最近在美國(guó)產(chǎn)業(yè)界有個(gè)很流行的理論，認(rèn)為在中國(guó)正興旺的制造產(chǎn)業(yè)很快就會(huì)經(jīng)歷“撞墻期”，就像是以出口導(dǎo)向的日本在1990年初所遭遇的；支持該理論的人指出，中國(guó)的技術(shù)創(chuàng)新步伐跟不上其經(jīng)濟(jì)成長(zhǎng)的速度。 但這樣的理論不僅可能內(nèi)容有誤，還有可能威脅到美國(guó)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力；其中一個(gè)原因在于，該理論支持者基本上是認(rèn)為美國(guó)政府決策者不需要有所作為，美國(guó)只要在等待中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)勢(shì)力逐漸減弱的同時(shí)，持續(xù)在創(chuàng)新方面維持領(lǐng)先即可。問(wèn)題是，美國(guó)的技術(shù)創(chuàng)新能力與大量推廣并制造具附加價(jià)值產(chǎn)品/服務(wù)的能力之間，出現(xiàn)越來(lái)越大的隔閡；至少得先弭平這樣的隔閡。 此外，以上“中國(guó)撞墻理論”的部分支持者，其實(shí)也是將美國(guó)制造業(yè)工作機(jī)會(huì)推向中國(guó)的始作俑者；這種毀滅性趨勢(shì)掏空了美國(guó)工業(yè)的根基。那些理論支持者也指出，中國(guó)過(guò)熱的房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)以及中國(guó)GDP成長(zhǎng)率趨緩，是該國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)勢(shì)力將減弱的其它跡象。 中國(guó)的國(guó)營(yíng)企業(yè)確實(shí)拖累其經(jīng)濟(jì)成長(zhǎng)，其中央政府也有一些讓觀察家“難以置信”的弊?。坏灿袑＜抑赋?，相較于中國(guó)中央政府控制型經(jīng)濟(jì)政策的遲滯，其省、市政府為了維持區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)運(yùn)作而投入大量資源，反而有更靈活的表現(xiàn)。 無(wú)論如何，就像喬治亞理工學(xué)院國(guó)際關(guān)系中心(Nunn School of International Affairs)的中國(guó)專家Dan Breznitz在最近一場(chǎng)美中經(jīng)濟(jì)與安全審查委員會(huì)(U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission)的聽(tīng)證會(huì)上所言：“我們不能坐等中國(guó)失敗?！?美國(guó)信息科技與創(chuàng)新基金會(huì)(Information Technology and Innovation Foundation)主席Robert Atkinson也在上述聽(tīng)證會(huì)上指出，對(duì)中國(guó)創(chuàng)新能力不屑一顧的態(tài)度，都是由那些所謂的“華府菁英(Washington elites.)”所挑起：“他們之中有太多人抱持根深蒂固的想法──“我們一點(diǎn)都不需要擔(dān)心，因?yàn)橹袊?guó)不會(huì)創(chuàng)新”?！?“中國(guó)若進(jìn)化到日本的層級(jí)，就會(huì)遭遇撞墻期；但那還有好長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間?！盇tkinson預(yù)測(cè)，中國(guó)在遭遇經(jīng)濟(jì)成長(zhǎng)瓶頸之前，還有40到50年。而 Breznitz則強(qiáng)調(diào)，中國(guó)不是日本；他指出，中國(guó)的省、市地方政府有清楚的目標(biāo)與充裕資金，也立志要讓中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力超越美國(guó)：“市我們?cè)撚X(jué)醒并正視這個(gè)對(duì)手的時(shí)候了，因?yàn)樗麄円呀?jīng)在眼前?！?也許人們可以爭(zhēng)辯，目前中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人所采取的策略方向是缺乏永續(xù)性思考的；北京城嚴(yán)重的空氣污染是一個(gè)例證。此外還有中國(guó)日益上揚(yáng)的勞動(dòng)成本，也讓部分西方企業(yè)打算將制造據(jù)點(diǎn)移出中國(guó)；但考量到與中國(guó)官方補(bǔ)貼與激勵(lì)措施相關(guān)的罰則，這些企業(yè)想要另覓他地建立制造據(jù)點(diǎn)，恐怕不是那么容易。 與其坐等中國(guó)撞上那道理論性的高墻，美國(guó)產(chǎn)業(yè)界應(yīng)該要重新建立自有制造產(chǎn)能。Atkinson所領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的基金會(huì)預(yù)定在6月份發(fā)表一份報(bào)告，計(jì)劃以德國(guó)的制造工程師訓(xùn)練方法為藍(lán)本，在美國(guó)設(shè)立15座“制造技術(shù)大學(xué)(manufacturing universities)”，期望藉此重振美國(guó)制造產(chǎn)業(yè)，弭平創(chuàng)新實(shí)驗(yàn)室與新產(chǎn)品/服務(wù)研發(fā)推廣之間的隔閡，也為美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)帶來(lái)新動(dòng)力。 編譯：Judith Cheng 本文授權(quán)編譯自EE Times，版權(quán)所有，謝絕轉(zhuǎn)載 參考英文原文： Will China hit a (great) wall? Don’t bet on it，by George Leopold

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{pagination} Will China hit a (great) wall? Don’t bet on it George Leopold WASHINGTON – There’s a fashionable theory making the rounds here that China’s booming manufacturing economy will soon “hit a wall” just as did the export-driven Japanese economy in the early 1990s. Relax, the hit-the-wall crowd urges, the Chinese can’t innovate much less maintain their current pace of economic growth. Not only is this view misguided, it threatens U.S. global competitiveness. One reason is that those who espouse this position are essentially arguing that policy makers do nothing but wait for China’s economy to cool off and fade while we continue to out-innovate them. Problem is, there’s a growing gap in the U.S. between technology innovation and the ability to scale up and produce new value-added products and services. At the very least, we need to close that gap. Moreover, some proponents of the hit-the-wall theory are the same Beltway insiders who enriched themselves by helping to ship U.S. manufacturing jobs to China, a ruinous trend that has effectively hollowed out the U.S. industrial base. Naysayers also point to China’s overheating real estate market as another sign of an impending slowdown, along with a declining rate of growth for China’s GDP. It’s also true that China’s state-run enterprises are a drag on economic growth, and the failings of the central government are, as one observer says, “unbelievable.” But China watchers note that the stasis created by China’s command economy is slowly being challenged by more nimble provincial and municipal governments. Regional and local officials “are doing everything in their power to make the system work, sometimes against the wishes of the central government,” Dan Breznitz, a China expert at Georgia Tech’s Nunn School of International Affairs, told a recent hearing before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. “We should not rely on China failing.” Robert Atkinson, president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, argues that the dismissive attitude toward China’s innovation drive is predominantly held by “Washington elites.” “There are way too many who have this deeply held view that we just don’t have to worry” because the China can’t innovate,” he told the U.S.-China commission. China “will hit the wall when they get to the stage of Japan, which is a long time from now,” Atkinson predicts. “The Chinese can go 40 or 50 years before they get to that wall.” Breznitz stresses that China is not Japan. Municipal and provincial officials, he argues, have a clear set of goals, the money and the will to transform China’s economy in hopes of surpassing ours. “It is time that we wake up and smell the jasmine or ginger [tea] because it’s coming,” Breznitz warns. One could argue that China’s current leaders are taking the nation in a direction that is unsustainable. Beijing’s air pollution is but one example. Another is rising labor costs in China, a trend that has some Western companies looking for ways to pull their manufacturing operations out of China. But penalties related to government economic and other incentives will make these manufacturing “re-shoring” efforts difficult. Rather than wait for China to hit a theoretical wall, the U.S. must rebuild its manufacturing capacity from the ground up. Atkinson’s foundation is preparing a report to be released in June that will propose the creation of 15 “manufacturing universities” that will be modeled on Germany’s approach to training manufacturing engineers. Such an initiative would augment other efforts to revive U.S. manufacturing so that we can begin the close the gap between laboratory innovation and the introduction of new products and services that can help create a new engine of U.S. economic growth.