut domestic production lines for rechargeable battery cells by half, while focusing on non-consumer applications. It will also curtail investments in a solar panel production factory in Malaysia.
Meanwhile, it will halt sales of smartphones in Europe this year, even though it only reentered the European market in March.
So, Panasonic, which calls itself a “Green Innovation Company,” is finding it much harder to create so-called “Eco & Smart Solutions” as it trims most of its “green” products and smartphones, which could hold a fundamental key to the growth of new smart appliances.
Sony electronics shrinking
The good news is that Sony expects to be in the black for its current fiscal year. The bad news is that it probably won’t be able to achieve its goal of returning its electronics business to profitability.
Sony posted a consolidated net loss of 40.1 billion yen for the April-September half, compared to a 42.4 billion yen loss during the same period a year ago. Helped by selling off its chemical products business, the company’s operating profit jumped about 40 percent in the second quarter, but this wasn’t enough to offset increased tax burdens.
It’s encouraging to see the company’s losses from its TV operations are shrinking this year, and Sony’s financial services are generating a better-than-expected profits.
But the company is hardly out of the woods.
The biggest problem is that Sony has shown no evidence that newly “refocused areas” -- digital cameras and imaging technology, video games and mobile devices – outlined earlier this year by Sony’s new chief Kazuo Hirai are putting the company back onto a growth trajectory.
By contrast, sales of game consoles and digital cameras continue to shrink. "A return to the black [in the electronics business] will be difficult" in the current year, Sony acknowledged.
Sharp losing Apple's trust?
It’s clear that Sharp’s future hinges on its success on small- to medium-size screens for mobile phones and tablets, not large-screen TVs. It’s been speculated that Sharp’s survival depends on its ability to ramp up production of panels for Apple’s iPhones and iPad. The company may have already screwed that up, according to a story that appeared in Nikkei, Japan’s economic journal.
Apple reportedly started looking for a new panel supplier in 2009. Apple’s search was triggered by Samsung’s launch of its Galaxy line of smartphones, which soured Apple’s relationship with its Korean rival.
Apple has always had a multiple-sourcing strategy for displays. But without Samsung as its key display supplier, Apple was eager to find another leading LCD vendor.
Apple liked what it saw in Sharp's panel technologies, including its IGZO (indium-gallium-zinc oxide) and in-cell technologies, which integrate touch sensors directly into LCD panels.
In December 2010, Apple decided to go so far as to help Sharp expand its capacity to manufacture panels for smartphones and tablets by providing Sharp with 100 billion yen it needed to remodel its flagship panel factory in Kameyama. The fab was originally built to produce large-screen TV displays.
Despite Apple’s support, Sharp, was unable to manufacture enough panels at the cost Apple demanded, according to the Nikkei report.
Apple did adopt Sharp's IGZO panel technology for the new iPad unveiled in March, but Sharp reportedly missed the delivery date of new panels by nearly half a year..
Further, mass production of in-cell panels for Apple's iPhone 5 only started at Sharp's Kameyama plant on the same day that Apple announced plans to release a new iPhone on Sept. 12. Missing the delivery date is bad enough. But to do so with the critical products Sharp is betting its future on -- for its most important customer – borders on suicidal.
Sharp harbored hopes of becoming a leader in solar energy technology. But that plan also went out the window when Sharp ended production of photovoltaic modules in the U.S. and Europe to concentrate production in Japan. This retrenchment was a part of a turnaround plan the company had to submit to secure bank loans late September.
責編：Quentin
