《日本經(jīng)濟(jì)新聞(Nikkei)》日前報導(dǎo)，日本三大電子廠瑞薩(Renesas)、富士通(Fujitsu)與松下(Panasoinic)有意合并彼此的系統(tǒng)芯片(SoC)設(shè)計/研發(fā)業(yè)務(wù)，成立一家新公司；此外該報導(dǎo)并指出，這三家公司也有意將芯片制造部門獨立，成立一家專職生產(chǎn)的新機(jī)構(gòu)。 據(jù)了解，若三大日本電子廠真的成立合資公司，將可獲得來自日本官方支持的“日本創(chuàng)新網(wǎng)絡(luò)(Innovation Network Corp. of Japan，INCJ)”機(jī)構(gòu)之大筆資金；而傳言也指出， Globalfoundries 也有意加入合資的行列。日經(jīng)新聞的報導(dǎo)充其量只能說是概略性的，因為尚未有任何一家日本公司開始著手針對此計劃進(jìn)行會談。 而 這樣一個復(fù)雜的合并/合資公司計劃，充斥著日本政府經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)業(yè)省(Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry，MEITI)的官僚氣息；實際上，這類產(chǎn)業(yè)政策是起不了多大作用的，它也許能讓那三家虛弱的電子廠商(主要是富士通與松下)因政府施援手而多活幾年，但此舉卻可能威脅其中最有潛力的贏家(瑞薩)，在已經(jīng)非常競爭的移動SoC市場上無法立足。 讓我們來破解這個研擬中的計劃吧！首先，日本半導(dǎo)體業(yè)者已經(jīng)歷過一系列的整并，包括瑞薩在2009年陸續(xù)合并了三菱(Mitsubishi)與NEC的芯片業(yè)務(wù)。甚至到現(xiàn)在，瑞薩仍在整理透過多起收購案得來的所有業(yè)務(wù)；該公司并在 2010年做了一個策略性決定，將瑞薩移動(Renesas Mobile)獨立為百分之百持股的子公司，聚焦手機(jī)應(yīng)用的SoC。 瑞薩移動的目標(biāo)是在手機(jī)市場上成為“高通(Qualcomm)之外的選擇”，而我懷疑，富士通半導(dǎo)體以ASIC為核心的業(yè)務(wù)型態(tài)，以及松下主要專注在大規(guī)模集成電路(LSI)研發(fā)的現(xiàn)況，是否有助于瑞薩移動達(dá)成目標(biāo)？我認(rèn)為，幫助不大。 在此同時，對松下來說，預(yù)兆早已浮現(xiàn)了好一段時間；這家日本消費性電子大廠也許在十年前曾風(fēng)光一時，并擁有自家開發(fā)的、為該公司一系列數(shù)字消費性電子裝置量 身打造的Uniphier LSI芯片。這個構(gòu)想在那個時候是不錯，松下也頗有雄心要將其芯片推銷給其它客戶，但隨著臺灣芯片設(shè)計業(yè)者如晨星(MStar)、聯(lián)發(fā)科 (MediaTek)在近幾年崛起，該計劃逐漸失色。 松下在去年秋天宣布縮減半導(dǎo)體業(yè)務(wù)，將裁減約1,000名相關(guān)人力，并將芯片生產(chǎn)業(yè)務(wù)外包；據(jù)估計，松下芯片產(chǎn)能提供集團(tuán)內(nèi)用的比例在五成左右，但在該公司停止生產(chǎn)電視機(jī)之后可能進(jìn)一步減少。對于正試圖重整半導(dǎo)體業(yè)務(wù)的松下 來說，若能與瑞薩還有富士通合并，無疑是天上掉下來的禮物，該公司突然就有個地方能夠把晶圓廠還有相關(guān)人員塞過去。 至于富士通半導(dǎo)體的困境，是在于缺乏平臺；富士通仍主要是一家ASIC供貨商，該公司可能在為國內(nèi)系統(tǒng)商客戶打造出色ASIC方面表現(xiàn)杰出，但一直無法轉(zhuǎn)型 為ASSP供貨商。富士通半導(dǎo)體能為假想中的三方合資公司提供之優(yōu)勢一樣不明，也許是如NTT Docomo等的更多日本客戶，但可確定的是不會有太多海外客戶。 而更詭異的提案是將上述三家日本廠商的芯片制造業(yè)務(wù)合并──要如何讓被那三家公司放棄的晶圓廠成為可行的芯片制造合資公司？此外，精確地說，Globalfoundries將在其中扮演什么角色？ 總的看來，這個創(chuàng)建兩家合資公司(一家負(fù)責(zé)芯片設(shè)計，一家專職芯片制造)的計謀，可能只是讓三家電子廠方便拋棄掉不想要的東西，而且不會被日本社會冠上“裁員惡棍”的污名 (在日本，裁員與關(guān)閉工廠會是特別大的事件)。 但缺乏領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者以及優(yōu)柔寡斷(總是不可避免地拖延一年又一年)的民族性，已經(jīng)讓日本電子產(chǎn)業(yè)損失甚鉅；這個曾經(jīng)在日本島上最活躍的產(chǎn)業(yè)，現(xiàn)在像無頭蒼蠅一樣不知何去何從，對未來很茫然。日本有句俗諺說“只要團(tuán)結(jié)一致，就無可畏懼”；但現(xiàn)在看來，這群人很害怕，沒人想率先跨出第一步。 編譯：Judith Cheng 本文授權(quán)編譯自EE Times，版權(quán)所有，謝絕轉(zhuǎn)載 參考英文原文： Commentary: Japan Inc. faces choppy seas，by Junko Yoshida

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{pagination} Commentary: Japan Inc. faces choppy seas Junko Yoshida Nikkei, Japan’s economic journal, reported Wednesday (Feb. 8th) the potential merger of the SoC design/development divisions of Japan’s big three electronics companies – Renesas, Fujitsu and Panasonic – into one new company. Separately, according to Nikkei, the three companies will spin off their chip manufacturing divisions and create a new entity focused on production. That joint venture will reportedly receive a huge capital infusion from a Japanese government-backed investment fund called Innovation Network Corp. of Japan (INCJ), and Global Foundries is reportedly expected to become a part of that joint venture. The Nikkei report is sketchy at best since none of the Japanese companies supposedly involved in the deal is talking. The blueprint for such a complex merger/joint venture plan has fingerprints of Japan’s bureaucrats at Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (MEITI) all over it. Practically speaking, such business engineering makes little sense. The plan may salvage the weaker players of the three (read: Fujitsu and Panasonic) to survive for several more years through government handouts. But the move threatens the potential winner of the three (Renesas Mobile) with a reduction to irrelevancy in the already very competitive mobile SoC market. Let’s break down the proposed deal. First, Japan’s semiconductor companies have already undergone a series of consolidations. Renesas merged with the chip division of Mitsubishi, then with NEC’s chip division in 2009. Even now, Renesas is still sorting out all the assets it acquired through its various transactions. But Renesas made a strategic decision in 2010 to spin off Renesas Mobile, as a 100 percent subsidiary, solely focused on SoCs for the mobile business. In particular, for Renesas Mobile, which is looking to become “the Qualcomm alternative" in the mobile world, I doubt the infusion of Fujitsu Semiconductor’s mostly ASIC-centric business and Panasonic’s mostly inward-looking captive LSI development business could help advance its cause. Not much, in my opinion. Meanwhile, for Panasonic, the handwriting has been on the wall for awhile. The Japanese consumer electronics giant may have had its moment a decade ago, as it developed its home-grown Uniphier LSI chips, originally designed as an engine for a host of the company’s own digital consumer electronics products. A good idea at the time, and the company indeed harbored ambitions of extending its chip business to external customers. But that plan has steadily faded as SoC power houses in Taiwan like MStar; and MediaTek have emerged in the last several years. Late last fall, Panasonic announced its plan to shrink its semiconductor business by shedding about 1,000 employees and outsourcing chip production. Panasonic's internal IC consumption, which accounts for 50 percent of its total output, is expected to fall further as the company cuts back TV production. For Panasonic, which has been exploring ways to restructure its semiconductor business, the proposed merger plan with Renesas and Fujitsu must be a God’s send. Suddenly, it has a place to unload its fabs and engineers. What’s ailing Fujitsu Semiconductor is the lack of a platform. Fujitsu remains primarily an ASIC company. It may excel in crafting great ASICs for domestic system buyers, but it has never been able to transform its business into an ASSP supplier. Again, the assets Fujitsu Semiconductor could bring to the three-way Japan Inc. chip joint venture remains unclear. Perhaps, more Japanese customers, like NTT Docomo. But surely not many global customers. Even more mysterious is the proposed scenario of merging all three companies’ chip manufacturing units. How could the combined fabs dumped by the three companies become a viable chip production venture? And, precisely, what role will Globalfoundries play? This whole maneuver of creating two separate JVs (one for chip design and another for chip manufacturing) could be simply a convenient way for the three companies to unload a lot of assets they no longer want – without being painted as “job-killing” villains in the Japanese society. (Layoffs and fab closures are particularly problematic in Japan) But a lack of leadership, or an endemic case of indecisiveness (postponing the inevitable year after year), is costing the Japanese electronics industry dearly. Once the highest flying industry in the Land of Rising Sun, the electronics sector is now blindly huddling together — like orphans in a boxcar — with little idea of its future. There is a Japanese saying: “If we cross the street (river, or whatever) together, there will be nothing to fear.” But right now, the view from the boxcar is pretty fearful, and nobody wants to cross the tracks.